

GCRO RESEARCH REPORT
NO. 10



SOCIAL COHESION IN GAUTENG

FEBRUARY 2019

Edited by

Richard Ballard

Contributions by

Richard Ballard, Christian Hamann,
Kate Joseph and Thembanani Mkhize

A PARTNERSHIP OF



SOCIAL COHESION IN GAUTENG

February 2019

ISBN: 978-0-6399873-0-9

e-ISBN: 978-0-6399114-6-5

Editor: Richard Ballard

Design: Breinstorm Brand Architects

Cover image: Danielle Wepener

Peer reviewer: Kira Erwin

Copyright 2019 © Gauteng City-Region Observatory

Published by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory

(GCRO), a partnership of the University of Johannesburg, the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, the Gauteng Provincial Government and organised local government in Gauteng (SALGA).

Social cohesion in Gauteng

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The authors thank the City of Johannesburg for contributing to this report. Furthermore, the report has benefitted enormously from a close read by independent peer reviewer Kira Erwin, and from copy-editing by Hazel Cuthbertson. Finally, this research drew on the time and input of respondents who agreed to be interviewed, and from the ideas shared at forums attended by the researchers, such as the Gauteng Champions for Social Cohesion.



Photograph by Christina Culwick

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	010
1. SOCIAL COHESION IN SOUTH AFRICA	018
<i>Richard Ballard</i>	
1.1) The transition in South Africa	019
1.2) The limits of nation building, reconciliation and economic transformation.....	020
1.3) Paradoxes of social cohesion.....	020
1.4) Wicked problems and vicious cycles	021
1.5) Interventions to remedy the situation	023
1.6) The structure of this report	024
2. SOCIAL COHESION: ORIGINS, DEFINITIONS, AND DIMENSIONS.....	028
<i>Themban Mkhize</i>	
2.1) Social cohesion as a ‘problem’ to be governed: A history of thinking	028
2.2) Descriptions, definitions and dimensions	032
2.3) Dimensions of social cohesion	035
2.3.1) Common values and a civic culture	035
2.3.2) Social order and social control	037
2.3.3) Social solidarity and reduced inequality.....	038
2.3.4) Social networks and social capital	039
2.3.5) Territorial belonging and identity	040
2.4) Conclusion	041
3. SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN GAUTENG	044
<i>Christian Hamann</i>	
3.1) Introduction.....	045
3.2) Desegregation in Gauteng.....	046



3.3) Identity, place attachment, shared beliefs and participation	051
3.3.1) Identity	051
3.3.2) Place attachment.....	052
3.3.3) Shared beliefs and participation	054
3.4) Trust.....	057
3.4.1) Assessing trust within communities	057
3.4.2) Perceived trust between blacks and the whites.....	061
3.5) Race and belonging	067
3.5.1) South Africa belongs more to black people than other population groups	067
3.5.2) A place for white people in South Africa	072
3.5.3) Indians' entitlement to affirmative action benefits	078
3.5.4) Contribution by the coloured population	084
3.6) Attitudes towards migrants and migration	089
3.6.1) Should foreigners be allowed to stay?	090
3.6.2) Violence against foreigners.....	095
3.6.3) Influx control.....	098
3.7) Attitudes towards gay and lesbian people.....	103
3.7.1) Equal rights for gay and lesbian people	103
3.7.2) Violence against gay and lesbian people.....	109
3.8) Policy implications.....	114

4. ANALYSING PAST AND CURRENT INITIATIVES: DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF INTERVENTION..... 120

Kate Joseph

4.1) Introduction.....	121
4.2) Methodology and initiative mapping	122
4.2.1) Two decades of interventions.....	128
4.3) How initiatives conceive of the problem they are confronting and the objective of their initiative	129
4.3.1) Addressing systemic exclusion, material deprivation and inequality	129



Photograph by Darya Maslova

4.3.2) Alleviating distress and trauma.....	131
4.3.3) Violence prevention.....	131
4.3.4) Prejudice reduction.....	132
4.3.5) Government and governance.....	132
4.4) Scope, scale and reach of initiatives.....	133
4.4.1) Understandings of participation.....	134
4.4.2) Location of initiatives.....	140
4.5) Conclusion.....	144

5. LEARNING FROM PAST AND CURRENT INITIATIVES: METHODOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING SOCIAL COHESION 148

Kate Joseph

5.1) Politicking.....	150
5.1.1) Canvassing.....	150
5.1.2) Setting an example: public appeal; appeal to authority; appeal to personality.....	150
5.1.3) Media campaigns.....	151
5.1.4) Civic education.....	152
5.1.5) Legislative action.....	152
5.2) Mutual identification and recognition.....	153
5.2.1) Mixing, contact and exposure.....	153
5.2.2) Dialogue.....	154
5.2.3) National symbols.....	156
5.2.4) Sport and cultural events.....	157
5.2.5) Religion.....	159
5.3) Individual and community psychology.....	160
5.3.1) Psychosocial support and trauma counselling.....	160
5.3.2) Liberation social psychology.....	161
5.3.3) Therapeutic activities.....	161
5.3.4) Tackling subsidiary problems facing communities.....	162



5.4) Arts-based practises.....	162
5.4.1) Theater	163
5.4.2) Art in public space.....	163
5.4.3) Autobiographical art.....	164
5.5) Infrastructure-focused programmes.....	164
5.5.1) Infrastructure.....	164
5.5.2) Urban planning.....	165
5.5.3) Upgrading spaces and skills development.....	166
5.6) Conclusion	167
APPENDIX	168
REFERENCES	182


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	African Centre for Cities
ACMS	Centre for Migration and Society
ADF	African Diaspora Forum
AKF	Ahmed Kathrada Foundation
ANC	African National Congress
ARNSA	Anti-Racism Network of South Africa
ATU	Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa
CBO	Community based organisations
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CDL	Critical Diversity Literacy
COJ	City of Johannesburg
CPF	Community Policing Forum
CSVV	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DAC	Department of Arts and Culture
DE	Department of Education
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DSD	Department of Social Development
ECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
EU	European Union
FHR	Foundation for Human Rights
GALA	Gay and Lesbian Archive of South Africa
GCRO	Gauteng City-Region Observatory
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPG	Gauteng Provincial Government
HSF	Helen Suzman Foundation

Photograph by Neo Matloga



HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
LGBTQI	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer and intersexed
MOOV	Massive Open Online Varsity
MOVE	Method : Visual : Explore
NGO	Non-government organisation
NICDAM	National Institute Community Development and Management
NICSA	National Interfaith Council of South Africa
NMF	Nelson Mandela Foundation
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP	People's Action Party
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
QOL	Quality of Life Survey
RDP	Redistribution and Development Programme
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SAHRC	South Africa Human Rights Commission
SDGS	Sustainable Development Goals
SETA	Skills Education Training Authority
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TBU	Targeted Beneficiaries Unit
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TSM	Therapeutic Spiral Model
UF	United Front
WICDS	Wits Institute for Critical Diversity Studies





Photograph by Chrystal van Niekerk



Executive summary

In order to assist local government to develop research and informed policy, the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) conducted a six-month-long research project centred on better understanding the current dynamics of social cohesion within Gauteng. This resulting research report tackles five guiding questions, each of which corresponds to a chapter:

1. How has social cohesion become a goal in post-apartheid South Africa, and what are the key limitations resulting from this understanding of social progress?
2. In a global context, how is social cohesion defined and what are the main contestations about this ideal of social change?
3. How do the respondents of the 2015/16 GCRO Quality of Life (QoL) survey respond to questions on levels of trust, claims to belonging by different race groups, and the place of migrants and gays and lesbians in Gauteng?
4. How have past and present initiatives to improve social cohesion conceived of the problem they are attempting to address, and what is their scale of intervention?
5. What are the various methodologies that have been used in past and present initiatives to improve social cohesion?

1. Introduction: Social cohesion in South Africa

CHAPTER 1 addresses the way in which social cohesion has become an ideal of social change in post-apartheid South Africa. Social cohesion borrows extensively from other ideals of social change such as nation-building, reconciliation and transformation. Unlike nation-building, social cohesion has the potential to offer a de-territorialised basis for social harmony, and it can therefore accommodate cross border migrants. The major limitation of the concept of social cohesion is that it brings together a series of distinct problems to fix – violence, prejudice, gatekeeping, systemic exclusion and exploitation. In seeking a society free of these problems, social cohesion cannot, in and of itself, easily offer solutions to these problems. For example, more social

cohesion is not necessarily going to prevent violence. Paradoxically, it can sometimes be the root of violence.

To prevent social cohesion becoming no more than a kind of wishful thinking, it is necessary to appreciate the complex aspects of the many problems we seek to transcend, and to think in precise terms about how we might address their causes. Rather than calling for social cohesion in general, we might rather conceive of our social goal in more precise terms such as preventing direct violence; helping the victims of direct violence; reducing biases and prejudices; and offsetting or transcending the material and psychological impacts of biases and prejudices.



“

To prevent social cohesion becoming no more than a kind of wishful thinking, it is necessary to appreciate the complex aspects of the many problems we seek to transcend, and to think in precise terms about how we might address their causes.

”

2. Social cohesion: Origins, definitions, and dimensions

CHAPTER 2 traces the genealogy of social cohesion as an academic concept and a key policy objective internationally. The term originated in the late nineteenth century with concern about the harmful outcomes for society of the transition to capitalism, industrialisation and urbanisation. It assumed that with the disappearance of pre-industrial communal life, modern industrial society needed to find a new basis for building solidarity and sociability. Consequently, social cohesion has been presented as a requirement for modern life, as a key element of democracy, and as the basis for economic interaction. Over the past few decades, social cohesion has become an object of policy concern in Canada, parts of Europe, and other regions

concerned with managing diversity, and, in particular, managing the integration of immigrant populations. It sits alongside other kinds of projects such as post-colonial nation-building that sought to transcend ethnic division.

Scholars have suggested that social cohesion is multi-dimensional and comprises five domains: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity; social networks and social capital; and territorial belonging and identity. The merits of each of these dimensions have been debated, as have the ways in which they might themselves produce counterproductive effects.

3. Social attitudes in Gauteng

CHAPTER 3 explores social diversity and different social attitudes among residents of Gauteng by way of the valuable insights provided in the GCRO's Quality of Life IV survey (2015/16). These attitudes are not straightforwardly determinant of how people behave. They are nevertheless a useful set of indicators of the mood of the province, including people's perceptions of whether or not there is trust, the extent to which people exhibit various kinds of prejudices and whether or not they endorse violence. We are not able to answer the questions of where these attitudes originate or how they are formed, but our analysis highlights how attitudes are distributed in space and how attitudes relate to the demographic characteristics of respondents.

As a contextual exercise, the first part of this chapter examines urban segregation. It does this first by mapping the level of racial homogeneity or heterogeneity in each ward, and showing that Gauteng is still significantly influenced by past patterns of socio-spatial segregation – as can be seen from the low levels of racial diversity in townships. However, it argues that we should also assess homogeneity in terms of spoken language. When this kind of social heterogeneity is mapped, townships are far more heterogeneous than suburbs. Respondents in Gauteng identify mostly with their

nationality, race or gender group and Gauteng respondents' strongest shared belief (79% agree) is that Gauteng would be a better place if all still believed in the 'rainbow nation'. These shared identities and beliefs provide an important basis on which common ground can be found between otherwise diverse groups of people.

Trust is a very important component of social cohesion because improved trust is a cornerstone of a greater sense of community and reconciliation. It is therefore concerning that only 14% of respondents in Gauteng feel that most people within their community can be trusted, and that this proportion has been declining generally since 2009. Although level of trust (within communities and between population groups) is somewhat related to population group and age group, it is also strongly related to income, since lower levels of trust within communities and between population groups were found in the economically marginalised parts of the province.

Various questions about belonging and the claims of particular race groups in South Africa elicited a divergent set of responses. Many respondents endorsed the claims and belonging of particular race groups while some did not.

Attitudes towards migrants and migration sketched out contrasting pictures. The largest proportion of South African-born respondents (58%) feel that legal foreigners should be allowed to stay in Gauteng, but 43% of respondents in Gauteng feel that influx control (intended

to curb internal migration) should be reinstated. Only 4% of respondents indicated that they believe it is OK to physically attack foreigners in order to make them leave. Alarming, a much higher percentage (14%) feel that it is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people.

4. Analysing past and current initiatives for improving social cohesion: Defining the problem and scope of intervention

CHAPTER 4 presents an analysis of 60 past and current initiatives to improve various aspects of social cohesion. It shows that there is a substantial history of practise relating to attempts to improve social relations within South Africa. Many different organisations are active in this sector including national, provincial and local government; human rights foundations; research institutes, NGOs; and CBOs. Many initiatives are concerned with improving social relations in general terms and therefore do not focus on a particular kind of identity or a particular kind of discrimination. However, a large number of organisations are concerned with discrimination based specifically on national identity (xenophobia). Both general and specific focus areas may have certain advantages and limitations.

The chapter argues that there are five strands of thinking related to the problem at hand: several initiatives see the problem as stemming from broader social systems (rather than specific individuals) and try in their own way to make positive contributions to offsetting the systems that reinforce unequal relationships and social injustice. Some initiatives concentrate attention on those who have been harmed and attempt to alleviate their distress (for example by trauma counselling) and understand that the result of this work in turn improves community relations. Some initiatives focus on preventing and de-escalating violence. Some initiatives focus on reducing individuals' prejudicial thoughts, speech or behaviours. This is commonly attempted by appealing to members of a

broad, collective body simultaneously, for example 'fellow South Africans'. Some initiatives tend not to interject in the social arena directly but rather attempt to mobilise government or influence policy as a means of achieving their objective. Although the motivations behind each of these approaches might be qualitatively different, the various understandings of the problems are not unique, isolated or mutually exclusive. Many of the programmes we analyse identified systemic exclusion, rather than the exclusionary behaviour of individuals, as the key problem to be resolved.

The scope, scale and reach of initiatives can differ dramatically. In this regard, there are a series of choices about scale and participation that any intervention implementer would need to consider. 'Participation' might mean hearing a message, engaging in a once-off conversation, or participating in a long-term campaign. To some extent, there is a tension between depth and breadth. Media campaigns might reach tens of thousands of people or more, but the way in which they do so is qualitatively different from the kinds of interactions possible with smaller groups. Many initiatives are intentionally delimited, for example by wanting to change a particular community, and so they forego wide coverage. An intervention might make an important difference to a community insofar as key individuals exert an influence. Some interventions understand active participation to be necessary for individual development, whereas others hope for ripple effects outside of direct participation.

5. Learning from past and current initiatives: Methodologies for improving social cohesion

There are many different methods of doing social cohesion work. Based on the set of initiatives we reviewed in the previous chapter, **CHAPTER 5** discusses five main methodologies and the numerous sub-sets of activities within each:

POLITICKING. These centre on attempts to persuade people to align with a particular position, and are about how to change people's minds. Examples include information campaigns, mass media or public service announcements, initiatives by public figures and messages from leaders.

PROMOTING MUTUAL IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION. Activities like dialogue, sports and cultural days, and shared national symbols, are intended to foster a sense of togetherness, where individuals identify with one another and with a collective. While there is no doubt there is much value in such work, a clear explanation of how change takes place is lacking, particularly by a long-term measure. There are stumbling blocks in this line of thinking – bringing people together does not necessarily mean that they will get along better. Often violence happens in spaces where people are not strangers and they have much in common, for example, in domestic violence cases or xenophobic attacks within communities.

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY. These methods advocate that for a society to function well, people need to have good mental health, both personally and collectively. Work in this area includes trauma counselling, therapeutic group activities, and community peace-building actions. Counselling might also be concerned with developing community agency to challenge the overarching structures that prevent people from being able to participate in society equally.

ARTS-BASED METHODOLOGIES. These bridge the gap between individual and community psychology and mutual identification and recognition. Activities we review range from quiet expressions of personal feelings to major public arts festivals, as well as other types of theatre, music and celebration. Very often, government allocates responsibility for social cohesion to cultural departments. In this work, the question of how societal and personal change is thought to happen requires more robust engagement.

INFRASTRUCTURE-FOCUSED PROGRAMMES. The last type of method includes infrastructure-focused programmes. We found repeatedly in our research that tense social relations were evident in areas with limited resources and less infrastructural support from government. Improving service delivery infrastructure, more effective urban planning, and ensuring that public servants are well equipped and sensitive to diversity, can reduce inequality and promote social cohesion. Infrastructure-focused programmes can provide an opportunity for implementing social cohesion objectives alongside other municipal responsibilities and within other budgets. They may also provide a conducive base on which other types of social programmes can be built.



Photograph by Kyle Brand



Photograph by Darya Maslova



Chapter 1

Social cohesion in South Africa

RICHARD BALLARD

Key points:

- The term social cohesion gained currency in South Africa in the 2000s following the increased use of this term globally. In South Africa, the idea of social cohesion borrows some aspects from earlier frameworks for understanding social transformation after apartheid, such as multi-racialism, non-racialism, black consciousness, nation-building, reconciliation and economic transformation.
- Social cohesion functions as a broad ideal but does not always offer a clear analysis of why social tensions exist, nor does it offer a clear path for achieving social cohesion. Calls for more social cohesion in response to social tensions can fail to recognise the ways in which some kinds of social cohesion can cause social tensions.
- Problems such as intolerance and prejudice are ‘wicked problems’ insofar as they may be unclear and stubborn, have multiple causes, and be symptoms of other problems. The problems which social cohesion proposes to fix can be a vicious cycle:
 - The problems might have quite distinct manifestations including violence, prejudice (both explicit and implicit), gatekeeping, systemic exclusion and exploitation.
 - The problems might attach in different ways to social identities such as nationality, class, religion, gender, age, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, language group, race and political affiliation.
 - The problems are caused by a complex set of conditions including norms and beliefs, unresolved trauma, instrumental use of prejudice, spatial separation, crime and corruption, impunity and race-thinking.
 - The resulting problems can, in turn, have a series of effects such as the normalisation of antisocial behaviour; the normalisation of the idea of social divisions; internalised oppression; social disconnection; material deprivation; death, injury, trauma and mental health problems, and they may stifle economic growth. These results feed back into the vicious cycle, exacerbating the conditions for inequality and social antipathy.
- Programmes to improve social cohesion sometimes take the form of sports events, cultural events and dialogues. While these are no doubt important activities to support, they will not, by themselves, reverse the vicious cycle outlined above. Improved social relations might have much more to do with the outcomes of development-related programmes than with ‘social cohesion’ programmes as such.
- Programmes that do attempt to address social relations should have more specific objectives than simply ‘improving social cohesion’. These objectives might include preventing direct violence; helping the victims of direct violence; reducing biases and prejudices; or offsetting the material and psychological impacts of biases and prejudices.

1.1 The transition in South Africa

One of the key puzzles in South Africa's transition to democracy is how a society that was once designed around the principles of social division could become a society based on equality, solidarity, respect and tolerance. Given that white minority governments taught people there was a hierarchy of races, is it possible for people to now regard one another outside of racial categories and hierarchies? Since apartheid insisted that it was not possible for 'different' people to live together, is it possible for people to do so now in the democratic era? Since black people were dispossessed of land, homes, education and economic opportunities under colonialism and apartheid, is it possible to create a single nation that unites those who benefitted materially in the past and those who did not? And since apartheid used many forms of violence to enforce its vision, how might those who authorised and implemented these injustices be integrated into a society with those who were victimised by them?

To be sure, the heritage of the past is not only one of social division but also one of togetherness and common humanity. Racist ideologies defined much about life in South Africa, but they did not define everything. Social life was also characterised by mixing, solidarity, friendship and Ubuntu. The eventual scrapping of the Group Areas Act in 1991 came years after some neighbourhoods began to mix. Apartheid's logics did not enjoy a consensus in society. Liberal opponents of apartheid advocated multi-racialism, where different races would be treated equally and live in a state of mutual tolerance. More radical opponents of apartheid advocated non-racialism, an approach which rejected apartheid's racial classifications altogether. Followers of the philosophy of black consciousness sought to overturn racist narratives of black inferiority.

Apartheid's attempts at social engineering were, then, incomplete. The transition to democracy revealed a society more stable than many had expected. The lived reality of many people in South Africa was, and is,

in effect, a cosmopolitan one where people who speak different languages mix and interact. Social differences in such contexts are frequently experienced in positive terms, with people learning one another's languages, taking an interest in one another's cultures, and building communities, friendships and indeed families that incorporate social difference.

Yet in the assessment of many scholars and some in positions of authority, this organic 'bottom up' transformation needs to be augmented with a more proactive attempt to produce a transformed society. In the years following the advent of democracy, a series of terms came to define the nature of the ongoing transition:

- **Nation-building.** Given that 'grand apartheid' was based on the premise that South Africa was made up of a series of incompatible 'nations', constituted territorially, a key narrative of the democratic era has been nation-building and the rainbow nation, or a single territory for a diverse people. In this regard, there has been a widespread popular adoption of the new national symbols and of a national identity.
- **Reconciliation.** The principle of reconciliation was to encourage perpetrators of apartheid's atrocities to disclose what they had done in order to establish the conditions under which forgiveness might be possible. The foundational mechanism for this was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996–1998).
- **Economic transformation.** In order to address inherited material inequalities, the post-apartheid government implemented policies which attempted to foster economic growth; introduced or extended welfare initiatives such as grants and housing; created mechanisms of redress such as employment equity, black economic empowerment, and land reform; and intervened in the labour market, for example to create jobs through public works schemes.

1.2 The limits of nation-building, reconciliation and economic transformation

From the 2000s, limitations of the transition, whether ‘bottom up’ or engineered, became apparent. One indication was the outbreaks of violence against foreigners, most spectacularly in 2008. Although nation-building can foster a common identity among citizens, nationalism also has the potential to accentuate the division between citizens and migrants.

In addition, although the democratic government continued to use the term non-racialism, it showed very little commitment to dismantling apartheid’s racial categories. The terms ‘black’, ‘African’, ‘white’, ‘Indian’ and ‘coloured’ have retained validity in everyday and official usage. Although such terms were retained in order to enable redress, the counterproductive result is that they are regarded as normal ways of classifying people in post-apartheid society.

Reconciliation was an incomplete project that not did go far enough towards recognising and addressing the suffering and trauma that apartheid produced. Furthermore, many of those who benefitted structurally from apartheid took the opportunity to deny responsibility for the injustices of the past because they did not personally violate human rights.

Economic transformation has not been fully realised and inequality remains stubbornly high. Notwithstanding important advances, for example, grants for the poor and some black upward mobility, current patterns of deprivation and privilege are reminiscent of the past. Critics argue that beyond superficial identification with national symbols, a project

of nation-building and of reconciliation was not possible in the context of enduring material deprivation for the majority of black people. The Rhodes-Must-Fall and Fees-Must-Fall movements questioned the very project of reconciliation, given the enduring injustices of the past in post-apartheid society.

Despite significant transformation, patterns of intolerance in South African society persist in racist statements and actions; class prejudice; sexism; homophobia; religious intolerance; ethnic tensions; intra- and inter-party tensions; intolerance of people with disabilities and diseases; intolerance of internal migrants; and age-based discrimination. Increased national and international media coverage of these intolerances highlights the multiple unaddressed tensions among South Africans.

It became clear, then, that even with nation-building, reconciliation and economic transformation, social tensions will not simply melt away over time and that new kinds of social tensions could emerge. Some in government began to talk of the need to foster ‘social cohesion’. This concept retains, in effect, much of the content of ‘nation-building’ and ‘reconciliation’ but it does not define social togetherness in national terms and is therefore more easily able to accommodate migrants. Those addressing the idea of social cohesion generally assume that social tensions can be attributed to a lack of social cohesion, and that disharmony can be fixed by promoting social cohesion.

1.3 Paradoxes of social cohesion

While social cohesion presents a broad social ideal – that we should have a more cohesive society – the framework does not offer a comprehensive idea of the social change required or a comprehensive understanding of why social cohesion is lacking. The logic of social cohesion is presented as self-evident. According to some critics, the framework is under-conceptualised and lacks rigour in articulating a coherent notion of what is meant by the term, how

it works and how we bring it about (Freemantle 2015; Misago 2016).

There are, in effect, a number of paradoxes that make it very difficult to identify and effect simple solutions:

- Sports events are often thought to generate social cohesion. However, they do not always produce social harmony, as illustrated by public violence between supporters of rival football teams in Europe

- over many decades.
- More social cohesion does not always result in less social tension. Both might increase at the same time because increasing social cohesion within a group can cause increasing social tension between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Football supporters who attack other football supporters are doing so in part because they have a very strong identification with their own team, to the point of hating supporters of rival teams. Social cohesion does not therefore inevitably displace social tension; it might be the root cause of it.
 - Providing people with information about the ‘right’ way to behave does not necessarily modify behaviour. Despite long-term global anti-smoking, safe sex and anti-drunk-driving campaigns, people often continue their risky behaviour knowing that it might be dangerous. Even though strong social norms have made racist utterances morally indefensible and socially unacceptable in South Africa, these utterances are nevertheless made on a regular basis. At a psychological level, people cannot simply be ‘educated’ out of their intolerant ways of thinking about social difference. Predispositions tend to be firmly established by adolescence, and people tend to absorb only new information that confirms their predispositions and ignore new information that contradicts them (Sears et al 1979 in Gordon 2016).
 - Anti-prejudice campaigns sometimes backfire, particularly when the people whose prejudice is targeted feel that they are being denied autonomy over their thinking (Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht 2011).
 - Bringing people together does not always result in improved social relations. According to the contact hypothesis, increasing contact between previously segregated groups should reduce prejudice and promote harmony since it increases familiarity, understanding, social intimacy and empathy. However, familiarity does not only produce harmony – violence can occur between people who know each other intimately, as was illustrated by the genocides of Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda (Durrheim and Dixon 2005).
 - Social cohesion is arguably not the natural state of any society (Thrift 2005). We might romantically imagine that the ideal society is a community in which everyone is strongly bonded, but even intimate communities demonstrate a variety of cleavages, prejudices and power structures. In nations across the world, people do not necessarily like or identify with many of their compatriots, yet these are not unhealthy societies per se; many are characterised by a high degree of social functionality and even mutual care and consideration. The absence of strong social bonds does not necessarily mean that a society is deteriorating towards a state of violence and prejudice.
 - Relatedly, those who call for social cohesion sometimes assume that social cohesion is achieved through common values or social homogeneity. Yet expecting agreement on basic values is unrealistic in the context of diverse positions on religion, for example. Neither is it possible or desirable to establish a dominant culture and expect all citizens to assimilate into it since this would disavow minority cultures in the process.

1.4 Wicked problems and vicious cycles

Problems such as racism, prejudice, social tension, and other social cohesion related problems, can be regarded as examples of ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber 1973). Rather than being simple or easy problems that can be overcome by the application of scientific reason, wicked problems are stubborn, seem unclear, and have multiple causes and manifestations. Wicked problems, as Rittel and Webber explain, are invariably symptoms of other problems. As a result, solutions are difficult to discern and could take a very wide range of forms.

Social problems

Problems such as racism, xenophobia, sexism and other forms of identity-based prejudice and discrimination are not one dimensional and have various manifestations (United Nations 2001). As the apex of the triangle in Figure 1 shows, these manifestations can include obvious transgressions of social tolerance such as violence, expressions of prejudice and gatekeeping. There may also be less obvious transgressions of social tolerance such as when people deny they are prejudiced

but they nevertheless think and act in terms of social hierarchies, or when people who were privileged by the past deny that their privilege results from systemic biases. Various kinds of direct exploitation, as well as systemic inequality and exclusion, may also be evident.

The problem at hand might be about attitudes and ideas held in private, prejudices that are communicated to broader audiences, problematic behaviour, or it might be beyond the thoughts, speech or actions of any individual 'racist' and take the form of systemic exclusion.

Figure 1: A vicious cycle

GCR0



Causes

The causes of these problems are immensely complex. We can draw links between the manifestations of the problem listed in the apex of the triangle, for example, to show how violence can cause expressions of prejudice, and vice versa. Furthermore, we can identify a wide range of social causes that contribute to this set of social problems. The list in the lower left corner of the triangle is merely indicative, but suggests some of the deep structures behind the various manifestations of social problems listed in the apex.

Effects

Some of the effects of racism, xenophobia, sexism and other systems of intolerance are listed in the lower right corner of the triangle. For example, internalised oppression, social disconnection and material deprivation reinforce the idea that South Africa is a divided society. Some social problems, such as xenophobic attacks, can suppress the economy: every month thousands of traders travel to Gauteng to buy goods to sell in neighbouring countries. According to one estimate, they spend R160 million a year in the province

(Peberdy 2015a). In the months following xenophobic attacks, a great deal of this trade evaporates (Peberdy 2015b). The theory of social capital argues that economic interaction requires a degree of trust, cooperation and sociability (Chou 2006), so the absence of prejudice, exclusion, suspicion and social division is therefore good for the economy.

We quickly see how difficult it is to arrange the causes of problems, the problems themselves, and the effects of these problems, as a linear progression. Rather, the various processes all potentially have relationships with one another, reinforcing each other through feedback loops. In other words, it is a vicious cycle.

Drawing a map of relationships might seem daunting, but it is an important device for recognising that a problem cannot simply be attributed to, for example, the moral deficiencies of prejudiced individuals. It also cannot only be solved by appealing to people's good nature, or by punishing those who transgress. Bad attitudes and anti social behaviour are themselves part of a much broader set of systemic relationships, and so policing them might not be effective without the contribution of other kinds of interventions.

1.5 Interventions to remedy the situation

Many kinds of interventions to improve social cohesion have been implemented: legislation; criminal justice; mechanisms of redress; social welfare; crisis management; education; national symbols; community events; leadership training; therapy; and dialogue. Given that there have been more than two decades of experimentation in peace building, prejudice reduction and related endeavours in South Africa, there is a wealth of experience to learn from. Chapters 4 and 5 of this report provides a typology of interventions to help promote social cohesion, organised by scope and methodology but for now, two observations are worth making:

First, some of the most important strategies for promoting social cohesion might not be 'social cohesion' interventions. Different sectors of government have the potential to disrupt the vicious cycles that produce intolerant social relations even where they do not explicitly set out to do so. For example, welfare systems can promote greater equality and alter the ways in

which people in a highly unequal context relate to one another. In South Africa, various initiatives related to social grants, education, housing, and economic policies, while not intended to be social cohesion programmes per se, have had profound implications for social relations (Erwin 2017b).

Second, interventions that explicitly set out to foster social cohesion tend to gravitate to a set of practices that are not necessarily linked to a well-developed theory of change. Government programmes specifically focused on social cohesion often take the form of cultural events or sports events. These kinds of events are valuable in and of themselves – it is important to support dance, music and theatre groups, to showcase cultural diversity and to cultivate an appreciation of different forms of creative expression among the general population. These kinds of events might help people learn about those who are different from themselves, and gain an understanding of appropriate and inappropriate ways of behaving. They might even assist in processing trauma. Sports events,



Photograph by Darya Maslova

in particular, create opportunities for people to get to know one another, and they help communities reclaim public spaces. These kinds of interventions are, no doubt, worthwhile activities, but there seems to be little reflection on how they can disrupt the vicious cycle of social problems more comprehensively. In general, we assume strategies will work, without knowing what their effects will actually be.

Some organisations use dialogue as a method for attempting to promote understanding, empathy and shared respect between people who regard themselves as socially different. Like cultural and sports events, dialogue can be a valuable exercise. However, it might also have a limited effect: most volunteers for such engagements are typically already open to non-prejudicial thinking, while prejudiced people who attend might be capable of revising their thinking about particular individuals from groups they are prejudiced about, but they tend not to question their

overall prejudice about the group as a whole. It is also difficult to know how long the impact of dialogue lasts beyond that specific intervention, and exactly how well such experiences translate into real-world engagements within structures of power (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2005).

In developing interventions to improve social cohesion, it is useful to avoid overly simplistic objectives such as 'wanting people to get along better'. More targeted objectives may include:

- Preventing direct violence.
- Helping the victims of direct violence.
- Reducing biases and prejudices.
- Offsetting or transcending the material and psychological impacts of biases and prejudices.

Successfully achieving these kinds of objectives requires a comprehensive theory of change as well as multi-pronged and sustained interventions that systematically target causes of problems.

1.6 The structure of this report

Chapter 2 is a short literature review that explores social cohesion as an area of concern for government. The chapter includes a history of the use of the term and how it has been applied and understood by various academics and policymakers over more than a century.

Chapter 3, which deals with social attitudes in Gauteng, is a benchmarking exercise. In this section we compare the attitudes of respondents in the various municipalities of Gauteng. This comparison is based on results from the Gauteng City-Region Observatory

(GCRO) Quality of Life (QoL) IV (2015/16) survey, which had a sample of 30 002 respondents. The chapter covers respondents' answers to questions about diversity, belonging, trust, and exclusionary sentiments. These results are expressed in terms of a variety of population subdivisions, with a focus on differences between population groups, age groups, and income groups.

From the survey, it is evident that many residents of Gauteng identify with the province, express tolerant attitudes, reject violence, and expect there to be trust



between groupings. Some participants, however, responded in a way that suggests intolerance, alienation, a willingness to exclude and, in a small minority of cases, an acceptance of violence towards minorities. The chapter shows in detail how higher economic status is often related to more inclusive attitudes, suggesting that reducing socio-economic inequality could promote greater social cohesion. The chapter also highlights some areas of concern, such as a widespread lack of trust within communities and between population groups, as well as the fact that a relatively high proportion of respondents feel that violence towards gay and lesbian people is acceptable, whereas a much lower proportion of respondents condone violence against foreigners. The areas of possible interventions suggested in the chapter focus on specific thematic concerns (such as trust and homophobia) or could be spatially directed to areas with consistently intolerant attitudes. Interventions should, however, always recognise individuality and the importance of various dimensions of diversity that shape the lived experiences of residents of Gauteng.

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, there have been a great many initiatives centred on bringing people together and improving social relations. Chapters 4 and 5 of this report present a topology of 80 initiatives which have attempted in various ways to tackle problems that are thought to arise from a lack of social cohesion (listed in the Appendix).

The motivation behind this study is to gain a better understanding of what work has been done in this sector; to investigate perspectives around the scope and limitations of different initiatives; and to begin to catalogue the contemporary intervention landscape.

The majority of the initiatives we focused on were implemented in Gauteng, specifically in the City of Johannesburg, although a few examples from other parts of the country have also been included. By looking across programmes led by civil society organisations, research-based organisations, and government departments, Chapter 4 maps this landscape.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the range of methodologies and strategies used by various initiatives. In this chapter we asked a series of questions of each initiative, such as who is working in this sector? How do they think about the problem? Which method do they use? And why might the scope, scale and reach of initiatives differ? By reading across the findings we can gain insight into what has been learnt collectively about attempting to reduce social tensions. This chapter offers comparative inductive insights, but avoids any sort of hierarchical assessment of the initiatives. Rather, it presents a 'menu of possibilities' highlighting programmatic elements that policy planners should consider. This can help ensure that future frameworks and initiatives build on the learning derived from current and previous efforts. We found that there are usually both advantages and disadvantages to most methods and generally methodologies are implemented as a matter of routine, without sufficient reflection on what specific leverage the method could have for a particular problem or social pattern.

This type of work provides an opportunity for government to partner with other agencies. The research shows that there is a wealth of capacity and allies, and an array of potential social cohesion methodologies.



Photograph by Kabelo Mohlapo



Chapter 2

Social cohesion: Origins, definitions, and dimensions

THEMBANI MKHIZE

Key points:

- Social cohesion has been used as both an academic concept and as a policy objective.
- The way in which academics, politicians and officials talk about social cohesion not only informs us about what is going on in society, it also gives us an insight into the speakers' values and concerns. For example, it may reveal their interest in a return to a more traditional and religious society; or their support for the idea of nation-building; or their wish to promote cosmopolitan or pan-Africanist feelings of togetherness instead of exclusive nationalism; or it might dovetail with the idea of social capital through the argument that individuals benefit from others they know and can draw from; or advocate for redistribution in order to achieve a more egalitarian society.
- Social cohesion has been presented as a solution to, or the antithesis of, social alienation; social problems caused by industrialisation, capitalism and urbanisation; social polarisation along racial, ethnic or nationalist lines; inequality; deprivation resulting from the decline of the welfare state; and the exclusion of immigrants.
- Some ideas about social cohesion have been criticised for advocating authoritarian control of society and the suppression of dissent, or for relying on romantic ideas about traditional society and local communities.
- Theorisations of social cohesion generally recognise that individual behaviour and thinking – whether or not people identify with one another and act in solidarity, or seek to distance themselves from one another – are related to broader structures such as the economy.
- Social cohesion is generally defined as multi-dimensional, encompassing common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reduced wealth disparity; social networks and social capital; and territorial belonging and identity. However, each dimension may be broad and ambiguous. For example, social order and control can be taken to mean the absence of crime, which is a reasonable ingredient for improving levels of trust and solidarity. However, it could also mean that certain categories of people or activities, such as street trading, are defined as disorderly and are therefore policed or removed. The pursuit of 'social order' can sometimes result in vulnerable people being left worse off.

2.1 Social cohesion as a 'problem' to be governed: A history of thinking

The past three decades have seen an increase in international concern for, and a problematisation of, social cohesion as a tool for governance and "as a condition of democratic government" in academic and policy circles (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008: 62; see also Kearns and Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy,

Swiatek, and Moulaert 2012; Ballantine et al. 2017). Although social cohesion implies an ideal social state, it is broad enough for people to embed a wide variety of ideas in the concept, which reflect their own concerns and beliefs. It is politically open-ended, insofar as actors from across the political spectrum are able to articulate

their own particular concerns in terms of social cohesion (and, more to the point, a lack of social cohesion).

Some scholars consider social cohesion in Europe to be both an academic concept and a key policy objective:

[S]ocial cohesion forms a nodal point in the discursive field, dwelling on the contradictions of equality and diversity, unity and autonomy, as well as on the concern of repairing social damage caused by capitalist modernisation. [...] From this perspective, problematizing social cohesion draws attention to the danger of social disorder in modern capitalistic societies stemming from their inherent economic transformation and class divisions
(Novy et al. 2012: 1875).

Social cohesion is sometimes presented as an antidote to social injustices such as polarisation, disarray, inequality and socio-economic exclusion. Scholarship on the need for (more) cohesive societies in the European Union (EU) – and elsewhere – views the lack of social cohesion as having resulted from the negative implications of capitalism, modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation (see Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012; Norton and De Haan 2013). Scholars argue that these developments disrupted closely-bonded and well-integrated local community life, alienated economic (im)migrants in host urban areas, and have resulted in “unemployment or underemployment and poverty, and [a] lack of social integration or social capital” (Barolsky and Pillay 2009: 17). The late nineteenth and early twentieth century French scholar, Emile Durkheim, whose work centred on the implications of social change, referred to this lack as ‘anomie’ (Barolsky and Pillay 2009: 17).

Durkheim saw “group life as [the] antidote to anomie” (Norton and De Haan 2012: 5); and his modernisation theory – articulated in the seminal book *De la Division du Travail* (The Division of Labour in Society) – argued, among other things, that rapid societal change associated with industrialisation and urbanisation has led to an erosion of social norms and values, and this has led to a breakdown of social integration (Novy et al. 2012). Durkheim argued that “during periods of acute political crisis, interpersonal violence will increase due to threat to collective sentiments posed by the crisis” (Pridemore and Kim

2006, quoted in Barolsky and Pillay 2009: 17). According to Durkheim, social cohesion can only be accomplished via two distinct types of solidarity, manifest in the process of European industrialisation – mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity (Novy et al. 2012). Mechanical solidarity was characteristic of ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’ societies typified by homogeneity of work and life in general, with a strong collective ethos among societal members (Norton and de Haan 2012). Organic solidarity was a feature of advanced and complex “capitalistic societies characterized by cooperation and division of labour which arise automatically through each individual’s pursuit of his/her own interests” (Novy et al. 2012: 1875). Durkheim believed that the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity would be “disorderly and marked by ‘anomie’ and pathologies, but this would gradually be overcome” (Norton and de Haan 2012: 6) and stabilised via adaptation and creation of ‘functional’ institutions emphasising norms and values as elements guiding group life (Norton and de Haan 2012).

Durkheim’s ideas were inevitably informed by the prevailing paradigms of his own era, some of which romanticised precolonial society and asserted that, in contrast, modern society was unnatural, corrupting and morally deficient (Hookway 2015). He was suspicious of individualism and secularism and favoured the highly structured nature of traditional society, which he thought provided the necessary parameters for better social relations. Many of his assumptions were later critiqued and rejected. Traditional societies, as idealised by Durkheim, arguably never existed in the way that he imagined, in part because the appearance of harmony frequently resulted from the suppression of difference and dissent by authoritarian leaders – a set of conditions many modern societies would not wish to impose. Nevertheless, Durkheim’s ideas are instructive because some of his assumptions are carried through into contemporary thinking about social cohesion, such as the assumed need for common values, or the argument that ‘local communities’ provide a good model for modern urban society. Such assumptions should similarly be critiqued – contemporary societies simply are not founded on common values. The challenge, then, is to achieve a civic space free of exclusion, violence and prejudice even though people have different values and live in densely-populated urban societies.

Although the concept of social cohesion has deep roots within the discipline of sociology, only recently has it become a term that governments use to articulate concern about society and to implement programmes aimed at improving social relations. According to Eizaguirre and colleagues (2012), social cohesion, as a policy objective in Europe, gained prominence in the 1970s with the decline of the welfare state and a growing emphasis on the market, individualisation, deregulation, privatisation and devolution. Against the backdrop of structural unemployment, jobless growth, precarious employment, a fragmented division of labour, and the widening disparities that accompanied neoliberalism and the regression of the welfare state, social cohesion was catapulted into official European discourse and politicised (Novy et al. 2012: 1876). Scholars argue that this politicisation stemmed in large part from the ineffectiveness of existing social policies as well as the refusal of governments to apply alternative redistributive policies. Social cohesion first entered European regional policy in the mid-1980s in terms of “economic and social cohesion” (Novy et al. 2012: 1876), and was seen by supranational European agencies – such as the European Commission and the EU – as a panacea for the socio-economic exclusion and regional inequalities that were rampant across the region. European national urban programmes were readjusted in state expenditures and economic policies (Eizaguirre et al. 2012). During this era, European cities became progressively more diverse, mainly because of large numbers of economic migrants seeking socio-economic opportunities (Eizaguirre et al. 2012).

Liberal theorists such as Jürgen Habermas were influential during this period (Eizaguirre et al. 2012). According to Habermas – whose theory of communicative action (critical rationality) stressed the need for consensus and shared understanding – it is only through talk and verbal communication that we can make sense of ourselves and others, and verbal communication is the basis for societal transformation (Norton and de Haan 2012). Chipkin and Ngqulunga (2008: 64) note that liberals such as Habermas have contributed significantly to contemporary ideas of social cohesion because they argue that the conditions of social cohesion need not be a common national culture, identity or history, much less a shared ethnicity. Rather,

a constitutional patriotism, or “postnational patriotism [...] a shared moral consciousness” (Chipkin and Ngqulunga (2008: 64), through which citizens identify with democratic institutions and their associated values, becomes the basis for social cohesion. This kind of patriotism is especially useful in the analysis of how social cohesion manifests in the South African context (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008). According to the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC 2012a), the idea of social cohesion became popular in South Africa in the 1990s as a response to the negative effects of globalisation and city competitiveness, most notably, exclusion and socio-spatial and socio-economic fragmentation across different urban neighbourhoods (cf. Novy et al. 2012).

From the 1990s onwards, “several political coalitions at a diversity of spatial scales [in Europe] [...] made an effort to tackle the problems of growing disparity by seeking to conciliate competitiveness and social cohesion” (Novy et al. 2012: 1882). One of the ways in which this was translated at policy level was through the development of social cohesion policy, European Urban programmes and other EU-supported programmes (Novy et al. 2012: 1876). The EU’s first Cohesion Report (1996) envisaged reduced socio-economic disparity as being an outcome of greater social cohesion (Novy et al. 2012; Eizaguirre et al. 2012). At around the same time, sociologists began stressing the importance of social capital and social networks in society. For example, Bourdieu “focused on the benefits to individuals that accrue from the participation in groups, and the need for individuals to invest in these relations (with different types of social capital being fungible)” (Norton and de Haan 2012: 7). Since the 1990s, European supranational, national and urban institutions have foregrounded the importance of social cohesion and it is increasingly being seen as a key policy concern at city level as well (Novy et al. 2012). In the 2000s, social cohesion policies not only substituted “policies based on citizenship principles (social justice, identity, and political participation)” (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2000) but they also became intertwined with concepts such as competitiveness and ‘good governance’ (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2000). “Neoliberalism and social cohesion [thus] stand in a contradictory and dialectical relation” (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2007) because, “[o]n

the one hand, certain features of modern capitalism are detrimental to social cohesion, but on the other, a certain level of social cohesion is necessary for capitalism to exist as it provides social peace and legitimisation” (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2007). This suggests that social ideals used to create (a national) cohesion can, in fact, maintain the capitalist status quo, both intentionally and unintentionally (Beall, Gelb, and Hassim 2005).

Emerging literature highlights social cohesion as a government project – or at least the need for it – in the developing world (see, for instance, Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008; Barolsky and Pillay 2009; Ortmann 2009). Much of this literature argues that the project of social cohesion is following a similar route in democratic societies in the developing world as it did in (Western) Europe. After achieving independence from colonial regimes, many leaders in post-colonial contexts appear to have understood social cohesion as nation-building, nationalism or peace building (see, for instance, Haynes 2009; Ortmann 2009; Kpessa, Beland and Lecours 2011; Abrahams 2016), particularly as a response to acute religious, ethnic or cultural conflict, division and violence. This may be due largely to the desire on the part of postcolonial leaders to distance themselves from the histories of oppression and colonialism, such as in Singapore, where the post-colonial government made a concerted effort to destroy all artefacts and buildings redolent of colonialism and construct new ones symbolising a new, specifically Singaporean identity (Ortmann 2009). Social cohesion as nation-building in the developing world is also articulated in Kpessa, Beland and Lecours’s (2011) analysis of the correlation between nation-building and social policy in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). They note that the arbitrary demarcation of state boundaries during colonisation played a significant role in creating ethnic divisions across the broader region, as well as within various territories.

Some post-independence African nationalist leaders attempted to foster a sense of national unity via health, education and housing policies within their countries:

[I]n SSA, the neoliberal turn of the 1980s favoured the decline of state-level integration and solidarity, which helped trigger territorial mobilization and fragmentation.

As a consequence, the politics of welfare retrenchment in SSA does more than simply reduce benefits and increase inequalities; it also potentially weakens national unity (Kpessa et al. 2011: 2115).

Neoliberal policies therefore had the same effects in post-independence states in sub-Saharan Africa as they did in Europe, including the regression of the welfare state, the introduction of structural adjustment programmes, and a decline in solidarity. This facilitated fragmentation in multi-ethnic states. Although colonialism played a key role in ‘dividing and conquering’ sub-Saharan Africa, the neoliberal turn of the 1980s may have exacerbated extant cultural divisions in the region, especially since neoliberal policies also enabled a ‘cultural’ turn that saw the return of traditional regional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa (Kpessa et al. 2011). This placed the emphasis on an ethnic identity and in the process undermined the national identity that African nationalist leaders such as Julius Nyerere sought to accomplish with social and economic policies such as Ujamaa (Kpessa et al. 2011).

In South Africa, social cohesion is often linked to the impacts that social change has had on social relations, which is the backdrop to social cohesion becoming increasingly prominent in the South African policy context (see Barolsky and Pillay 2009, and Ballantine et al. 2017). According to Barolsky and Pillay (2009), South Africa was not immune from the social and economic change that triggered fragmentation and the need for social cohesion elsewhere (both in Europe and in other sub-Saharan Africa countries), and, in addition, in this country social cohesion in the policy environment had to take into account severe criminality and violence associated with the political transition from apartheid to democracy. As Barolsky and Pillay (2009) observe in their study on how crime, citizenship and safety manifest in the global South:

many societies that have experienced a transition from authoritarian rule, as was the case in South Africa, have experienced a rapid escalation in crime rates, including violent crime. Continents and countries that have since the 1970s experienced this correlation between democratisation and violence include Latin America, the former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe,

as well as democratizing states in Africa, most notably South Africa itself (Barolsky and Pillay 2009: 17).

Although notions of social cohesion and nation-building have been articulated one way or another via documents such as the South African Constitution – which stresses the need for unity in diversity, among other things – it has been taken ‘on the ground’ to mean other things in addition to this constitutional ideal (Barolsky and Pillay 2009). People in a variety of contexts have cohered around what unites them and what sets them apart from other ethnic/cultural/socio-economic/political groups. Citing crime and violence as hindrances to social interaction between people and the “development of shared spaces of social citizenship”, Barolsky and Pillay (2009: 16) highlight the ways that citizens of different socio-economic standing have cohered differently in the South African context: affluent residents in gated communities, driven by fear of crime, have united against the poor, who are seen as a socio-economic threat, whereas in marginalised areas, residents have cohered around the notion of exclusion, as evidenced by the pronounced service delivery protests in these areas. In black townships, which have suffered “the structural violence of poverty and unemployment, [people have] cohered around that which comes from outside and threatens, or is perceived to threaten or impede, the life chances of local citizens” (Barolsky and Pillay 2009: 18). This explains the recurring violence against foreign African nationals (xenophobia) in Johannesburg and other South African metropolitan areas over the last few years. Chipkin and Ngqulunga (2008: 67) agree that “[s]ocial cohesion on the basis of a pan-African identity is weak in South Africa. Even if many South Africans identify with the continent, hostile behavior towards foreigners is the true measure of pan-African solidarity in South Africa”.

Chipkin and Ngqulunga refer to the high levels of crime and violence (including xenophobic violence)

in South African society and lament that a huge percentage of such crimes are “contact crimes ... in socio-economically depressed areas where there are high levels of unemployment, a proliferation of liquor outlets, an absence of community amenities, poor infrastructure and high levels of recidivism” (2008: 69). The most prevalent of these contact crimes is domestic violence, where women are more often than not on the receiving end. Chipkin and Ngqulunga argue that violence against women is largely due to a “crisis of patriarchal expectations of masculinity [...] in the face of unemployment, poverty and/or low incomes” (2008: 70). Coupled with women’s growing self-confidence and a need to be (financially) independent, this may be responsible for the decline in the number of marriages in South African as women become increasingly unwilling to marry. Marriage – and, by extension, the ‘conventional’ family (mother, father, and children) – can be a very restrictive institution for women in a patriarchal society, and this has an effect on the attainment of social cohesion. Chipkin and Ngqulunga argue that although there appears to be:

a shared commitment to the principles of diversity, equality and justice [as enshrined in the Constitution] ... [and] an overwhelming sense today that differences should be resolved through non-violent deliberation in parliamentary forums [...] [t]he faultlines in South African society are in the family and between friends (2008: 64, 69).

The issues of crime and violence as they relate to the family in South African society as a whole, are dealt with in *A National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society*, published by the South African national Department of Arts and Culture in 2012 after extensive consultation with a variety of stakeholders (DAC 2012a). The strategy emphasises social cohesion as the basis for nation-building.

2.2 Descriptions, definitions and dimensions

Social cohesion is presented by scholars as a multidimensional, diverse, fluid and complex concept, with different, sometimes hotly contested meanings,

for different actors (see Kearns and Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012; Norton and de Haan 2012). Bernard, for instance, refers to social

“

After achieving independence from colonial regimes, many appear to have understood social cohesion as nation-building, nationalism or peace building.

SEE HAYNES 2009; ORTMANN 2009; KPESSE, BELAND AND LECOURS 2011; ABRAHAMS 2016

”

cohesion as a:

quasi-concept, that is, one of those hybrid mental constructions that politics proposes to us more and more often in order to simultaneously detect possible consensuses on a reading of reality, and to forge them (Bernard 1999: 65, cited in Novy et al. 2012: 1873).

The impression given is that social cohesion is ‘a good thing’ and that everyone knows what it means, but the meaning is, in fact, very unclear. Kearns and Forrest argue that if the term is to function as a meaningful goal of government, “then greater clarity and consensus about its meaning and effects are required” (2000: 996). So what exactly is social cohesion, then?

Norton and de Haan (2012: 11) draw on descriptions and definitions of social cohesion from a wide range of academic sociological scholarship and international institutional policy to demonstrate the complexity, fluidity and multidimensionality of the concept:

Social cohesion is the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means (European Committee for Social Cohesion 2004).

[Social cohesion is] the dialectical relationship between mechanisms of social inclusion and people’s reactions, perceptions and attitudes to ways in which these mechanisms operate in producing a sense of belonging in society (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC).

[A] cohesive society is one that works towards the well-being of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding marginalization and entails fostering cohesion by building networks of relationships, trust and identity between different groups, fighting discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities, and enabling upward social mobility (OECD 2011).

Social cohesion ... a characteristic of a society dealing with the relations between societal units such as individuals, groups, associations as well as territorial units. (McCracken 1998).

Groups are cohesive when group-level conditions

are producing positive membership attitudes and behaviors and when group members’ interpersonal interactions are operating to maintain these group level conditions. Thus, cohesive groups are self-maintaining with respect to the production of strong membership attractions and attachments. [...] causally interrelated phenomena focused on individuals’ membership attitudes and behaviors, which deals with the social processes that link micro and macro-level outcomes and ultimately impact individual behavior (Friedkin 2004: 410).

[Social cohesion is] the capacity of societies, not merely groups and networks, to peacefully manage collective action problems (Woolcock 2011).

[Social cohesion is] the forces holding the individuals within the groupings in which they are (Moreno & Jennings 1937).

Norton and de Haan (2012: 10) perceive social cohesion to be a concept with a “normative character ... [which] suggests a need to take sides when formulating a definition”, and see the role of the state as a criterion critical to its characterisation and description. In their opinion, the role of the state is “inherent [to] and constitutive of social cohesion” (2013: 3), and instrumental in the three areas by which social cohesion can be characterised: a clarified sense of who belongs in a given social group or territory (national citizenship/ social membership); norms and values around fairness and equity; and access to livelihoods and basic services by individuals and households. In a socially cohesive society, the role of the state would be manifest in “institutions for peaceful management of rapid change” (Norton and de Haan 2012: 13).

Chipkin and Ngqulunga consider social cohesion, from a Marxist perspective, to be where:

citizens of the state share feelings of solidarity with their compatriots, and act on the basis of these feelings [...] as an affective bond (feelings of solidarity) between citizens [...] [T]he key measure of social cohesion in South Africa is the function of state bodies, rather than the stability of the political arena (2008: 61-62).

The South African national Department of Arts and Culture defined social cohesion as:

the degree of social interaction and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression among individuals and communities. In terms of this definition, a community or society is cohesive to the extent that the inequalities, exclusions and disparities based on ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age, disability

or any other distinctions which engender divisions, distrust and conflict are reduced and/or eliminated in a planned and sustainable manner. This, with community members and citizens as active participants, working together for the attainment of shared goals, designed and agreed upon to improve the living conditions for all (DAC 2012b).

2.3 Dimensions of social cohesion

The various definitions presented above demonstrate that, broadly speaking, social cohesion is a multidimensional concept relating to “diverse aspects of the dynamics of social relations, such as social exclusion ... belonging”, networks and solidarity (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1873). This study draws particularly on the authors’ articulation of five specific dimensions of social cohesion: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reduced inequalities; social networks and social capital; and territorial belonging and identity (Kearns and Forrest 2000). Below we discuss these five dimensions both as areas of contestation within the literature and as policy directions.

2.3.1 Common values and a civic culture

Norton and de Haan (2012: 3) argue that “social cohesion cannot really be separated from the generation of shared values, identities and norms”. Similarly, according to Kearns and Forrest, common values – ranging from cultural values to political and religious values – enable members of a society “to identify and support common aims and objectives, and share a common set of moral principles and codes of behavior [sic] through which to conduct their relations with one another” (2000: 997). Achieving common norms and values, and, by extension, a common national identity within a territory or community, may be accomplished through education and by ‘the family’, as an institution (Kearns and Forrest 2000; Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008; Norton and de Haan 2012). According to Kearns and Forrest (2000: 997), in a cohesive society, common values extend to – or should be particularly manifest in – citizens’ “support for political institutions and general engagement with political systems rather than indifference or disaffection

towards them”. Novy, Swiatek and Moulaert argue for a re-problematisation of social cohesion to encompass cultural, socioeconomic, political and ecological perspectives. They advocate for the cultural perspective of social cohesion to focus on “identity and common culture as key dimensions of belonging to a social whole” on the grounds that “[i]t is the lack of common norms and institutions providing for labour, social and political rights which is increasingly undermining social and territorial cohesion” (2012: 1879). Whereas Kearns and Forrest (2000) regard democratic participation and political engagement as being tied to common values and civic culture, Novy and colleagues (2012) argue for a separation of the political (citizenship and public/democratic participation) and the cultural (common values and identity) domains.

Scholars who view the notion of common or shared values and civic culture as the core of social cohesion have been critiqued for fostering essentialism, exclusion and wishing to force minority cultures to assimilate with a dominant mainstream culture (cf. Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012; Norton and de Haan 2012). Norton and de Haan suggest that common values are also entirely compatible with social division, since “[i]t is not hard to think of societies that are (crudely) cohesive in their capacity to generate exclusionary and xenophobic values, norms and actions” (2012: 10). They advocate instead, therefore, for social cohesion policies that “enable peaceful contestations, voice respect for cultural difference and broadly speaking build the freedoms of both individuals and groups” (2012: 10). Novy and colleagues similarly ‘push’ for advancement from “an essentialist and exclusionary concept of national citizenship which continuously produces ‘outsiders’, towards a scale-sensitive and inhabitant-centred



Photograph by Christina Culwick

conception of citizenship” (2012: 1884). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) states that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’, united in their diversity. It becomes important, as a result, to consider the extent to which residents of other nationalities are being catered for by national, provincial and local governments, especially in cultural contexts as diverse as Gauteng.

In an analysis of how social cohesion and nation-building have taken shape over the past decades in South Africa, Abrahams (2016) finds that the central conception of social cohesion in this country still appears to be nation-building. This “social cohesion nation-building complex” has been prescribed by government and is, among other objectives, based on ‘persuading’ people of their “South African-ness” (Abrahams 2016, 102). The populace is expected to enact this vision on the ground. While it has been fluid, constantly shifting, and, at times, has excluded other tribes, races, ethnicities and nationalities, however indirectly, it has always been embroiled in the “political imperative of a liberation party narrative” (Abrahams 2016). As a result, the social cohesion nation-building project in South Africa emphasises and reifies the hegemony of the dominant ruling party - the African National Congress (ANC) - played a critical role in liberating the country from apartheid. For this reason, social cohesion is inextricably bound up here with party politics (Abrahams 2016; Erwin 2017b).

2.3.2 Social order and social control

Social order and social control pertain to “the absence of general conflict within society and of any serious challenge for the existing order and system” (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 998). According to Wrong, social order is manifest in routine, mundane, day-to-day life activities, and it can be understood as “the conditions under which individuals and groups are prepared to co-operate with one another to reach common goals [...] Social order rests upon tolerance between individuals and groups (for example, between different ethnic groups and/or between the generations)” (1994 cited in Kearns and Forrest 2000: 998).

Social order is very much contingent on trust and it can be effected via coercive or repressive means or via subtle, co-optive means, which Nye (2004) refers to as ‘soft power.’ According to Kearns and Forrest, social

order can be achieved either “through the subordination of opposition by means of constraint and regulation ... [or via] more subtle means of achieving social control” (2000: 998). In the context of a city such as London, social order and social control manifest in the physical design of public space – human surveillance (security guards), technological surveillance (CCTV), fenced/fortified/privatised pseudo-public facilities meant to keep ‘undesirables’ out (Kearns and Forrest 2000; Novy et al. 2012). Scholars have attributed the decline of the public realm – “that public space which expresses the civic culture and in which the activities that bind a community can be undertaken” (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1007) – to overt social control and the ‘fixation’ with social order. Norton and de Haan critique the narrow conception of social order as a dimension of social cohesion:

A concern with social cohesion can lead to an inherently conservative perspective – where contestations, conflict, challenge, or even social change can be seen as working to undermine social stability (Norton and de Haan 2012: 4).

Kearns and Forrest argue that problems with social order and social control manifest at a micro or sub-local level as:

issues of crime, incivility and informal social control, not as major issues of legitimacy and revolution. Perhaps this is what happens when people with no jobs and no hope do not have the ‘dull routines’ to fall back on – they have no routines and only gain a sense of utility, efficacy and power through engaging in conflict with others, often over the defence of territory (Kearns and Forrest 2012: 998).

A look at townships, informal settlements and inner-city areas in Gauteng suggests that this is the case here as well, since some of these areas have experienced extreme xenophobic violence against foreign African nationals, violent service delivery protests, and violence against criminality (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008; Barolsky and Pillay 2009; Dirsuweit 2014). Citizens taking the law into their own hands in acts of ‘vigilante activism’ (mob justice) suggests a lack of faith in the state’s ability to control crime, which may be a response to an inefficient

police system and non-responsive Community Policing Forums (CPF) (Dirsuweit 2014). In taking action, citizens are asserting their own legitimacy, albeit via punitive and unlawful means. Is there a need, instead, for the (local) state in such areas to foster social order and social control as a means of achieving social cohesion? Erwin is of the opinion that one of the first steps towards the mitigation of such violence, the improvement of “community-level state–society relations” (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 668), and the realisation of social cohesion in South Africa, could be a ‘less talk, more action’ approach by government, or a translation of the social cohesion ideal(s) and discourse “from rhetoric to action” (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 38), since ‘actions speak louder than words’. The approach to social cohesion proposed by Erwin requires, as its basis, a “common provision of services” to citizens across the board (2017b: 42). According to Erwin (2017b), people in South Africa, regardless of their geographical location and family income, are lacking equal access to the amenities and services fundamental to the optimisation of their life chances – clinics, hospitals, housing, water, electricity, public schools, to mention but a prominent few. Diverting attention and funding from sports and the arts, which Erwin argues to have been the core focus of government’s budgetary allocations thus far, and investing instead in meeting the basic needs of the populace, would not only improve the overall wellbeing of the populace, it would also ensure that:

[p]eople are provided with the necessary basis for a socially coherent society through shared provision rather than an unobtainable common principle engineered by government ... [I]f common provision is taken seriously by government, it militates against retreating into fixed identities. It may even encourage a public dialogue on identities and differences prised free from being overdetermined by material wealth (Erwin 2017b: 42).

Erwin (2017b) implies that socio-political upheavals such as identity-based xenophobic violence and service delivery protests can be managed ‘materially’ in part, in all areas, via an emphasis on ‘infrastructural improvement’. The legacy of apartheid planning is spatially manifest in Gauteng, and metropolitan structures in the areas are increasingly identifying spatial transformation and spatial integration as

some of their main objectives. Consequently, it is essential to assess the extent to which socio-economic disparities are being addressed through social cohesion programmes in the city-region.

2.3.3 Social solidarity and reduced inequality

Novy, Swiatek and Moulaert (2012: 1878) describe a socially cohesive society as one in which “[s]olidarity and wealth and the reduction of income disparities are required to create equal opportunities and a sense of fairness. Solidarity is linked to forms of redistribution”. In the EU, social solidarity, as a prerequisite for, and a dimension of, social cohesion, is referred to as “the harmonious development of society and its constituent groups towards common economic, social and environmental standards”, which may be “achieved through the solidaristic redistribution of finances and opportunities between groups and places” (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 999). The notion of social cohesion as social solidarity and the addressing of exclusion is perhaps best expressed by Dahrendorf:

Social cohesion comes in to describe a society which offers opportunities to all its members within a framework of accepted values and institutions. Such a society is therefore one of inclusion. People belong; they are not allowed to be excluded (Dahrendorf 1995: viii, cited in Novy et al. 2012: 1878).

Social solidarity and the reduction of wealth disparities can manifest across various levels of government (supranational, national, regional and local) as well as in everyday, personal, non-state ways (for example, a willingness to assist the less well off with no expectation of anything in return) (Kearns and Forrest 2000). In metropolitan areas such as Gauteng, one way of redistributing wealth and enhancing social solidarity would be by enhancing equal access to services, infrastructure and utilities in the city-region – in terms of transport, housing, education, and health (Novy et al. 2012; Erwin 2017b). In some big cities, including Johannesburg, this has been attempted by a ‘one-city-one-tax-base’ approach, in which wealthier areas subsidise poorer areas, as opposed to ‘fiscal mercantilism’ and ring-fencing. Kearns and Forrest stress that this approach might not only help bring

about harmonious development and reduce inequality in society, but it might also promote “collective and personal well-being [because] income inequality brings about a breakdown in social cohesion through the stress, frustration and family disruption it causes, in turn leading to problems of crime and violence” (2000: 999).

In South Africa, social development programmes, including child support grants, and affirmative action initiatives such as Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment, can be viewed as a form of social solidarity that contributes to social cohesion (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008).

2.3.4 Social networks and social capital

Kearns and Forrest argue that cohesive societies are characterised by “a high degree of integration within communities and families” (2000: 999). However, social networks are not necessarily confined to the neighbourhood but stretch across cities, although immediate kinship links are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Social and support networks, of different kinds, are “the essence of social cohesion. And these sets of support networks may be spatially diffuse and may change over time” (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1000). Scholars have thus cautioned against the dangers of the ‘local’ trap in studying social networks, since social networks and support networks go beyond the community level, and perhaps even the city-region level (Kearns and Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012).

Social networks are also a crucial element in the grand theories around the concept of social capital that gained prominence in the 1990s through the writings of Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman (Kearns and Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012; Norton and de Haan 2012). One of the theorists of social capital, Putnam, argues that social capital is accumulated via a “mutual lubrication between trust and cooperation” (1998: 171, cited in Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1001) and, in addition, “[t]heories on social capital have emerged to explain the role of social networks in social cohesion through empowering excluded populations and helping them to participate in economic growth as well as in political decision-making” (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2007), and thus social inclusion. As a policy objective, social capital has found its niche in policies pertaining to urban regeneration and neighbourhood-based regeneration

initiatives (Kearns and Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012).

According to some scholars, the use of the term social cohesion by city institutions and policymakers, and even in some academic scholarship, is problematic in the sense that it tends to emphasise the positive implications of social networks and sociability and does not address the elephant in the room – coercive power and its associated conflicts (see Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Norton and de Haan 2012). A Bourdieuan perspective of social capital, in contrast, “emphasise[s] conflict and the power function of social capital which becomes a resource in the social struggles that are carried out in different social arenas or fields” (Novy et al. 2012: 1880). The issues of struggle and conflict that go hand-in-hand with social capital are generally ignored in policy (Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012). According to Eizaguirre and colleagues, ignoring issues of coercive power and the strategies that citizens develop in a bid to challenge policy initiatives, or in the absence of policy initiatives, is problematic because “it obviates the importance of citizens’ rights when citizens use political power to reshape policies that weaken those rights” (2012: 2013). They recognise that a narrow focus on social capital, that does not address the inherent differences and conflicts that materialise in society, is also an insufficient lens:

By focusing on social capital as a non-monetary fount of resources, the strength of the community is put at the centre of the analysis and at the core of policy makers’ policies without considering more costly economic solutions to economic problems (Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2013).

This is also reflected by Novy and colleagues (2012) in their analysis of the link between social cohesion and competitiveness in European urban policies. According to these scholars, it remains unclear whether social cohesion is an end in itself or is merely a functional means to an end (the end being competitiveness). They are of the opinion that this subordination of social cohesion and its objectives has undermined economic stability in Europe (Novy et al. 2012). A new way of approaching conflict and power relations within the city is thus required. Rather than placing the emphasis only on what local government is initiating

in cities and communities to enhance social cohesion, it is of paramount importance to also pay attention to initiatives by civil society and grassroots movements towards enhancing social cohesion (Novy et al. 2012).

2.3.5 Territorial belonging and identity

Kearns and Forrest consider “a strong attachment to place and the intertwining of people’s identities with that of places” to be important elements for social cohesion because of “their positive effects upon such things as the adherence to common values and norms and a willingness to participate in social networks and build social capital” (2000: 1001). Thus, places – or attachments to places – are critical aspects of people’s ability to cohere, since they “provide a symbolic bond to people, past experiences, ideas and culture (which collectively are important for cohesion)” (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1001). For this reason, people who feel that they belong to a particular ‘place’ – be it a nation, city-region or neighbourhood – care about what happens in a place, participate in its activities, and may even become territorial in their behaviour (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1001). According to Taylor, this “territorial functioning is relevant to group cohesiveness and solidarity” (1988, in Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1001). However, the potential disadvantages are contingent on the scale at which place attachment and territorial belonging occur. For instance, some residents of a local community within a city may feel like they belong to their respective neighbourhoods – or neighbourhoods which resemble theirs – but to nowhere else in the city:

The danger is that people may come to exist in small worlds – close or closed communities – as a result of which they do not share values, understandings and commitments with or to the wider society (and its constituent social groups) of which they are a part (Kearns and Forrest 2000: 1001).

According to Barolsky and Pillay (2009) and Dirsuweit (2014), this is evidenced in South African cities by privatisation of public spaces, suburban road closures, and the proliferation of gated communities in affluent neighbourhoods due, in large part, to a fear of crime. Several scholars argue that neighbourhoods and cities do not operate as ‘islands’ or in a vacuum (Kearns and

Forrest 2000; Eizaguirre et al. 2012; Novy et al. 2012). Consequently, as an antidote to limited place attachment and belonging at a city level, Kearns and Forrest advocate for cities to be planned and designed in such a way that they consist of “‘permeable places’ rather than ‘excluded states’” (2000: 1013).

Identity, of course, is more than just identifying with a particular place; social identities are another defining (sub-)dimension of social cohesion. As Haynes explains:

[Identity] is normally applied to individuals, [but] it can also be a collective concept, extending to groups, communities and even countries in relation to their various ethnic, religious and cultural entities [...] Many identities are based on shared values, beliefs or concerns that ... include religion ... political ideologies, ethnicity, national or culture (Haynes 2009: 56).

The use of identity as a basis for social cohesion and nation-building is particularly evident in the culturally diverse city-state of Singapore. In his analysis of the politics of citizenship and inventing national identity in Singapore, Ortman refers to two types of national identity – ethnic and civic national identity. “The most crucial difference between the two is that in the former, citizenship is believed to be inherited from birth, while in the latter, it is voluntaristic and can be acquired” (2009: 25). Singapore’s multi-ethnic heterogeneity – due in large part to immigration – is the basis for Clammer’s assertion that “Singaporeans are characterized by citizenship and not national identity” (1995, in Ortman 2009: 25). In an attempt to foster national solidarity in Singapore, national identity, as a government project in the city-state, emphasises civic nationalism symbolised by civic symbols such as a National Day, a national flag, a national oath of allegiance and the constitution. One of the ways of communicating this discourse has been through music (Ortman 2009: 25). This project has, nevertheless, been done in a top-down, authoritarian manner that promotes the interests and brand of the ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), over others:

The link between the [People’s Action] party and the nation is symbolized in the distinct similarity between the party pledge and the national pledge. This perception

has also contributed to the opinion within the ruling party that legitimate opposition cannot come from other parties (Ortmann 2009: 28).

According to Ortmann (2009), the construction of a national identity in Singapore in this regard seems to promote ethnic nationalism because it favours one group (the ruling party) over others and gives the impression that the ruling party is ordained to rule Singapore without opposition. According to Abrahams, the situation is similar in South Africa, where social cohesion as a discourse has not been widened to include, equally, both those who support the ANC's national vision and those who do not (2016: 107). Ortmann (2009) finds the situation in Singapore problematic by virtue of the tensions it has created on the ground. Singaporeans rejected the government's top-down discourse on national identity via appropriation of the national artefacts and have mobilised and challenged national government directly. Ortmann (2009) considers

it progressive to de-emphasise a national identity (especially one that reifies a political regime) and instead place more emphasis on civic national identity and democratisation.

Several other scholars have also cautioned against an emphasis on an ethnic national identity on the grounds that it creates exclusivist tribal, racial, and xenophobic tensions (see Haynes 2009; Kpessa et al. 2011; Norton and de Haan 2012; Abrahams 2016; Erwin 2017b). Haynes refers to these tropes as 'destructive identities' (2009: 57): "Such a situation can be exacerbated by the actions of political leaders – individuals who may seek to benefit personally from construction of exclusivist identities – as a result of arousing the emotions and enmity of members of their group against others" (Haynes 2009: 57). It can be argued then that identity – and by extension, social cohesion – is a social construct that is potentially liable to being held hostage by partisan politics and political motives.

2.4 Conclusion

Social cohesion is hard to pin down because the concept is fluid, ambiguous and multidimensional. As pointed out, social cohesion entails, at the broadest level, cultural, redistributive and relational dimensions (Sole et al. 2011, in Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2007). The cultural dimensions – 'common shared values and a civic culture' and 'territorial belonging and identity' – pertain to, or result from, shared values, norms and identities. Redistributive dimensions such as 'social solidarity and

reduced wealth disparities' may derive from policies promoting redistribution and socio-economic inclusion. The relational dimensions of social cohesion result from the promotion of social capital (Sole et al. 2011, in Eizaguirre et al. 2012: 2007) and are seen in 'social networks and social capital' and 'social order and social control'. However, it is important to recognise that these three dimensions are themselves intertwined and thus cannot be confined to just one of these broad categories.



Photograph by Craig Higson-Smith



Chapter 3

Social attitudes in Gauteng

CHRISTIAN HAMANN

Key points:

- Census data shows a high level of racial segregation in Gauteng. The City of Johannesburg exhibits relatively higher levels of racial diversity at ward level than other municipalities.
- Some wards have a comparatively high degree of racial mixing while others, townships, for example, do not. However, while these spaces might appear to be racially homogenous, they are in fact far more language-diverse than racially-mixed wards.
- Some wards are more class-diverse than others. However, this is unlikely to mean that there is a great deal of social integration between people of extremely different incomes. Spatial mixing might not mean integration but rather that segregation is occurring at a sub-ward level.
- Respondents were asked whether they identified most strongly with their race, gender, nationality, class, religious group, clan, neighbourhood or as individuals. Just over a fifth of respondents in Gauteng identify most strongly with their nationality (largely South African) and one fifth identify strongly with their demographic group (race and gender).
- Responses on place attachment are ambivalent. Although some responses seem to be contradictory (people like living in Gauteng but would emigrate if they could), these are not mutually exclusive because people have shifting aspirations and capacities related to migration.
- Gauteng respondents' strongest shared belief (79% agree) is that Gauteng would be a better place if we all still believed in the rainbow nation.
- The survey, which was conducted before the 2016 local government elections, showed that one in 13 residents in Gauteng planned to abstain from voting despite being registered to vote, mostly because of a general dislike and mistrust of politics.
- Trust levels within communities have generally been declining since 2009. Only 14% of respondents in Gauteng feel that most people within their community can be trusted.
- The spatial patterns of trust levels suggest that one can expect to find lower levels of trust in the economically marginalised areas of Gauteng.
- Almost 60% of Gauteng's respondents agreed with the statement 'Blacks and whites will never really trust each other', while a quarter of the sample disagreed with the statement. White respondents were most likely to disagree with the statement, as were affluent respondents.
- Respondents largely rejected statements such as 'South Africa belongs more to blacks than other population groups';

‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’; and ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’. However, respondents were less likely to agree with the statement ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’. These attitudes varied, particularly with the race and income of respondents.

- When asked to choose between these statements: ‘Gauteng should be for South Africans only. They must send the foreigners back to their countries.’; ‘A lot of foreigners came to work in South Africa for poor wages under apartheid. We all suffered under the same system. They should be allowed to stay.’; and ‘Foreigners living in Gauteng are alright, but only if they have legal permission from the government’, most respondents chose the last option.
- Most respondents did not endorse violence against foreigners. Respondents who did endorse violence are concentrated in isolated wards around the province.
- 43% of respondents supported reinstating influx control to restrict internal migration.
- In Gauteng, 56% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’ while 29% of respondents disagreed with the statement. This measure is related to the age of the respondent, with older respondents being less likely to agree.
- In Gauteng, 15% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’. In comparison, 4% said it was acceptable to be violent towards foreigners, and 2% felt that it was acceptable for a man to beat his partner.

3.1 Introduction

This section of the report is a benchmarking exercise to compare the attitudes of respondents across municipalities in Gauteng. This comparison is based on results from the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) Quality of Life (QoL) IV (2015/16) survey, supplemented with data from previous QoL surveys and national census data from Statistics South Africa¹. The QoL IV (2015/16) survey, conducted during 2015 and 2016, is the fourth biennial survey conducted by the GCRO, and the results are based on the circumstances and views of 30 002 respondents in Gauteng province. The survey, which included more than 200 questions, asked a range of questions about social and political perceptions, and sourced opinions on issues of race and transformation, belonging, sexuality and attitudes towards violence.

A summary of respondents’ answers to attitudinal questions in the QoL IV (2015/16) survey is provided in Figure 2. This snapshot shows us that in the context of a survey, many residents of Gauteng identify with the province, express tolerant attitudes, reject violence, and

expect there to be trust between groupings. However, some participants did respond in a way that suggests intolerance, alienation, a willingness to exclude and, in a small minority of cases, the acceptability of violence towards minorities. The more detailed sections below consider whether these views vary according to population group, age, income and geography and how specific municipalities compare to the provincial average.

Section 3.2 explores different expressions of diversity within Gauteng. Section 3.3 investigates residents’ responses to questions of identity, place attachment, participation in public affairs and shared beliefs. Sections 3.4 to 3.7 examine, in depth, specific social attitudes including issues of trust, belonging, inclusion and exclusion, as well as attitudes towards two specific minority groups – migrants and gay and lesbian people. These results are expressed against a variety of population subdivisions, with a focus on the differences between population groups, age groups, and income groups.

1. The maps and tables in this chapter show data for the old municipalities of Randfontein and Westonaria separately. GCRO recognises that these two municipalities were amalgamated to form the Rand West City Local Municipality in September 2016. However this chapter is based on data from the QoL IV (2015/16) survey which was collected when the two municipalities were still separate, and there are significant differences between the two areas that are worth highlighting.

Figure 2: A summary of respondents' attitudes

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)




Table 1: Data used to calculate diversity

	Racial diversity	Spoken language diversity ³	Income diversity
Data source	GCRO QoL IV survey (2015/16)	2011 National Census Counts (Statistics South Africa 2011)	GCRO QoL IV survey (2015/16)
Social attributes	African Coloured Indian/Asian White	Afrikaans; English; IsiNdebele; IsiXhosa; IsiZulu; Sepedi; Sesotho; Setswana; SiSwati; Tshivenda; Xitsonga	No income R1 - R800 R801 - R3 200 R3 201 - R6 400 R6 401 - R12 800 R12 801 - R25 600 R25 601 - R51 200 R51 201 or more
Maximum level of diversity achievable	1.38	2.39	2.07

3.2 Desegregation in Gauteng

Diversity in Gauteng should be viewed as having a variety of dimensions. For example, racial diversity provides valuable insights into processes of racial mixing, but it obscures other indicators of diversity such as language and income.

In Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5, insights into racial diversity, spoken language diversity and income diversity are mapped. The data sources and social attributes used to determine diversity are provided in Table 1. Each representation of diversity² tells its own story of the social and economic composition of wards in Gauteng and collectively these representations show how different dimensions of diversity shape the city-region.

In terms of racial diversity (Figure 3), it is clear that the wards in Gauteng with relatively high racial diversity (the darkest shading on the map below) are mostly concentrated in Johannesburg, apart from a handful of wards in Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Emfuleni. A closer look at the spatial pattern of high and low racial diversity

in Gauteng reveals a stark contrast between racial diversity in former townships and established suburban areas. Wards in the City of Johannesburg that encompass former township areas (like Alexandra, Diepsloot, Orange Farm and Soweto), and the inner city, show much lower racial diversity than wards encompassing the northern suburbs of Johannesburg (like Midrand and Roodepoort). Although Johannesburg is the least racially segregated metropolitan municipality in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 2016), integration is only taking place in certain spaces, polarising high and low diversity, as seen in this representation. Similar contrasts are also seen in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni between areas such as Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Soshanguve and Centurion as well as between Tembisa, Katlehong and Benoni. This view of racial diversity gives the sense that people in some parts of the city-region remain segregated from other population groups and that many parts of the city-region are not diverse in terms of population composition.

2. Diversity is represented with an entropy score per ward (Parry and Van Eeden 2015). The entropy score (where n is the number of social attributes considered in a subunit and p_r is the proportion of the subunit's total population belonging to social attribute r) is calculated as follows:

$$E = \sum_{r=1}^n p_r \ln \left(\frac{1}{p_r} \right)$$


In an area where n represents the number of social attributes in a subunit, E will vary between 0 and its maximum value of $\ln(n)$.

3. Spoken language in the census refers to language most often spoken at home by the respondents, irrespective of their mother tongue.

Figure 3: Racial diversity

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Entropy score per ward




Diversity in Gauteng takes on a completely different character when we consider the diversity of spoken languages in wards (Figure 4). Many wards that have low levels of racial diversity, such as townships, have very high levels of language diversity, while some wards with higher racial diversity have lower levels of language

diversity. In townships the people are more likely to speak a combination of indigenous southern African languages (such as IsiZulu, Sesotho, Setswana, Sepedi, Xitsonga and IsiXhosa), whereas in racially mixed areas people are more likely to have adopted English as their spoken language (GCRO 2013).

Figure 4: Spoken language diversity

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: Statistics South Africa 2011



Entropy score per ward




In addition to racial diversity and spoken language diversity (which provide two contrasting pictures of diversity in Gauteng), we can also apply the technique to show income diversity (Figure 5). Income diversity provides a valuable indication of the extent to which affluent and poorer households live within the same ward. The spatial patterns of income diversity should be interpreted with the knowledge that income

distribution in Gauteng is extremely uneven. Generally, the metropolitan municipalities have higher median incomes than the district municipalities, but there is also a lot of unevenness within municipalities. In Johannesburg and Tshwane there are distinct differences in income between the north and the south of the municipalities while Ekurhuleni exhibits similar income distinction but between its central and its

Figure 5: Income diversity

GCR0

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Entropy score per ward



peripheral areas (Wray et al. 2014). In Figure 5, the patterns of high and low income diversity are not as clear as the general income distribution in the province. The ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ do not co-exist within the same ward in areas with lower income diversity. Higher income diversity, on the other hand, indicates that residents who have vastly different income levels are living within the same ward. For example, in the Honeydew area of Johannesburg (where income diversity is high)

the residents of the mostly poor Zandspruit informal settlement live in very close proximity to the residents of the Jackal Creek golf estate and other wealthy areas. Mixing is, of course, not the same thing as social integration. The fact that rich and poor live in one ward does have some important implications but it does not necessarily mean that the ward has been transformed away from class segregation in a more substantive sense.

3.3 Identity, place attachment, shared beliefs and participation

According to some frameworks, social cohesion is fostered through identity, place attachment and participation (Jenson 1998). In this section we consider the views of respondents in the QoL IV (2015/16) survey with regard to a variety of attitudes ranging from their identity to their participation in public affairs.

3.3.1 Identity

Respondents in the QoL IV (2015/16) survey were asked to indicate if they associate themselves with one kind of group identity (Table 2). A fifth said that they identified

most strongly with their race, while 18% said they identified most strongly with their gender. Respondents in Johannesburg identified most strongly with nationality (24%), while the most prominent responses in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni were gender (20%) and race (25%), respectively.

In Gauteng, almost a fifth of respondents said that they did not identify with any group but rather considered their individual identity to be the most important.

Table 2: ‘Which of the following do you most strongly identify with’, by metropolitan municipality

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

	Gauteng	Johannesburg	Tshwane	Ekurhuleni
Race	20%	19%	18%	25%
Gender	18%	15%	20%	20%
Nationality	22%	24%	19%	22%
Class	3%	3%	3%	2%
Religious group	10%	10%	13%	8%
Clan	1%	1%	1%	2%
Neighbourhood	8%	9%	7%	6%
No one, I’m an individual	17%	20%	17%	15%

3.3.2 Place attachment


According to the QoL IV (2015/16) survey 65% of respondents in Gauteng agreed that ‘Gauteng is the best province and I’d rather live here than anywhere else’ (Figure 6). Respondents’ attachment to Gauteng is very similar across metropolitan municipalities with greater variation among local municipalities. In Randfontein, for

example, 79% of respondents agreed with the statement (the highest proportion in Gauteng) while in Lesedi 57% of respondents agreed with it (the lowest proportion in Gauteng). Despite this sense of satisfaction with living in Gauteng, there were large proportions of respondents who agreed (more than 30% in all municipalities apart from Midvaal and Emfuleni) that they would emigrate

Figure 6: ‘Gauteng is the best province and I’d rather live here than anywhere else’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




tomorrow if they could (Figure 7). The largest proportion of respondents who indicated that they would emigrate if they could, was in Westonaria (37%). In Johannesburg, 32% of respondents indicated that they would emigrate tomorrow if they could, compared to 32% and 33% in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni respectively. The questions are not mutually exclusive, simply because people have different aspirations and capacities related to migration.

In this regard, 4% of respondents in Johannesburg strongly agreed that Gauteng is the best province to live in while also strongly agreeing that they would emigrate tomorrow if they could. The same is true of 4% of respondents in Tshwane and 5% of respondents in Ekurhuleni. (Note that this survey was conducted prior to the amalgamation of Westonaira and Randfontein into Rand West City).

Figure 7: ‘I would emigrate tomorrow if I could’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.3.3 Shared beliefs and participation

As Table 3 shows, 76% of respondents regard Gauteng as their home and 79% of Gauteng respondents agreed that Gauteng would be a better place if we all still believed in the rainbow nation. In Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Merafong, Mogale City, Randfontein and Westonaria the proportion of respondents who felt that Gauteng would be better if we all still believed in the rainbow nation exceeded the proportion of respondents who regard Gauteng as their home. The opposite was true in Tshwane, Emfuleni, Lesedi and Midvaal.

Despite strong shared beliefs in Gauteng, there are also numerous respondents who feel that they are not needed by the South African economy and who were not planning to vote in 2016 local elections despite being

registered to vote. On average, one in five residents in Gauteng felt that they were not needed by the South African economy while one in 13 residents in Gauteng planned to abstain from voting despite being registered to vote in the 2016 local elections (Table 3). Among the metropolitan municipalities, Tshwane had the highest proportions of respondents who felt that they were not needed by the South African economy and who stated that they were not going to vote in the 2016 local elections. Among other municipalities, the highest proportion of respondents who felt they were not needed by the South African economy was in Lesedi (33%) while the highest proportions of respondents who planned to abstain from voting despite being registered to vote were in Emfuleni (10%).

Table 3: Questions related to place attachment, shared beliefs and participation, by municipality

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

	Respondents who regard Gauteng as their 'home' (irrespective of where they come from)	Respondents who agreed that Gauteng would be a better place if we all still believed in the rainbow nation	Respondents who agreed that they are not needed by the South African economy	Respondents in Gauteng who are registered to vote but who were not planning to vote in the 2016 local elections
Gauteng	76%	79%	19%	8%
Johannesburg	73%	80%	17%	8%
Tshwane	80%	75%	22%	10%
Ekurhuleni	76%	82%	19%	6%
Emfuleni	90%	68%	21%	10%
Lesedi	92%	72%	33%	6%
Midvaal	85%	78%	24%	3%
Merafong	64%	89%	13%	8%
Mogale City	76%	92%	12%	7%
Randfontein	81%	94%	9%	8%
Westonaria	57%	92%	20%	9%

In order to understand voter participation, it is necessary to consider the social attributes of those respondents who are registered to vote but were not planning to vote in the 2016 local elections (Table 4), as well as the reasons why respondents did not take up their opportunity to vote (Table 5). In Gauteng, the white population (9%) were the most likely to abstain from voting while the Indian/Asian population were the least likely to abstain (6%). Variations among population groups were small in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni, while variations among population groups were somewhat larger in Tshwane. There were not very large variations by age, but it is evident that respondents in Gauteng who were aged between 18 and 24 years were slightly less likely to abstain from voting than older respondents. This holds true across the province and

the three metropolitan municipalities. Respondents aged between 40 and 54 years seemed the most likely to abstain from voting despite being registered to vote in the 2016 local elections. In Gauteng, there was more significant variation among respondents from different income groups than the two previous measures. Respondents from households with a monthly income of more than R38 401 were more likely to abstain from voting than respondents from households with lower monthly incomes. Interestingly, there was no variation among respondents from different income groups in Johannesburg and minimal variation among respondents in Ekurhuleni. This clearly suggests that, in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni at least, respondents' income does not significantly increase or decrease participation in formal political processes.

Table 4: Respondents in Gauteng who are registered to vote but who were not planning to vote in the 2016 local elections

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

Population Group	Gauteng	Johannesburg	Tshwane	Ekurhuleni
African	8%	8%	9%	6%
Coloured	7%	6%	14%	6%
Indian/Asian	6%	7%	8%	3%
White	9%	9%	12%	7%
Age Group				
18 - 24 years	6%	7%	7%	5%
25 - 39 years	8%	8%	10%	6%
40 - 54 years	9%	9%	11%	7%
55+ years	8%	8%	10%	7%
Monthly household income				
R0 - R1 600	8%	8%	9%	6%
R1 601 - R12 800	7%	8%	8%	6%
R12 801 - R38 400	8%	8%	10%	6%
More than R38 401	11%	8%	17%	8%

Respondents had a variety of reasons why they decided to abstain from voting. The most common reasons are summarised below for Gauteng and for each metropolitan municipality (Table 5). In Gauteng, 38% of respondents planned to abstain from voting because they do not like politics, the nature of politics or because they regard it as a waste of time, while 33% of respondents planned to abstain from voting because they do not think

that their vote will make a difference. About 11% of respondents who planned to abstain from voting did so simply because they do not care about voting. Reasons for not voting varied somewhat between the metropolitan municipalities, but in all metropolitan municipalities a general dislike of politics and a sense that votes do not make a difference were prominent.

Table 5: Reasons why respondents who are registered to vote were not planning to vote in the 2016 local elections

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

	Gauteng	Johannesburg	Tshwane	Ekurhuleni
I don't know who to vote for	7%	6%	10%	8%
I don't think my vote will make any difference	33%	30%	29%	36%
I don't care	11%	12%	12%	10%
I don't have an ID	1%	1%	1%	1%
I don't like politics/broken promises/it's a waste of time	38%	41%	38%	39%
Local elections don't matter	5%	5%	7%	3%

3.4 Trust

Trust among people is an important component of social cohesion. It is important for various reasons, including the fact that higher levels of trust (which are difficult to foster in diverse societies) generally provide a better sense of community (Hooghe, Reeskens, and Stolle 2007) and because trust is noted as an important part of interracial reconciliation (Wale 2013). Literature on social capital also suggests that trust is an important basis for social, economic and political functioning (Putman 1993). In this section, we analyse trust at a community level as well as trust between population groups.


3.4.1 Assessing trust within communities

Respondents in the QoL IV survey (2015/16) were asked whether they felt that most people in their community (as they define it) can be trusted or whether they feel that they need to be very careful when dealing with people in their community. The proportion of respondents in Gauteng who felt that most people in their community could be trusted was very low, at 14% (Figure 8). The municipality with the highest proportion of respondents who felt they could trust others in their community was Emfuleni (18%) while the lowest was Ekurhuleni (12%). The City of Johannesburg (16%) had the highest community trust levels among the three metropolitan municipalities.

Figure 8: Trust within communities, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Trust within communities has generally been declining since 2009 when the first QoL survey was conducted in Gauteng (Figure 9). The rate of decline in Gauteng is emulated in Johannesburg, but is significantly less

volatile than trust levels in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. The fact that the trend is generally declining is a concern for the immediate future of social cohesion in Gauteng.

Figure 9: ‘Most people in my community can be trusted’, by metropolitan municipality, since 2009

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL 2009, 2011, 2013/14, 2015/16



“Trust within communities has generally been declining since 2009 when the first QoL survey was conducted in Gauteng.”

In addition to varying over time, there is also significant spatial variation for trust levels within wards in Gauteng (Figure 10). In wards with the worst trust levels (where the proportion of respondents who trust the people in their community is less than 8.5% per ward), only one in every 18 respondents felt that people in their community could be trusted. These wards were spread throughout the province. There are interesting spatial patterns that emerge within specific municipalities. For example, trust levels were somewhat weaker in the southern parts of

Johannesburg than in the central and northern parts of the city. Respondents in and around the inner city also seemed less likely to trust members of their community. Figure 10 shows that there were higher levels of trust in Johannesburg as a whole compared to other municipalities in Gauteng. In Tshwane, the wards on the south western and north western boundaries of the municipality had markedly lower levels of community trust than other parts of the municipality.

Figure 10: ‘Most people in my community can be trusted’

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)





Figure 11 shows that the proportion of respondents who felt that most people in their community could be trusted varied somewhat by population groups and age, but most significantly by income. 14% of respondents from households with a monthly income of less than R1 600 felt that most people in their community could be trusted, compared to 21% of respondents from

households with a monthly income of more than R38 401. In terms of population groups, the white (17%) and Indian/Asian (17%) populations were most likely to trust people in their community, while by age group, respondents aged 55 years and older (17%) were the most likely to trust people in their community.

Figure 11: Trust within communities by population group, age group and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.4.2 Perceived trust between blacks and the whites

Another dimension of trust related to social cohesion is the (perceived) trust between population groups. First, we consider to what extent respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’ in each municipality in Gauteng (Figure 12). Only 24% of respondents disagreed with the statement while 58% agreed with it. Ekurhuleni (64%) and Randfontein (64%) had the highest proportions of respondents who agreed with the statement. Among the metropolitan municipalities, Johannesburg (55%) had the smallest proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement and also the


largest proportion of respondents (28%) who disagreed with the statement.

Perceived trust between black and white people varied according to population group, age group and income group. We compared opinions for Gauteng as a whole, with Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Figure 13 shows that whites in Johannesburg, Tshwane and the province overall were the most likely to disagree with the statement and also least likely to agree with the statement. In Ekurhuleni, coloureds were slightly more likely to disagree with the statement while whites and Indian/Asians were equally likely to agree with the statement. Trends in Johannesburg were similar to provincial trends.

Figure 12: ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




“Literature on social capital suggests that trust is an important basis for social, economic and political functioning.”

Figure 13: ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Reservations about trust between blacks and whites did not vary as significantly between age groups as they did between populations groups (Figure 14). In Gauteng, 26% of older respondents (aged 55 years and older) disagreed

with the statement while 56% agreed with the statement. On average, 24% of respondents younger than 55 years disagreed with the statement and an average of 59% agreed with the statement.

Figure 14: ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Perceived trust between races tends to increase as income increases, especially for Gauteng as a whole and Johannesburg (Figure 15). In Gauteng, 36% of respondents from households that earn more than R38 400 per month disagreed with the statement, compared to 23% of respondents from households that earn less than R1 600 per month. This trend is similar in Johannesburg, but the strength of this relationship is markedly stronger in Johannesburg than in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni.


Interracial trust levels have a particularly interesting spatial distribution (Figure 16). Pockets where large proportions of a ward agreed with the statement were distributed throughout the province but were more often than not associated with areas with low levels of racial diversity. These patterns also relate to the income geography of the city-region as noted in Figure

15 above. The City of Johannesburg is a particularly interesting example, where it is clear that the city is shaped by contrasting opinions in the south-west and the north-east of the city. Respondents in the north-east of the city were more likely to disagree that blacks and whites will never really trust each other. By comparison, respondents in the south-west of the city were more likely to agree with the statement. The ‘north’ and the ‘south’ of Johannesburg are vastly different spaces, not only in terms of income, but also in terms of the degree of ward level population group and language group mixing. Such a clear distinction between ward level attitudes is not evident in the other metropolitan municipalities, but there is significant spatial evidence to suggest that trust levels are most likely to be low in former township areas in the province.

Figure 15: ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCR0

DATA SOURCE: GCR0 QoL IV (2015/16)






Photograph by Christina Culwick


Figure 16: ‘Blacks and whites will never really trust each other’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Percentage ‘agree’ per ward



3.5 Race and belonging

Senses of belonging and inclusion are important components of social cohesion. In this section we provide an analysis of four questions from the QoL IV (2015/16) survey that provides some indication of whether population groups regard each other as belonging equally in South Africa and Gauteng.

3.5.1 South Africa belongs more to black people than other population groups

In Gauteng, 34% of respondents agreed that ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than coloureds, Indians or whites’ while 49% of respondents disagreed


with the statement (Figure 17). The percentage of respondents who agreed in Johannesburg (31%) was lower than the other metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng (39% in Tshwane and 35% in Ekurhuleni).

Municipalities on the southern periphery of the province (Lesedi at 47%, Emfuleni at 41% and Midvaal at 39%) had the highest proportions of respondents who agreed with the statement while municipalities on the western edge of the province (Westonaria at 18%, Randfontein at 22%, Mogale City at 20% and Merafong at 22%) had the lowest proportions of respondents who agreed with the statement.

Figure 17: ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Across all population groups in Gauteng, respondents were noticeably more likely to disagree with the statement 'South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites' than agree with the statement (Figure 18). In Tshwane the split between

respondents who agreed and those who disagreed was more even. African respondents were the most likely to support the statement of all the population groups, although more African respondents rejected the statement than accepted it.

Figure 18: 'South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites', by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Opinions about belonging did not vary much between age groups (Figure 19). In Gauteng, respondents from all age groups were more likely to disagree with the statement (around 50% in each age group). Although the variation

within age groups in each metropolitan municipality was minimal, the proportion of respondents in each age group who disagreed with the statement was lower in Tshwane than in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni.

Figure 19: ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Views on whether South Africa belongs more to black people than other population groups varied slightly by income (Figure 20). Trends in Gauteng are emulated in Johannesburg and indicate that respondents from households with a higher monthly income were more likely to disagree with the statement (58% for respondents in households earning more than R38 400 a

month) than respondents from households with a lower monthly income (48% for respondents in households earning less than R1 600 a month). Variations between income groups were much less in Tshwane while Ekurhuleni showed a jump in the proportion of respondents who disagreed with the statement when household earnings exceed R12 800 per month.

Figure 20: ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)




The spatial distribution of these attitudes per ward (Figure 21) shows a number of areas in Gauteng where up to 71% of respondents agreed that ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites’. These were mostly in northern Tshwane, Lesedi and Emfuleni. The spatial distribution of these attitudes in Gauteng shows that some peripheral municipalities

have greater proportions of respondents with much harsher attitudes than other municipalities. Numerous wards in Lesedi, Midvaal and Emfuleni had at least 48% of the population in agreement with the statement. In the municipalities on the western edge of the province, only one ward had an equally large proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement.

Figure 21: ‘South Africa belongs more to black people than to coloureds, Indians or whites’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.5.2 A place for white people in South Africa


Respondents in the QoL IV (2015/16) survey were also asked to indicate to what extent they agree with the statement that ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’. On average, 22% of respondents in Gauteng agreed with this statement (Figure 22). Lesedi (34%), Midvaal (28%) and Emfuleni (27%)

were the municipalities with the largest proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement. The municipalities on the western edge of the province had the lowest proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement. Only 19% of respondents in Johannesburg agreed with this statement, fewer than in Tshwane (25%) and Ekurhuleni (24%).

Figure 22: ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’, by municipality

GCR0

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Responses varied somewhat by population group (Figure 23). About two thirds of Indians/Asians and whites disagreed with the statement, whereas 60% of Africans disagreed. Respondents in Johannesburg seemed less likely to agree with the statement than most of their counterparts residing in Tshwane and

Ekurhuleni. Variations in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni are slightly different in the sense that the white population does not stand out as the population group that is most likely to disagree with the statement in the same way as it does in Johannesburg and in Gauteng as a whole.

Figure 23: ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Opinions over the belonging of white people in South Africa were spread evenly between age groups (Figure 24). In Gauteng, respondents aged between 18 and 24 years (63%) as well as those aged between 40 and 54 years (62%) were slightly more likely to disagree with the statement than other age groups. Respondents residing

in Johannesburg were the most likely to disagree with the statement and that holds for all age groups considered there. Tshwane was the only metropolitan municipality where the average of respondents who disagreed with the statement in each age group was below 60%.

Figure 24: ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)





Photograph by Alet Pretorius


Views on whether white people have a place in South Africa today varied somewhat by income group (Figure 25). Following the pattern of previous findings, respondents from wealthier households were more likely to disagree with the statement ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’ than comparatively poorer respondents. In Gauteng, 69% of respondents from households that earn more than R38 400 per

month disagreed with the statement, compared to 60% of respondents from households that earn less than R1 600 per month and disagreed with the statement. This trend was even stronger in Johannesburg where the difference between the higher income households who disagreed and lower income households who disagreed was 13%. The differences in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni were smaller.

Figure 25: ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




The fact that most respondents shared common views on the place of white people in South Africa is reflected in the spatial distribution of these attitudes per ward in Gauteng (Figure 26). Very little variation occurs between wards, apart from a few wards across the

province where at least 40% of respondents agreed that ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’. A prominent cluster of such wards were located in northern Tshwane and Lesedi.

Figure 26: ‘There is no place for white people in South Africa today’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Percentage ‘agree’ per ward



3.5.3 Indians’ entitlement to affirmative action benefits


Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the statement ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’. In Gauteng, 29% of respondents agreed with this statement (Figure 27). The proportion of respondents per municipality who agreed with the statement varied much less than the proportion of respondents per municipality who disagreed with the statement. Johannesburg had the largest proportion of

respondents who disagreed (50%) with the statement, closely followed by Ekurhuleni (48%), Midvaal (46%) and Tshwane (43%). Johannesburg also had the smallest proportion of respondents who agreed (27%) with the statement, closely followed by Ekurhuleni and Emfuleni (28% each), Tshwane and Midvaal (30% each). Lesedi had the largest proportion of respondents who agreed (38%) and the smallest proportion of respondents who disagreed (33%).

Figure 27: ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Responses across population groups varied significantly (Figure 28). Unsurprisingly Indian/Asian respondents were the most likely to disagree with the statement in Gauteng and across all metropolitan municipalities.

This was followed in most instances by the white population and then the coloured population. African respondents were the least likely to disagree and the most likely to agree.

Figure 28: ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Opinions on whether Indians deserve to benefit from affirmative action did not vary much across different age groups in Gauteng (Figure 29). In Johannesburg older respondents were marginally less likely to disagree with the statement than younger respondents.

In Johannesburg, 44% of respondents aged between 18 and 24 years disagreed with the statement compared to 42% of respondents aged 55 years and older. Variations in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni were minimal.

Figure 29: ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)




There was a greater degree of variation between income groups than between age groups, especially among the metropolitan municipalities (Figure 30). Overall, respondents in households that earn more than R12 801 per month were more likely to disagree with the statement (on average 53%) than respondents in

households that earn less than R12 800 per month (on average 46%). A similar trend was seen in Johannesburg and Tshwane. Data for Ekurhuleni, however, shows that respondents in poorer households were slightly more likely to disagree with the statement than respondents in wealthier households.

Figure 30: ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



The spatial distribution of these responses showed interesting variation across the municipalities in Gauteng (Figure 31). Each of the three metropolitan municipalities had a cluster of wards where less than 17% of respondents agreed with the statement that 'Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action' and in each case some relationship to the income distribution in the metropolitan municipality was evident. A particularly stark contrast was evident between opinions in the north of Johannesburg and the south. Respondents

in the south of Johannesburg were more likely to agree with the statement 'Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action' than respondents in the north of Johannesburg. In Tshwane, a contrast was found between former township areas in the north (where more respondents per ward agreed with the statement) and suburbs in the south-east of Tshwane (where fewer respondents per ward agreed with the statement), while in Ekurhuleni the contrast was visible between southern township areas and central suburban areas




Photograph by Darya Maslova

Figure 31: ‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Percentage ‘agree’ per ward



3.5.4 Contribution by the coloured population


Respondents to the QoL IV (2015/16) survey were asked if they agreed with the statement that ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’. Only 31% of all respondents

agreed with this statement (Figure 32). Against the trends of other measures analysed, Midvaal (44%), Lesedi (40%), Tshwane (39%) and Emfuleni (36%) had the highest proportions of respondents who agreed with the statement.

Figure 32: ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Analysing these opinions per population group reveals, unsurprisingly, that the coloured population was the most likely to agree with the statement and the least likely to disagree with it, across all the metropolitan municipalities and in Gauteng as a whole (Figure 33). In Gauteng, 60% of coloured respondents agreed

with the statement compared to 42% of whites, 41% of Indians/Asians and 28% of Africans. In all metropolitan municipalities the African respondents were the most likely to disagree with the statement (51% in Ekurhuleni, 47% in Johannesburg and 39% in Tshwane) and also the least likely to agree with the statement.

Figure 33: ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCR0

DATA SOURCE: GCR0 QoL IV (2015/16)




Views on the contributions of the coloured population varied somewhat by age group (Figure 34), but it did not vary evenly across metropolitan municipalities. For the province as a whole, respondents aged 55 years and older (36%) were marginally more likely to agree with the statement that ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’ than respondents aged between 18 and 24 years (30%).

The variation between the oldest and the youngest age groups was the most significant in Ekurhuleni, where the difference for those who agreed with the statement was 10%. Johannesburg had a 4% variation between the youngest and oldest age groups. All age groups in Tshwane were more likely to agree with the statement than the provincial averages and other metropolitan municipalities.

Figure 34: ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Organised according to income (Figure 35), the data shows that respondents from wealthier households were less likely to disagree with the statement. However, the second highest income group was marginally the most

likely to agree with the statement. The variations in different metropolitan municipalities were very similar to the provincial trends.

Figure 35: ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’, per metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV 2015/16




The spatial distribution of respondents who disagreed that ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’ was not spread evenly in Gauteng (Figure 36). Respondents residing in wards in and around former townships were more

likely to disagree with the statement than respondents in suburban areas of the province. This distribution of attitudes held relatively evenly in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni.


Figure 36: ‘Coloured people are playing an important role in helping build the new South Africa’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Percentage ‘disagreed’ per ward



3.6 Attitudes towards migrants and migration


The QoL survey provides a breakdown of the proportion of self-reported migrants in Gauteng. The proportion of cross-border migrants in Gauteng was 7% in 2015, and 10% of Johannesburg’s population indicated that they migrated to the province from another country, compared to 6% in Tshwane and 5% in Ekurhuleni

(Figure 37). Only Merafong (14%) and Westonaria (15%) were home to greater proportions of respondents who have migrated from another country. Johannesburg, being an economic hub in the province, attracts about 50% of all cross border migrants to the province, compared to 19% in Tshwane and 18% in Ekurhuleni.

Figure 37: The migration status of respondents, per municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.6.1 Should foreigners be allowed to stay?

Respondents to the QoL IV (2015/16) survey were asked which one of the following three statements best described how they feel about foreigners living in Gauteng:

1. Gauteng should be for South Africans only. They must send the foreigners back to their countries.
2. A lot of foreigners came to work in South Africa for poor wages under apartheid. We all suffered under the same system. They should be allowed to stay.
3. Foreigners living in Gauteng are alright, but only if they have legal permission from the government.


The responses from the survey for each municipality are presented in Figure 38 below. Except in Lesedi and Emfuleni, the majority of respondents feel that legal foreigners are 'ok'. Nearly a quarter of all respondents

in Gauteng felt that foreigners must be sent home while only 18% felt that foreigners should be allowed to stay irrespective of whether or not they have permission. In Johannesburg, 20% of respondents feel the same way, compared to 23% of respondents in Ekurhuleni and 29% of respondents in Tshwane. Attitudes in municipalities in southern Gauteng were the most concerning, since 55% of respondents in Lesedi, 42% of respondents in Emfuleni and 37% of respondents in Midvaal felt that foreigners must be sent home. Interestingly, the proportion of respondents per municipality who felt that foreigners should be allowed to stay did not vary as much as the other two responses towards foreigners. The only exception is Westonaria, where 34% of respondents felt that foreigners should be allowed to stay.

Figure 38: Attitudes towards foreigners, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Attitudes towards foreigners varied somewhat by population group (Figure 39). In Gauteng, the African and coloured respondents were the most likely to feel that foreigners must be sent home (25%) while whites were the least likely to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay (17%). In Johannesburg, the coloured population was the most likely to feel that foreigners should be sent home (25%) while Africans were the least likely to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay (18%). In Tshwane, Africans were the most likely to feel that foreigners should be sent home and also the

least likely to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay. In Ekurhuleni, the coloured population was the most likely to feel that foreigners must be sent home (28%) while whites were the least likely to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay (9%). Trends in the opinions per population group did not hold across metropolitan municipalities but it is evident that the largest proportion of respondents in each metropolitan municipalities and each population group feels that legal foreigners are 'ok'.

Figure 39: Attitudes towards foreigners, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Attitudes towards foreigners were slightly more consistent across age groups (Figure 40). The majority of respondents in each age group felt that legal foreigners are 'ok', while respondents of all ages were slightly more likely to feel that foreigners should be sent home than to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay. The data

from Gauteng suggests that older respondents were more likely than younger respondents to feel that foreigners should be sent home. In Johannesburg, much less variation across age groups was evident, compared to the other metropolitan municipalities.

Figure 40: Attitudes towards foreigners, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)




There were interesting variations between income groups in terms of attitudes towards foreigners (Figure 41). In Gauteng, respondents from households with a monthly income of more than R38 400 were the least likely to feel that foreigners must be sent home (17%) and they were also the most likely to feel that all foreigners should be allowed to stay (23%). Respondents from households with a monthly income of less than R1 600 were the most likely to feel that foreigners must be sent

home (26%). The trend in Johannesburg was very similar to the provincial trend, but more pronounced in Tshwane and less pronounced in Ekurhuleni. In Ekurhuleni, respondents from households with a monthly income of more than R38 400 were less likely to feel that foreigners should be allowed to stay (16%) than respondents from households with a monthly income of less than R1 600 (19%) – the opposite of the trend in other metropolitan municipalities and the provincial average.

Figure 41: Attitudes towards foreigners, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




There was little variation between most wards on how many respondents felt that foreigners must be sent home (Figure 42). Wards in Lesedi, Midvaal and Emfuleni were the exception, however. More than a third of respondents in most wards feel that foreigners must be sent home. More than half of the wards in Johannesburg,

Mogale City, Randfontein, Westonaria and Merafong had fewer than 20% of respondents feeling that foreigners must be sent home. The spatial representation of attitudes per ward shows that some wards in the southern parts of Gauteng had the most respondents who feel that foreigners should be sent home.

Figure 42: ‘They must send the foreigners back to their countries’

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Percentage per ward



3.6.2 Violence against foreigners


According to the QoL IV (2015/16), only 4% of South African-born respondents in Gauteng agreed that it is acceptable to physically attack foreigners in order to

make them leave (Figure 43). Lesedi had the highest proportion (7%), while respondents in Merafong and Randfontein (1% each) were the least likely to agree with the statement.

Figure 43: ‘It is OK to physically attack foreigners in order to make them leave’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



“... there were many wards in which almost no respondents said that it was acceptable to attack foreigners...”

Responses varied between population groups, age groups and income groups (Table 6), and no consistent trend was immediately evident. In Gauteng, African and coloured respondents (4% each) were the most likely to agree with the statement. In Johannesburg, coloured respondents (4%) were slightly more likely to agree than other population groups while the African population in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni were the most

likely to endorse the use of violence to make foreigners leave. The variation between age groups was minimal in Gauteng and in the three metropolitan municipalities. Respondents from households with a monthly income of less than R12 800, in Gauteng as a whole and across all the metropolitan municipalities, were the most likely to agree that it is 'ok' to physically attack foreigners in order to make them leave.

Table 6: 'It is OK to physically attack foreigners in order to make them leave', by population group, age group and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

Population Group	Gauteng	Johannesburg	Tshwane	Ekurhuleni
African	4%	3%	3%	5%
Coloured	4%	4%	2%	5%
Indian/Asian	2%	3%	0%	1%
White	2%	2%	1%	3%
Age Group				
18 - 24 years	3%	4%	2%	4%
25 - 39 years	4%	3%	2%	5%
40 - 54 years	3%	3%	3%	4%
55+ years	3%	3%	2%	5%
Income Group				
R0 - R1 600	5%	4%	4%	6%
R1 601 - R12 800	4%	4%	3%	5%
R12 801 - R38 400	2%	2%	2%	3%
More than R38 401	3%	3%	2%	4%


Rather than being evenly spread, there were many wards in which almost no respondents said that it was acceptable to attack foreigners, and a small number of

wards in which up to a fifth of respondents said that it was acceptable (Figure 44).

Figure 44: South African-born respondents who agreed that it is ‘OK’ to physically attack foreigners in order to make them leave

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.6.3 Influx control


Respondents to the QoL IV (2015/16) survey were also asked to respond to the statement ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’. Despite the fact that influx control was a key element of apartheid, and despite the fact that 35% of residents are migrants from another province or country,

43% of respondents in Gauteng agreed that influx control should be reinstated (Figure 45). Respondents in Lesedi (57%) were the most likely to agree to reinstating influx control, followed by respondents in Emfuleni (49%) and Midvaal (49%). Respondents in Westonaria (31%) and Merafong (33%) were the least likely to support the idea of reinstating influx control.

Figure 45: ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



Responses to the statement varied by population group, but not in a consistent pattern across the province and metropolitan municipalities (Figure 46). In Gauteng, the coloured population (45%) was the most likely to agree with the statement while the Indian/Asian population (39%) was the least likely to agree. In Johannesburg, the African population (45%) was the most likely to agree with the statement while the white population (33%) was the least likely to agree. In Tshwane, the coloured population (54%) was the most likely to agree with the statement while the African population (41%) was the least likely to agree. In Ekurhuleni, it was again the African population (47%) that was the most likely to agree with the statement while the Indian/Asian population


was the least likely to agree (32%).

Variations between age groups was less than between population groups (Figure 47). Accommodating responses (respondents who disagreed with the statement) from different age groups in Gauteng ranged between 37% and 39%, while inhospitable responses (those who agreed with the statement) ranged between 42% and 44%. The variations within the three metropolitan municipalities were all equally small. This leaves a very small proportion of respondents with a neutral response to the statement, much smaller than the proportion of neutral responses to other measures discussed in this report.

Figure 46: ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




“The variations within the three metropolitan municipalities were all equally small. This leaves a very small proportion of respondents with a neutral response to the statement, much smaller than the proportion of neutral responses to other measures discussed in this report.”

Figure 47: ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Considering responses to the statement by income group (Figure 48), it is evident that respondents in Gauteng (and especially in Johannesburg) from households with a relatively higher monthly household income were more likely to disagree with the statement. The opposite is true in Tshwane, where respondents from households with a relatively higher monthly household income were

less likely to disagree with the statement ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’. In Ekurhuleni, the trends looks similar to Johannesburg, but respondents from households with a monthly income of more than R38 400 were the most likely to agree with the statement (50%).

Figure 48: ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Wards where more than 58% of the respondents agreed with the statement were scattered throughout the province, but with some distinct clusters in central and northern Tshwane, southern Johannesburg, and parts of Emfuleni, Midvaal and Lesedi (Figure 49). In Johannesburg, the spatial representation of opinions over influx control clearly supports the responses from

the different income groups. It is clear that wards in the northern parts of Johannesburg (where household incomes are generally higher) had lower proportions of respondents who agreed that influx control should be reinstated, compared to the southern parts of Johannesburg.


Figure 49: ‘There are too many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring back influx control’

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

GCRO



Percentage ‘agree’ per ward



3.7 Attitudes towards gay and lesbian people

3.7.1 Equal rights for gay and lesbian people


While the constitution prescribes the same rights for gay and lesbian people as for other South Africans, the QoL IV (2015/16) survey tested whether residents of Gauteng agreed. In Gauteng, 56% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’ while 29% of respondents disagreed (Figure 50). Randfontein had the largest proportion of respondents who agreed with

the statement (67%) and also the smallest proportion of respondents who disagreed (19%). Lesedi and Emfuleni (47% each) had the lowest proportions of respondents who agreed with the statement. The proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement in Johannesburg (55%) was lower than in Tshwane (56%) and Ekurhuleni (61%), and the proportion of respondents in Johannesburg who disagreed (31%) with the statement was higher than in Tshwane (29%) and Ekurhuleni (27%).

Figure 50: ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Opinions on whether gay and lesbian people deserve the same rights as other South Africans varied by population group (Figure 51). In all the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng, as well as the province as a whole, whites were the most likely to agree with the statement (64% in Gauteng, 62% in Johannesburg, 61% in Tshwane and 73% in Ekurhuleni). Africans were least likely to agree with the statement (55%), and in Johannesburg

the African population was equal to the Indian/Asian population (both 53%) in being least likely to agree with the statement. In Tshwane (49%) and Ekurhuleni (55%), the coloured population was least likely to agree with the statement. Although some variation existed between population groups, all population groups were more likely to agree with the statement than disagree with it.

Figure 51: ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’, by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)





Photograph by Lesedi Mogale


Interesting variations in opinions appeared between age groups (Figure 52) and income groups (Figure 53). Older respondents in Gauteng were less likely to agree with the statement than younger respondents. In Gauteng, 61% of respondents aged between 18 and 24 years agreed with the statement compared to 52% of respondents aged 55 years and older. This is one of the few measures in this report where all three metropolitan municipalities showed the same trend. There was less variation between income groups than age groups. In Gauteng,

between 56% and 59% of respondents in the various income groups agreed with the statement and this suggests there is no overall relation between income and opinion about whether gay and lesbian people deserve the same rights as all other South Africans (Figure 53). However, the data for Ekurhuleni, and to a lesser extent Tshwane, show that respondents from households with higher monthly incomes were more likely to agree with the statement than respondents from households with lower monthly incomes.

Figure 52: ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




“Although some variation existed between groups, all groups were more likely to agree with the statement than disagree with it.”

Figure 53: ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’, by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




The spatial distribution of these attitudes (Figure 54) reveals little about the nature of locations where higher proportions of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’. Wards where up to two out of three respondents disagreed with the statement appear on the

eastern boundary of the City of Johannesburg, northern Tshwane, northern Ekurhuleni and various parts of Emfuleni and Westonaria. However, these attitudes appear throughout the Gauteng province and are not closely related to any one element of the city-region’s socio-spatial structure.

Figure 54: ‘Gay and lesbian people deserve equal rights as all other South Africans’

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

GCRO



Percentage ‘disagree’ per ward



3.7.2 Violence against gay and lesbian people


The QoL IV (2015/16) survey asked respondents how they felt about violence against gay and lesbian people and the results give significant cause for concern. In Gauteng, 15% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’ (Figure 55). In Lesedi, 24% of respondents agreed with the statement – the highest proportion in the province while the lowest proportion of respondents

who agreed with the statement was in Randfontein (10%). The proportion of respondents who agreed with the statement was similar in the three metropolitan municipalities – 14% in Johannesburg, 16% in Tshwane and 14% in Ekurhuleni. Despite these concerning attitudes, the majority of respondents in Gauteng disagreed with the statement – 72% in Gauteng, 85% in Randfontein and 79% in Midvaal. Only in Lesedi did a much lower proportion of respondents (54%) disagree with the statement.

Figure 55: ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’, by municipality

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




The acceptability of violence against gay and lesbian people varied somewhat by population group in Gauteng (Figure 56). The population groups most likely to agree with the statement were Africans in Gauteng (15%), Africans in Johannesburg (15%), coloureds in Tshwane (17%) and Africans in Ekurhuleni (16%). The population groups that were the most likely to disagree with the statement were coloureds and whites in Gauteng (77% each), whites in Johannesburg (81%), coloureds in

Tshwane (71%) and Indians/Asians in Ekurhuleni (86%). Two findings that are consistent in the metropolitan municipalities are that the variation between those who agreed with the statement in each population group is much less than the variation between those who disagreed with the statement in each population group, and that respondents were much more likely to disagree with the statement than to agree.

Figure 56: 'It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people', by metropolitan municipality and population group

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Respondents in different age groups had very similar responses when asked how they feel about violence towards gay and lesbian people (Figure 57). In Gauteng as a whole, the difference between the group most likely to agree (those aged between 18 and 39 years) and the group least likely to agree (those aged between 40 and 54 years) was 2%. The variation was small in all of the metropolitan municipalities. In all the metropolitan municipalities and according to the provincial average,

respondents aged between 18 and 24 years were more likely than other age groups to agree with the statement. In this age group, 15% of respondents in Gauteng agreed (the highest, along with respondents aged between 25 and 39 years), 15% of respondents in this age group in Johannesburg agreed (the highest), 16% in Tshwane (the highest, along with respondents aged between 25 and 39 years) and 16% in Ekurhuleni (the highest).

Figure 57: ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’, by metropolitan municipality and age group

GCRQ

DATA SOURCE: GCRQ QoL IV (2015/16)




There are interesting variations in how respondents from different income groups responded to the statement ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’ (Figure 58). In Gauteng, respondents from households with higher monthly incomes were less likely to agree with the statement and also more likely to disagree with the statement. In Johannesburg this was particularly evident, since respondents from the poorest households were twice as likely to agree with the statement as respondents from the wealthiest households (16% and 8% respectively). In Tshwane,

respondents from the poorest households (15%) were slightly less likely to agree with the statement than respondents from the wealthiest households (16%) while respondents from households that earn between R12 801 and R38 400 a month were the least likely to agree with the statement (8%). In Ekurhuleni, the difference between respondents from the poorest households and the wealthiest households was relatively small (14% and 12% respectively), while respondents from households that earn between R1 601 and R12 800 were the most likely to agree with the statement (16%).

Figure 58: ‘It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people’ by metropolitan municipality and monthly household income

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Wards where up to 47% of respondents agreed that it is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people were distributed throughout the province (Figure 59). In Gauteng, a cluster of wards on the south-eastern

border is particularly concerning, as are wards near the borders between Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. These wards are characterised by relatively low household incomes.

Figure 59: 'It is acceptable to be violent towards gay and lesbian people'

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)



3.8 Policy implications

There is a great deal of variation in the answers given by residents of Gauteng to attitudinal questions about whether or not there is trust, whether particular population groups belong or have primary claims over belonging, whether migrants should be allowed to stay, whether gays and lesbians should have equal rights as others, and whether violence towards migrants or gays and lesbians is acceptable. The majority of respondents, however, are tolerant of other population groups, migrants and minorities. While it is often said that South Africa is still a divided nation, many respondents at least aspired towards tolerance and unity. The majority of residents in Gauteng do not need to be taught how to be tolerant – they already are tolerant.

Within the context of a survey, answers that demonstrate tolerance might be linked to an individual's perception of him or herself as a 'good' person, who would not say bad things, and a person who identifies as 'liberal'. It might also be related, however, to perceptions of what the expected answers to such questions might be, in the context of the 'new South Africa' where intolerance is unacceptable.


Beyond the context of a survey, an individual's actual thoughts and attitudes are more complicated. Some respondents might be cynical, giving what they

perceive to be the 'right' answers, yet having much more intolerant attitudes in practice, and even those who are generally tolerant might behave intolerantly at times. A person who says that they do not support violence against foreigners might, in fact, participate in such violence on occasion. Similarly, a person might say that it is acceptable to be violent towards foreigners but never act in accordance with that attitude. People might express tolerant and inclusionary views in a survey, but be biased when deciding, for example, who to appoint to a post, who to accept into a school or university, or whether or not to rent a property to an individual from a particular group.

Notwithstanding these variations, the levels of tolerance expressed by most Gauteng residents are consistent with a society attempting to address social hierarchies. Individuals who express tolerant attitudes are more likely to behave tolerantly and confront intolerance, or make intolerance unsustainable in various ways.

Responses to the survey that do reveal intolerant attitudes are contrary to the general trend of greater tolerance in a democratic South Africa, and at a policy level, they might present an opportunity for reform, since the expression and performance of biases and intolerance has, historically, been a source of such hurt

Photograph by Skhumbuzo Mtshali



and trauma in this country. Helping people change their perceptions of 'right' and 'wrong' is notoriously difficult and it cannot be achieved simply by appealing to people's 'better nature'. Intolerance is not a simple 'error' of thinking that can be easily corrected; it derives from social systems and structures evident in the way we raise our children, the language we use, and the nature of social inequality. Survey data is useful for drawing attention to some of the pernicious effects of these systems, and the causes of intolerant attitudes might be targeted for reform. In particular, resources need to be directed towards confronting homophobia since the survey revealed a willingness to endorse violence against gays and lesbians that is even greater than a willingness to endorse violence against foreigners.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that it is possible to target particular places or particular groups of people who exhibit greater intolerance. Poorer people and those living in poorer places seem more inclined to the expression of intolerant attitudes. Should reform therefore be directed at such people and places? Although there are patterns in the data that show that some age groups, income groups, population groups or locations are more inclined to be intolerant, these differences are minimal, and essentialist thinking runs the risk of producing a set of stereotypes of the illiberal poor. People living in wealthy or working class areas are

not immune from expressions of intolerance. At a general level, it does confirm that overcoming inequality, poverty and systemic exclusion are fundamental for achieving greater social cohesion (also discussed in Chapter 4).



To illustrate how responses vary both across and within areas in Gauteng, and how responses vary among respondents of different race and gender groups, Figure 60 maps the responses of nine individuals to five questions in the QoL IV (2015/16) survey. Three respondents were selected from each of three areas – Lenasia, Roodepoort and Orange Farm. An individual's attitudes cannot necessarily be predicted from basic demographics. Even where there are variations according to age, income, population group and location, a combination of positive and negative attitudes are always co-present in any given location and demographic slice. For example, while one Indian male living in Lenasia endorsed violence against gays and lesbians and does not think they should have equal rights, another Indian male and an Indian female from the same area both rejected violence against gays and lesbians and stated that they should have equal rights. One African male living in Orange Farm said that foreigners should leave while another said they could stay. An African male living in Roodepoort said that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as others, while two white residents of the same area said they should not.




Figure 60: Individual responses from selected QoL IV (2015/16) survey respondents

DATA SOURCE: GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)

GCRO





Photograph by Darya Maslova



Photograph by Darya Maslova



Chapter 4

Analysing past and current initiatives: Defining the problem and scope of intervention

KATE JOSEPH

Key points:

- An analysis of more than 60 initiatives to improve social cohesion reveals that the distribution of capacity is broad, since many different kinds of organisations are active in this sector, including national, provincial and local government; human rights foundations; research institutes, NGOs; and CBOs.
- Many initiatives are concerned with improving social relations in general terms, although some initiatives focus on a particular kind of discrimination (e.g. xenophobia) or a particular kind of identity. Both approaches may have limitations and advantages.
- Different initiatives conceive of their objectives in different ways and therefore imagine the process of improvement differently. There are multiple ways of understanding the problem of social cohesion:
 - Several initiatives see the problem as stemming from broader social systems (rather than specific individuals) and try, in their own way, to make positive contributions to offsetting the systems that reinforce unequal relationships and social injustice.
 - Some initiatives concentrate attention on those who have been harmed and attempt to alleviate their distress (for example, by trauma counselling). Many initiatives regard this work as improving community relations, in turn.
 - Some initiatives focus on preventing and de-escalating violence. Violent action is typically neither a neutral nor an indiscriminate eruption. It is often directed against particular identity groups, such as migrants or gay and lesbian people.
 - Some initiatives focus on reducing individuals' prejudicial thoughts, speech or behaviours.
 - Some initiatives do not intervene in the social arena directly but attempt instead to mobilise government or influence policy as a means to achieving their objective.
- There are variations in the scale and method of participation that interventions to improve social cohesion consider:
 - Who should be targeted for participation in the intervention and how do they participate (by hearing a message, engaging in a conversation, participating in an activity)?
 - What is the duration of their participation, and is their participation once-off or repeated? What are the limits and advantages of either intensive participation or brief participation?
 - What are the intended (or unintended) ripple effects of direct participation on others who have not participated or on broader social processes and patterns?
 - Why are some areas targeted for programmes more than others? Under what circumstances is it appropriate to forego wide coverage in order to target particular areas?

4.1 Introduction

There have been many initiatives to reduce social tensions and improve social relations in South Africa. A great deal of money, energy, and human capacity has been poured into endeavours that try to reduce prejudice, ameliorate the injustices that result from prejudice, improve understanding between people, reduce violence, manage the effects of violence, and foster mutual identification, among many other objectives. Campaigners, activists, lawyers, lobbyists, academics, facilitators and participants alike have spent countless hours wrestling with complex problems, trying to change patterns of thought and behaviour, and addressing the effects of prejudicial thinking and systemic exclusion. New efforts to design social cohesion programmes at the present juncture are not, therefore, starting from scratch. Much can be learned from past and present initiatives – the dozens of programmes already implemented constitute an enormous capital on which to build.

Chapters 4 and 5 are based on an analysis of more than 60 past and current initiatives to improve various aspects of social cohesion. In order to understand the range of approaches that exist for improving social cohesion, we pose and answer a number of questions about these initiatives:

- What types of organisations are working in this sector? Does each initiative focus on a particular kind of identity or a particular kind of discrimination, and if so which? A large number of organisations are concerned with discrimination based on national identity (xenophobia), but, we see in section 4.2, that many initiatives are concerned with improving social relations in general and are not therefore identity-specific.
- How do these initiatives conceive of the problem they are attempting to address and what is their broad objective? Section 4.3 considers five possibilities: Do initiatives see the problem as stemming from broader social systems (rather than specific individuals) and try, in their own way, to make positive contributions to offsetting the systems that reinforce unequal relationships and social injustice? Do they

concentrate attention on those who have been harmed and attempt to alleviate their distress (for example by trauma counselling)? Do they work with those who display prejudice and attempt to reduce prejudicial thoughts, speech or behaviour? Do they focus on preventing and de-escalating violence on the ground? Or do they focus rather on trying to reach government or influence policy? Many of the programmes we looked at identified systemic exclusion as the fundamental problem they wished to transcend.

- Why might the scope, scale and reach of initiatives differ? In section 4.4 we reflect on the various ways that different kinds of initiatives conceive of participation. How are participants expected to engage with the intervention and what is the experience of the participant? Is participation once-off or repeated? What is the geography of participation? Many initiatives are intentionally delimited and purposefully tackle particular communities only. This is a reflection of their approach and raises important questions about the depth and breadth of interventions.
- What is the range of methods used to improve social cohesion? In the next chapter we unpack five thematic areas under which social cohesion work is seen to be taking place, politicking; mutual identification and recognition; individual and community psychology; arts-based practises; and infrastructure-focused programmes. Some of the methods, such as sports events or cultural days, are very familiar. Some of the methods might prompt us to think about social cohesion in new ways, or to consider the limitations of a methodology, or the benefits of conscientious evaluation. It is also important to consider the relational impact of different methodologies, for instance can infrastructure-focused programmes provide the opportunity to implement social cohesion objectives alongside other municipal responsibilities and budgets? How might poor and unequal service delivery weaken the long-term impact of other social programmes?

“The approach was to throw a wide net and include as many relevant activities in the database as we came across during the research period. The City of Johannesburg constituted a particular case study for understanding the activities of local government.”

4.2 Methodology and initiative mapping

This chapter provides an analysis of past and present initiatives to improve social cohesion, based on an inductive grounded theory approach. Over a five-month period in 2017, a database of 60 past and present initiatives to improve social cohesion was compiled. To be sure, not all of these initiatives imagined themselves under the rubric of social cohesion, per se. Some were more focused on a particular kind of prejudice, such as xenophobia, or conceived of their project without using the term social cohesion, specifically. As noted in Chapter 1, we locate social cohesion within a broader range of paradigms such as nation-building and reconciliation. Social cohesion is used here as shorthand for an overarching field of interest and concern and therefore initiatives that might not themselves use the term, or might indeed be critical of it, are included.

The unit of analysis is the initiative, which could be a campaign or a programme. Consequently, as far as possible, the analysis was not based on the organisation as a whole, since an organisation might have multiple initiatives. The approach was to throw a wide net and include as many relevant activities in the database as we came across during the research period. The City of Johannesburg constituted a particular case study for understanding the activities of local government.

This report considers several campaigns from community based organisations (CBO), non-government organisations (NGO) and research-based organisations, alongside programmes proposed by the

City of Johannesburg (COJ), the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG) and the national Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). This diversity of capacity is represented in Figure 61. Qualitative information about the various initiatives was compiled using primary material, including 10 interviews with officials, NGO staff and scholars, as well as secondary material such as reports.

Table 7 (following spread) presents a list of many initiatives included in the database, organised according to whether or not they focus on a particular identity or particular kind of intolerance and, if they do, which one. Most initiatives recognise that identities are intersectional, and it is very difficult to consider any one of these identities in isolation from the others, although some do nevertheless focus on particular identities or kinds of prejudice. For example, the key identity for an initiative dealing with xenophobia will be nationality, while an organisation dealing with homophobia will have sexuality as its primary focus. Social justice issues and potential solutions, while interrelated, are not completely interchangeable. Some initiatives are very specific, nuanced and targeted. Sometimes programmes that were initiated as ways to reduce inequality and rectify representation, for example, initiatives focusing on international migrants, women, or even BEE programmes, are met with resistance and viewed as divisive mechanisms, especially by groups outside their focus area.




Photograph by Darya Maslova

Figure 61: The capacity to intervene is distributed across different kinds of organisations

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017





MEDIA

Once We Were There #TakeOnRacism
 #RacismStopsWithMe



FOUNDATIONS

NMF Annual Lecture Anti-xenophobia Community Dialogues Katshehong
 Project Constitution NMF Dialogue Programme
 Amarightza Civics Academy
 Anti-xenophobia Community Dialogues Jabulani



NGOs

Becoming Campaign One Movement at Many Faces, One Africa
 Roll Back Xenophobia Amnesty International at Many Faces, One Africa
 Khulumani Support Group



CBOs

Memorandum to the Mayor Youth African Soccer Cup
 Many Faces, One Africa Virtue Citizens
 Therapeutic Spiral Model Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group
 Alex Pan Africa Carnival Open Letter to the President



CORPORATES

Save South Africa Launch Violence Against Women Social Lab
 Redpeg Courses



PEOPLE

National Prayer Day Pray for South Africa
 Fees-Must-Fall

Table 7: Summary of initiatives according to whether or not they focus on a particular kind of intolerance or a particular identity

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017

Any	Nationality	Class	Political Ideology	Race
Bystander Intervention	Amnesty International Information Stall	Amarightza	Civics Academy	#RacismStops WithMe
Critical Diversity Literacy MA Programme	Anti-xenophobia Dialogues	Community Literacy Programme	Community Building and Engaged Citizenry	#TakeOnRacism
Counselling	Many Faces, One Africa	eJozi MOOV	Commemorative Days	Becoming Campaign
Learning Series	Memorandum to the Mayor	EPWP and Jozi@work	HSF Briefs	Khulumani Support Group
Dance for Dialogue	Migrant Help Desk	Medellin Library Parks Strategic Project	Project Constitution	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Department of Social Development	Mkhaya Migrant Awards	Medellin Metrocable	Save South Africa	
Gauteng Social Cohesion Carnival	One Movement Information Stall	Poverty Intervention Programmes		
Joburg New Year's Eve Carnival	Open Letter to the President	Transforming Sustainable Human Settlements		
NICDAM Community Conversations	Pan-African Carnival	Transport Sector Plan		
NMF Dialogue Programme	Peace Building			
NMF International Dialogue Series	Premier's Social Cohesion Games			
Parks and Public Open Spaces	Roll Back Xenophobia			
Jo'burg Safe City Strategy	Slovoview Building Bridges			
Targeted Beneficiaries Unit	Ubuntu Cup			
Therapeutic Spiral Model	Youth African Soccer Cup			

Age/Youth	Gender	Sexuality	Religion	Includes Disabilities
Building Inclusive Societies: Schools' Oral History Projects	Violence Against Women Social Lab	Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group	National Day of Prayer	Targeted Beneficiaries Unit
Fees-Must-Fall	Creative Expression Retreat	Queer Crossings Participatory Arts-based Project	Pray for South Africa	Therapeutic Spiral Model
Virtue Citizens	Redpeg Courses			
Therapeutic Spiral Model				

This report proposes different ways to break down these past and present interventions in order to build a better sense of the range of possibilities that exist in relation to social cohesion work. Working from concepts identified in the conceptual framework, data was collected and organised into an analysis framework. Repeated ideas, concepts or elements became apparent, and these were tagged and coded. This allowed us to describe patterns that emerged. Each initiative was explored in terms of several categories, including: methodology used; who was targeted; who the sponsors or organisers were; what framework informed it; which identity category it prioritised; the aim of the work; and its reach and scope.

Most initiatives do not fall neatly within designated boxes but are tangled across the investigative categories. For instance, the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign makes use of several methods: canvassing, legislative action, cultural events, and consultation. Any given initiative could be coded in multiple places to develop an idea of the range of methods being used. By exploding the initiatives in this way, strands linking divergent initiatives – by shared method, or shared aim – could be deduced.

This kind of broad reading does not provide a ‘definitive answer’. Rather, it alerts us to the range of possible options – the process developed a ‘menu of possibilities’ that contributes to understanding the possible forms and designs of a given intervention better, as well as the range of underlying logics. While some of these initiatives had formed alliances of various kinds with one another, many happened in isolation. However, this methodology presents the aggregate picture that emerges from all their disparate efforts.

4.2.1 Two decades of interventions

The analysis covers more than two decades of projects. It ranges from older initiatives that began shortly after the transition to democracy, to new initiatives that started as recently as 2016. Some have ceased to exist while others are ongoing. Some were short-lived while others continued for many years. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was concluded 20 years ago, in 1998, whereas the Khulumani Support Group, an organisation which campaigns for justice on behalf of those harmed by apartheid’s human rights violations, started around the same time and

continues today. This is the longest running initiative included in the analysis. Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group, which formed in late 2016 in reaction to homophobic attacks, is the youngest in the database.

The advent of democracy saw the formation of many foundations in the late 1990s – including the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF), the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation (AKF), the Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) and the Foundation for Human Rights (FHR) (originally called the European Union Foundation for Human Rights) – as well as the initiation of the TRC, the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign and the Khulumani Support Group. Many of the programmes cited in the City of Johannesburg’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 2016–2021 took shape in the early 2000s. Also in this period, Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa (ATU) brought professional therapists to communities in Johannesburg. From 2006 onwards, the city rolled out further social integration programmes including the Migrant Help Desk and the Targeted Beneficiaries Unit (TBU). The Slovoview Building Bridges initiative and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation’s (CSV) community interventions emerged in the wake of 2008 xenophobic violence. The idea of sport as a uniting medium gained renewed traction around 2010 when the country hosted the FIFA World Cup. Since then, various organisations have used soccer to foster camaraderie. The majority of the interventions we explore emerged in the period 2011 to 2017. Contemporary work has focused on ‘community’ in the form of community conversations or dialogue and addressing community identified issues such as drug abuse, violence, and lack of economic opportunity. A fair proportion of the initiatives prioritise artistic self-expression (performing arts, drawing, poetry) or other physical activities (walkabouts, play, soccer tournaments) and entertainment or celebration such as music and sports festivals, carnivals and the Mkhaya Migrant Awards. At the same time, antagonistic expressions seem to have swelled, with strong criticisms being directed at government, in particular, including vocal critiques of a lack of response to xenophobic incidents, calls for the resignation of the president from Save South Africa, and a rejection of reconciliation principles from the Fees-Must-Fall movement.

4.3 How initiatives conceive of the problem they are confronting and the objective of their initiative

Some years ago the municipality of Johannesburg planned a Social Cohesion Summit. The city's IDP 2016–2021 listed a number of possible topics it could encompass: social inclusion; citizenry participation (quality citizen participation); sense of belonging (identity); social capital (equitable distribution of resources to persons with disabilities, youth, elderly etc.); and hope (patience, trust that the government will fulfil promised delivery of services) (City of Johannesburg 2016: 179). Given that South Africa is perhaps one of the most unequal societies in the world, it is perplexing that none of the suggested topics dealt directly with addressing the material reduction of inequality. As with much of the work seeking to develop a social cohesion barometer in South Africa (Struwig et al. 2013), Johannesburg's summit topics appear to be derived from Jenson's (1998) five dimensional measure for social cohesion, developed in a Canadian context during the 1990s. While no doubt useful in part, Barolsky (2016: 1) argues that the western/northern take on the relationship between social cohesion, inequality and violence does not translate sufficiently to societies in the global south where community cohesion, especially in communities with diminished access to basic services, "can be both a protective factor and a driver of violence".

The argument tabled in this report is that the 'problem' that social cohesion attempts to resolve is not simply prejudiced thoughts, words and behaviour. Certainly the job of a social cohesion programme might be to reduce antisocial speech and behaviour, to build trust, and to replace feelings of alienation with solidarity and identification, but social cohesion programmes that do no more than appeal to people's better natures, or sanction them for being prejudiced, can only have a limited impact, given that social tensions and disharmony are manifestations of much broader causal feedback loops. We might even think of service delivery as an important part of social cohesion, even though we would not label a service delivery programme a social cohesion project in the first instance.

All of this provokes us into considering how the various initiatives in the database conceive of the

problem they are trying to overcome, how they imagine the objective of their initiative, and how they foresee the process of improvement happening. Do these initiatives try to delimit the change they wish to bring about within a broad set of possible transformations? We conclude that there are five ways of answering these questions: addressing systemic exclusion, material deprivation and inequality; alleviating distress and trauma; preventing violence; reducing prejudice; and through government and governance. These are not mutually exclusive – one initiative might have multiple ways of thinking about the problem and ways to resolve it.

4.3.1 Addressing systemic exclusion, material deprivation and inequality

Many of the programmes we looked at did indeed identify systemic exclusion as the fundamental problem they wished to transcend. These campaigns recognised the fundamental contradiction that people's rights are supposed to be guaranteed, by legal decree, regardless of race, class, sexuality, or nationality, but due to the junctures of power, class and security, people do not receive the full protection of their rights and so their everyday lives are insecure. These initiatives recognise, to varying degrees, that marginalisation results both from the prejudice of individuals and from broader social systems that exclude, even in the absence of a prejudicial gatekeeper. They recognise also that economic inequality is a primary source of social division (finding from the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation's South African Reconciliation Barometer 2015 cited by Hofmeyr and Govender 2016; Potgieter 2016, 2017), and that social cohesion will be difficult to achieve as long as material inequalities endure. These initiatives therefore had the objective of achieving a higher degree of social justice and equality, in addition to confronting bigotry.

Some of the initiatives we considered are broad-based, national programmes disbursed through provincial roadshows. An example of this is Amarightza, a FHR flagship project launched in 2015. Focused on socio-economic constitutional rights, this project targets "marginalised and vulnerable groups", to ensure that

people know their rights, know how to access them and know where to go when their rights are violated (www.fhr.org.za 2014). The FHR also functions somewhat as an intermediary organisation between national government, CBOs and local communities, by selecting well-conceptualised grassroots programmes for funding opportunities.

Other kinds of initiatives looking at structural inequality work best with smaller, more specific groups. Research by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) and the Gay and Lesbian Archive of South Africa (GALA) prompted the Queer Crossings project. This project was necessary because, as Anthony Manion notes, “LGBTQI [lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer and intersexed] migrants and asylum seekers ... [who] had hoped Johannesburg would be a safe haven instead ... met serious challenges in terms of safety and access to services” (quoted in Oliveira, Meyers, and Vearey 2016: 11). In this project, the experiences of 11 LGBTQI migrants were detailed through autobiographical workshops and compiled into a book, *Queer Crossings: A Participatory Arts-based Project* (2016).

A postgraduate academic programme, Critical Diversity Literacy (CDL), was initiated at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2014. This programme is “informed by Melissa Steyn’s notion of Critical Diversity Literacy, which is ‘a sharply focussed critical lens which examines those operations of power [that] implicate social identities to create systems of privilege, advantage, disadvantage and oppression’” (www.wits.ac.za/wicds/about-us n.d). On average, 10 students participate in the Master’s-level programme per year. The programme has succeeded in producing cohorts of people able to work in various sectors including the academy and NGOs. They are successfully raising the level of discourse around diversity thinking, notes Melissa Steyn (2017), director of the Wits Institute for Critical Diversity Studies (WiCDS).

Some initiatives aim to confront the practical barriers caused by structural exclusion. One such initiative, Value Citizens, works in schools to ensure that all learners, including foreign nationals, have some form of identity document before they complete Grade 12 and leave school (Motha 2017). The lack of necessary documentation prevents non-nationals opening bank accounts, notes Tsholofelo Sesanga (2017), community intervention programme manager at CSV, and

because they therefore sometimes carry large amounts of money on their persons, this makes them highly vulnerable to theft.

During this study, some interview respondents linked violence to the structural circumstances that perpetuate the material exclusion of those perpetrating violence:

[Y]ou never see problems in the suburbs ... government has limited resources that is why most of the time you find problems in the informal settlements. [G]overnment is overwhelmed by the numbers in terms of service delivery and stuff like that and that is when you see problems, but all in all I think people are [accepting of] migrants and they want to live with them except for the fact that they are fighting for resources (City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017).

Similar sentiments were expressed by other officials: “some of the more violent problems are wrapped around a result of abject poverty because people who are well off have other concerns to worry about, they don’t really care about who their neighbour is” (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017).

Many of the City of Johannesburg’s own programmes are intended to reduce the exclusionary effects of material deprivation. The persistence of apartheid geography in Johannesburg remains a barrier to inclusion (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017; City Official: Community Development 2017). The city has explored solutions such as mutual co-production (City Official: Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations 2017), where the city and community members work together to solve difficult issues such as developmental service delivery (City of Johannesburg 2016). The Transport Sector Plan (City of Johannesburg 2016) has had positive benefits, providing more people with greater access to the city. As Parnell argues, “investments in transport services and infrastructure, such as roads, footpaths, bus lanes and mass transit systems is essential to enable fair economic participation” (2016:131). She notes that implementing bus rapid transit systems in poorer and faster-growing cities, an approach pioneered by the cities of Curitiba and Bogotá in South America, can dramatically increase access to the city (Parnell 2016). One Johannesburg city official notes that Transit Orientated Development such

as the Corridors of Freedom project is envisaged as a means to “develop a multicultural, multiracial connected city”, as a way of breaking down the barriers between racially differentiated communities (City Official: Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations 2017).

4.3.2 Alleviating distress and trauma

One set of initiatives focuses specifically on the psychological consequences of violence, prejudice and exclusion. The CSVR’s counselling service, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s (IJR) creative expression retreat, and the Therapeutic Spiral Model employed by Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa (ATU), provide psychosocial support. Similarly, parts of the programmes run by the Department of Social Development (DSD) and the Targeted Beneficiaries Unit (TBU), which serves ex-combatants and ex-political prisoners, among others, (www.joburg.org.za 2010), also concentrate attention on those affected by trauma and violence.

Advocates of this kind of approach argue that “[b]y improving the psychosocial well-being of individuals, people are more likely to take care of themselves and of one another” (Bubbenzer and Tankink 2015: 7). It follows, therefore, that the neglect of psychosocial wellbeing contributes to increased antisocial behaviour. Trauma that is untreated not only diminishes the lives of the sufferers but may also feed into individual’s attempts to shore up their sense of self by discriminating against or asserting themselves over others. The psychosocial support model acknowledges this and participants in the creative expression retreat for abused women had some experience of this outcome. Doyle details how many of the women in the group, who had suffered sexual, psychological, and physical abuse from intimate partners and family members, “spoke of the challenges facing their community, including violence, substance abuse, and lack of access to resources, psychosocial support, education, and employment opportunities” (2017: 16).

Understandably, there is a strong bias towards this type of work in South Africa, mostly through community dialogues. When structural inequalities appear immovable without strong state action, this is one area that CBOs and NGOs can easily take up (Erwin 2017a). However, questions about the long-term impact of change strategies focused at the individual level remain. Enduring psychological benefits are not a given, even on

a individual level, and without proper skilled facilitation it is possible that participants might experience unexpected additional trauma (see Erwin 2017a).

4.3.3 Violence prevention

Some of the initiatives we looked at were specifically focused on violence prevention. Von Holdt et al. (2011) conducted research for CSVR on an outbreak of xenophobic violence that occurred in the Number 1 area of Slovoview township in 2008, where at least half the population are foreign nationals (Von Holdt et al. 2011). Angry residents of Number 1, a particularly congested and deprived area of the township, initially barricaded roads into the shack area, then drove out people perceived to be foreign nationals and looted their belongings.

The leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) in Ward 95 and 96 mobilised existing community structures such as Community Policing Forums (CPF) and street committees to bring the violence and destruction to an end (Von Holdt et al. 2011). The research found that community members “reinforced these structures with goodwill in what became a coalition against violence,” held together primarily by ward level leadership (Von Holdt et al. 2011: 75). This coalition was able to isolate Number 1 and prevent the violence from spreading to other parts of Slovoview. The day after the violence broke out, the coalition removed the barricade erected by the mob, which then allowed police patrols access. In the aftermath of the violence, “a process of reconciliation aimed at building bridges between the victims of violence (mainly foreign nationals) and the perpetrators of this violence (local South Africans) got under way” (Von Holdt et al. 2011: 76).

CSVV’s community initiative, Peace Building, concentrates on “mitigating current violence” and building “mechanisms that are preventative” (Sesanga 2017). This project started in 2016, although it emerged out of earlier anti-xenophobic work begun in 2008. In this project, influential community members, who are already seen as change agents, work with CSVV to become “peace builders” within their community (Sesanga 2017). The aim is to create “community ownership of the processes” to ensure sustainable, embedded networks that work on the ground (Sesanga 2017). About 15 peace builders, a mix of South Africans

and “non-nationals”, are selected to serve in each community. The aim of this is to show that non-nationals are an integral part of the community (Sesanga 2017). Often, community members suggest solutions, such as identifying a suitable person, who is respected and considered to be fair by both parties, to mediate disputes. In Mamelodi East, peace builders helped in shifting the tone and messaging of Mamelodi Concerned Residents’ protests (Sesanga 2017). The approach was to find out what people want and to negotiate with them – “okay we get you, is there a way of presenting what you are presenting without sounding like this [xenophobic]” (Sesanga 2017). Sesanga points out that many communities resort to violence “as a route to get heard ... it is a strategy” (2017). It is used when they feel all other avenues have been exhausted and no one is listening to their concerns. In the Mamelodi East case, the community had reached a point where they were so frustrated that they were saying “We don’t want to talk to anyone”, says Sesanga (2017). But because peace builders are not viewed as outsiders “they were able to actually come into that thing and actually calm down the situation and speak to both parties” (Sesanga 2017).

Another example comes from Masidantane End Hate Crimes Action Group. This initiative is concerned with ‘humanising’ LGBTQ people in communities where lesbian women have been raped or murdered because of their sexual orientation. In one instance, a bisexual and a lesbian member of the group simply had an impromptu conversation over a beer with two men in a shebeen. Long-time activist Bev Ditsie, one of the participants, explained: “it means that these two guys might be the ones to prevent another murder now while they walk down the street because for the first time they get it” (Ditsie 2017).

4.3.4 Prejudice reduction

The fourth kind of objective is to reduce prejudicial thoughts, prejudicial speech or prejudicial behaviour (of which violence might be a sub-set). These initiatives focus on racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia and other kinds of prejudice, and work with those who display such prejudice. One example is the Becoming campaign, of the Anti-Racism Network of South Africa (ARNSA) 2017, which, among other strategies, encouraged people to reflect critically on their own stereotypes and prejudices. On the first day of the campaign, the

focus was on becoming aware of the different ways that people interact with one another as a result of racism and “the dynamics of power between them” (ARNSA 2017: 2). The campaign found that this is not only driven by individuals but it can also be played out “in the workplace ... at school or on the sports field, in the news, and on social media” (ARNSA 2017: 2). It became evident that “racism affects people in their interpersonal relationships and, most importantly, racism affects all of us materially and on a structural level” (ARNSA 2017: 2). This kind of initiative recognises prejudice as being within and between hierarchies that are created and perpetuated as a result of differentiated access to power. Prejudice can even proliferate subconsciously through the normalisation of exclusionary systems, like language, for example. On the second day of the campaign a suggested topic of debate was how “seem[ing] [ly] ‘harmless’ words ... [contribute] to a culture of racial discrimination that underpins physical violence and overt racism” (ARNSA 2017: 3). Prejudice can therefore be seen as both a cause and an effect of systemic exclusion.

Sporting events that bring a variety of people together in a common interest can be examples of successful prejudice reduction initiatives. The Ubuntu Cup, a sports day facilitated by the City of Johannesburg, and other soccer-based initiatives ranging from the African Diaspora Forum’s (ADF) interschool Youth African Soccer Cup to the Premier’s Social Cohesion Games, featuring professional athletes, prioritised bringing foreign nationals and South Africans together to compete in and watch friendly matches. “Through these games,” explained Gauteng Premier, David Makhura, “we intend to unite all Gauteng residents against racism, xenophobia and all forms of prejudices that undermine nation-building and social cohesion” (Sekhonyane 2017: n.p.).

4.3.5 Government and governance

The fifth approach targets those in government and governance mechanisms. Instead of public awareness campaigns, many of the City of Johannesburg’s own programmes, such as City Safety and the Migrant Help Desk, for example, have inward looking components that involve fostering recognition by government departments and staff of a particular social plight.

Some interest groups and organisations target

national government in order to shift the way it treats particular minorities or governs particular kinds of social division. The Roll Back Xenophobia campaign sought to improve government recognition of the rights of refugees. Parsley (2005) notes that the work of Roll Back Xenophobia was instrumental in the national Department of Education allowing refugee children to obtain schooling, but it didn't have "much luck on health issues. There is still talk of women giving birth on the street outside of hospitals" (Dr Majodina, SAHRC Commissioner, quoted in Parsley 2005: 27). Parsley (2005) also notes ongoing frustration with the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) which takes a long time to attend to the basic social economic rights of refugees. While this situation may have improved somewhat since the time Parsley was writing, a Migrant Help Desk official pointed out in 2017 that they still experience difficulties with the DHA (City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017).

The Khulumani Support Group engages in ongoing work to compel the state to fulfil its commitments and address the needs of victims and survivors of apartheid-related gross human rights violations (www.khulumani.net 2016). The African Diaspora Forum (ADF), the United Front (UF) and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) collectively approached government in 2017, sending an open letter to the president urging him to oppose publically an apparently xenophobic march planned by the Mamelodi Concerned Residents (Polity.org.za 2017). National government also enacts initiatives, such as the African Union Agenda 2063 and the draft National

Action Plan, directed at policy to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.

Khalil Goga, from the Nelson Mandela Foundation's dialogue programme, suggests that one of the functions of both the state and the city is "to protect against ... internal crime. If you are not fulfilling that basic function you have a problem" (2017). He illustrates his point like this: "[P]eople are dying at civil war levels in townships and women [are] being abused. ... [T]hat's where your social cohesion is [missing]. That's what you should be looking at and mak[ing] sure that someone is prosecuted and goes to jail" (Goga 2017). Not only in cases of homophobic and gendered discrimination, but also with xenophobia, victims often face secondary victimisation when reporting a crime to officials who are supposed to help them. Activist and filmmaker Bev Ditsie advocates "going back to core ethics. Over all of it, across the board. We can tackle a lot of stuff if you have an organisation that can do the job that it is hired and paid to do. It's as simple as that. You take an oath and say you will serve, so serve" (Ditsie 2017). She recommends highly the work of Redpeg, which runs Skills Education Training Authority (SETA) accredited courses with police, nurses and doctors, to enable them to engage better with victims of hate crimes, particularly sexual violence (Ditsie 2017). The Fees-Must-Fall campaign is a complex and fractured one. It is worth noting here that some of its attention is focused towards perceived (or assumed negligent) perpetrators such as the state, although the state, and the ANC government in particular, is also viewed, at times, as an indispensable ally.

4.4 Scope, scale and reach of initiatives

The ways in which people participate vary from one initiative to another. Some initiatives work one-on-one with individuals. Many initiatives are intentionally limited, for example by wanting to change a particular community rather than the whole of society. Other initiatives use larger workshops or town hall meetings but even these might only reach a tiny fraction of the population of a single ward in the city. Nevertheless, such interventions are capable of making an important difference to a community insofar as key individuals

exert an influence. Other kinds of campaigns try to reach larger numbers of people, for example through a mass event or by using the media. The approach taken may be determined by the methodology followed, and the resources available. To some extent, there is usually a tension between depth and breadth. Media campaigns might reach tens of thousands of people or more, but the way they do it is qualitatively different from the kinds of interactions possible with smaller groups.

“Media campaigns might reach tens of thousands of people or more, but the way they do it is qualitatively different from the kinds of interactions possible with smaller groups.”

4.4.1 Understandings of participation

Different initiatives recognise the role of the participant differently. The participant might be someone who inadvertently hears a forty-seven-second radio advert, which was one of the awareness-raising strategies used as part of a mass media campaign by #RacismStopsWithMe (Independent Media and Ornico Media 2016). Or participants may have chosen or been invited to attend an event such as a lecture on racism. The annual lecture hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, for instance, draws an audience of 3 000 individuals, with an additional 2 000 watching live on Facebook (Goga 2017).

In other initiatives participants may be more actively engaged by participating in a workshop. For example, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of abuse, IJR held a two-day creative expression retreat with 20 women from Warrenvale and Ikhutseng, in the Northern Cape (Doyle 2017). The retreat brought together women of different ages, cis and trans gender women, women with different sexual orientations, and women who spoke different languages (Doyle 2017). The retreat activities included “embodiment exercises, guided meditation, free writing, crafts, discussions in a circle, stretching, mirroring, painting, active listening exercises, poetry, games, and a final performance that involved spoken word, dance, and an art gallery presentation of the women’s paintings” (Doyle 2017: 17). In initiatives such as this, a lot of energy is expected from the participants, but it is not necessarily directed at ‘solving’ the issues of discrimination and abuse.


Participation might also be categorised in terms of duration and frequency. Some kinds of initiatives use intensive, once-off training courses such as those offered

by Redpeg about creating a welcoming environment for LGBTQI people (www.redpeg.co.za n.d.). Other campaigns might centre around one slogan, but repeat it regularly. #RacismStopsWithMe, for instance, was mentioned on the radio often, as well as across Independent Media’s 20 newspaper titles and on digital platforms (King and Mtyala 2016). In contrast, Sarah Motha, manager of programmes for vulnerable groups at FHR, describes how the anti-xenophobia community dialogues they host last between four and eight hours and move between different communities: “Last month we were in Mamelodi, this month there is a potential we could be in Rosettenville” (2017). This initiative also advocates repeat engagement, as Motha describes: “I think we have been there [Soweto] twice and every person we meet in the dialogue we try to invite them to the next dialogue” (2017), and they are also encouraged to host more or less similar conversations in their own spaces. CSVr’s Peacebuilding initiative makes a concerted effort to train community change agents within the community (Sesanga 2017). When the CSVr facilitators move on, the resources, skills and capacity needed to sustain the intervention remain embedded within the community, allowing the programme to continue for years.

Figure 62 depicts the duration of participation, starting at the lower node with media announcements that tend to last minutes (or even seconds). Many initiatives, especially those run by CBOs, NGOs, or foundations are capable of hosting events that run for a several hours, or take up a full day. Several of the projects promoted by the City of Johannesburg are linked to the built environment. These are necessarily conceived as part of a long-term planning strategy, lasting years.

Figure 62: The duration of participation is highly variable across initiatives

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017



LEGEND

-  Local Government
-  Provincial Government
-  National Government
-  Academic
-  Action Research
-  Media
-  Foundations
-  NGOs
-  CBOs
-  Corporates
-  People



Photograph by Christina Culwick

Another distinguishing factor is whether participants take part as individuals, or together as cohorts (Figure 63). CSVR, for example, offers individual clinical counselling to victims of violence and conflict (www.csvr.org.za n.d.), whereas other initiatives are aimed at groups of participants who attend a series of workshops together. Reos Partners and Soul City brought the same group of stakeholders together, in a social lab that focused on violence against women, at least seven times over a period of 19 months (Reos Partners 2017). According to this design, insight was initially obtained from members of the group individually. Then the group came together to map out their collective understanding of the issue and design framing questions to guide a research agenda towards intervening in the violence against women sector. The group attended a second workshop phase as a whole to deepen each individual's

own understanding of the issue by sharing the primary research gleaned from on-location “learning journeys” (Reos Partners 2017). At this stage the organisers assessed people’s commitment to the project, and this was followed by a third phase, an innovation retreat. Here the group collaboratively interrogated ideas, experimented, and prototyped potential solutions (Reos Partners 2017). Collective participation is also integral to other initiatives, such as the Gauteng Premier’s Social Cohesion Games where people come together to watch a football match, or when a physical, public community gathers to commemorate national heritage days or enjoy a carnival. Figure 64 shows initiatives clustered according to typical participation size. Although most initiatives do operate with cohorts of participants, many of the initiatives work with groups of fewer than 100 people.

Figure 63: The ideal number of participants is highly variable across initiatives

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017



LEGEND

-  Local Government
-  Provincial Government
-  National Government
-  Academic
-  Action Research
-  Media
-  Foundations
-  NGOs
-  CBOs
-  Corporates
-  People

Exploring the geography of participation reveals other variances related to scale. Do participants come from one ward, one municipality, one province, or from all over the country? The Migrant Help Desk, for instance, aims to conduct dialogues with a maximum of 150 participants in high risk areas within each of the seven municipal administrative regions of the City of Johannesburg. “Each region must do at least two dialogues per quarter,” notes a city official at the Migrant Help Desk (2017), but within regions “they go according to wards, if they do a dialogue in ward 60 for example here, the next one would happen in ward 58”. In such cases, the reach of the initiative is circumscribed by the local ward boundaries. Each single event, therefore, is directed locally, but the series as a whole moves around in order to increase coverage. These initiatives try to assemble a broad range of figures within a community: residents, ward councillors, and service providers such as social workers, as well as people from community-policing forums and NGOs (City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017; Motha 2017). Motha points to an even more localised understanding of the space for activating change. She notes that people gather information from messages that circulate in conversations in taverns, salons, barber shops and small spaza shops within their neighbourhood (Motha 2017).

The National Institute Community Development and Management (NICDAM) community conversations follow a similar roving model to the dialogues of the Migrant Help Desk. This initiative, sponsored by the DAC, is intended to have a three-year lifespan. The model is understood to be a country-wide programme, even though in each session the participants come from the same province or even the same local area. NICDAM has held sessions in each of the country’s nine provinces with a maximum of 60 participants per session. Each session is a space for a racially diverse community of participants to discuss six factors that are considered to affect social cohesion: race, language, economic


redress, sexism, family values, and safety and security (Le Roux n.d.). Rather than trying to reach every inch of the country and every inhabitant, in phase one of the NICDAM process, three to four dialogues were held in each of the nine provinces over a period of four weeks. The dialogue in Johannesburg was conducted in Lenasia (NICDAM 2016). In this programme, participants are separated from people they know, and randomly assigned to a discussion group. Nonkhululeko Hlongwane, a participant from Springs, says, “when you are in your comfort space you think that you are the only ones who go through the particular problems,” but this kind of process allows you “to begin to understand that the issues you speak of are across cultures, across races” (cited in Le Roux n.d.: 2:37–2:53min). The impact of the initiative is considered to have the potential to radiate from the local level outwards to the provincial and even national level.

In most media campaigns, the intention is to reach a large audience across a broad area. The Roll Back Xenophobia campaign produced a radio series, *Once We Were There*, which was broadcast on community radio stations across the country (Parsley 2003). It tells the story of ten South African former exiles who are now prominent sports personalities, government officials, business people and artists (Parsley 2003).

Variations in the scale of the geographic target are represented in Figure 64. Some initiatives such as NICDAM community conversations, broadcast messages, and the TRC, were aimed at effecting a broad, country-wide change. Many of the City of Johannesburg’s programmes, such as the Migrant Help Desk dialogues, focus on systematic coverage of particular suburbs or wards. Other initiatives focus on particular groups or communities. The Nelson Mandela Foundation’s Civics Academy focuses on scattered individuals who have something in common, drawing, young participants together from all over the city.

Figure 64: Target areas are highly variable across initiatives

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017




LEGEND

- Local Government
- Provincial Government
- National Government
- Academic
- Action Research
- Media
- Foundations
- NGOs
- CBOs
- Corporates
- People


Figure 65: Map of initiatives within the City of Johannesburg

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017



Number of social cohesion interventions per location



4.4.2 Location of initiatives

Initiatives do not occur in a generalised way across a municipality, province or country. Even ‘nationwide’ campaigns have geographies that can be mapped. To illustrate this, Figure 65 maps Johannesburg initiatives for which we were able to identify a specific location. Most of these occurred in a belt from Soweto across the inner city. The geographic location of this belt echoes in some sense the attitudinal divide that emerged in the results mapping in Chapter 3. Soweto is considered to be a relatively cohesive space – it experiences some economic growth and has a rich history of cultural mixing, in terms of music, specifically, and political activism, more broadly (Twidle 2012). It is likely that initiatives are staged here to draw on Soweto’s symbolic political capital. Examples are the Pray for South Africa events, held by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) at the Hector Pieterse Memorial and the Orlando Stadium (Jericho Walls Prayer Network 2016); an anti-xenophobia community dialogue that took place in Jabulani (FHR et al. 2016); EPWP and Jozi@work projects in Orlando (www.joburg.org.za 2014), a Safe City project in Moroka (HSRC 2013); the Mooki trail, and the Premier’s Social Cohesion Games (Antonie 2017). A sustainable human settlements project was also initiated in nearby Luffhereng, in 2015 (www.joburg.org.za 2015).

The difficulties of achieving social cohesion are evidenced in the inner city of Johannesburg. Although it has material and social infrastructure (Simone 2004), a high level of visible policing (City Official: Safety 2017), support resources, and heavy investment from the city itself (City Official: Community Development 2017;

City Official: Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations 2017; City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017; City Official: Safety 2017), it also has populations and places that are deprived. The inner city is a microcosm of diversity, featuring a mix of people across various population demographics, affluent and poor, local and migrant. While the inner city is socially functional, by and large, with forms of solidarity, mutuality and belonging, it can also be violent (Stakeholder (b) 2017; Brown 2017), and many wards in the inner city are identified by the Migrant Help Desk as high-risk areas (Sathekge 2017)⁴. A variety of organisations, including faith-based, community, and research organisations, as well as government departments, have initiated social inclusion interventions in, or near, the inner city, often within or on the boundary of regions defined as high-risk. These include the Migrant Help Desk, CSVR, ATU, Project Constitution, Parks and Public Open Spaces, SAHRC, WiCDS and ACMS. The city has also planted food gardens to “alleviate poverty and reduce inequality” (www.jda.org.za n.d.) and rolled out safe city programmes, for example, in Newtown (HSRC 2013).


Reception areas and informal settlements are also identified as high risk. Zandspruit, the Roodepoort area and Randburg are neglected in this regard. Many of the initiatives taking place are located in areas that are racially homogeneous rather than diverse (Figure 66), and which, for the most part, display low levels of trust. This indicates that there are knotty social problems contributing to exclusion and lack of trust rather than simply a lack of racial mixing.

4. According to Sathekge (2017: 12), “the high risk areas were identified during the attacks on foreign nationals and lootings on foreign owned shops, including the criminal element attacks on foreign nationals. The identified areas are inclusive of the identified high risk areas research from the Wits African Centre for Migration Studies conducted from the previous incidents of violence or attacks on foreign nationals”.

Figure 66: Comparison of levels of trust and racial diversity combined with location of initiative actions

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017 and GCRO QoL IV (2015/16)




Number of social cohesion interventions per location



Most people in my community can be trusted: Percentage per ward





Number of social cohesion interventions per location



Racial diversity: Entropy score per ward



“Well-targeted initiatives, even if they do not directly require the participation of the majority of the population, can make an important difference.”


4.5 Conclusion

There are a number of ways to think about the problem of a lack of social cohesion and the objective of interventions. Local government might want to consider overcoming the problem by reducing prejudice, preventing violence, alleviating distress and trauma, overcoming inequality and systemic exclusion, or all of the above. How a municipality (or the province) imagines its objectives is likely to influence how it imagines the form that its social cohesion programmes might take, and the possible process of improvement.

The province does not necessarily need to reach every resident to improve the atmosphere of social cohesion. Well-targeted initiatives, even if they do not directly require the participation of the majority of the population, can make an important difference. For instance, leaders and authority figures can exert a powerful influence, either positively or negatively, within their own communities. Sensitive and well-trained public servants working to guarantee that people's rights are protected regardless of their race, class, sexuality and nationality, will help discourage notions that prejudices are acceptable and may be exhibited with impunity. It is also possible that intentionally local initiatives, such as community peace building programmes or an authentic conversation, might have as great an effect, and be more enduring, than a public service announcement broadcast widely. It follows that

local government should recognise the possibilities and limits of its own capacity and focus its energy on addressing problems that are within its control. For example, social cohesion programmes could target the more than 30 000 people who work for the City of Johannesburg to help them relate to the public with greater sensitivity towards diversity, and train staff to assist in de-escalating emerging violence hotspots.

Many of the practitioners interviewed in this research project advocated processes based on recognition, accommodation and negotiation (Steyn 2017; City Official: Community Development 2017; Sesanga 2017; Motha 2017; City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). In contrast, overly assertive messages, even wholesome ones, are more likely to encounter resistance and make people uncomfortable (Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht 2011; City Official: Community Development 2017). Human rights is a productive language for policy. This could help avoid some of the pitfalls associated with a narrow nation-building (or city-building) trope which has attracted serious criticism in the past, such as from the ACMS (see Freemantle 2012, 2015). Rights-based discourse – as articulated in the new urban agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – is experiencing significant global uptake at the moment, especially in direct relation to cities.



Photograph by Darya Maslova

**A & N
MARKET** Cell

100 DE KORTE ST.

**AFTER EIGHT
BEAUTY &
UNISEX SALON**



Photograph by Danielle Wepener



Chapter 5

Learning from past and current initiatives: Methodologies for improving social cohesion

KATE JOSEPH

Key points:

- This chapter carries out a grounded theory analysis of more than 60 initiatives to improve social cohesion and organises the methodologies used into five broad groups. These groups overlap to some extent, and might be thought of as potentially complementary rather than contradictory.
- Five streams of intervention methodologies were identified:
 1. Some initiatives use techniques such as canvassing, setting an example, media campaigns, civic education and legislative action to change the way people think and behave.
 2. Some initiatives attempt to inculcate a sense of mutual identification and the proper recognition of marginalised groups. These initiatives include national symbols, religion, sports and cultural events, forums for intergroup contact, and dialogues.
 3. A number of programmes and initiatives consciously deploy the thinking and techniques of psychology, in trauma counselling, liberation social psychology and therapeutic activities.
 4. Some initiatives locate themselves within arts based practises, whether fine art, arts and crafts, art in public spaces or art as a therapeutic technique.
 5. Various initiative use materialist methods – building infrastructure, planning urban spaces and upgrading in a way that is mindful of the objective of social cohesion.

In the first part of this research project, presented in Chapter 4, an analysis of more than 60 attempts to address aspects of social cohesion was carried out. Using a grounded theory approach, it summarised the different ways in which the initiatives conceived of the problem they are confronting and the scale of their interventions. In the second part of this research project, presented in this chapter, the methods these initiatives used were analysed. Some programme designs used methods typically associated with social cohesion building programmes, such as dialogues and cultural days. Other methods were designed to generate public support, and psychological interventions worked with


individuals in order to achieve better social relations. Some methods, like urban planning, that do not, at first glance, revolve around peoples' feelings towards one another, were also included. Five types of methodologies were found during the investigation, and the practises of one or two initiatives in each category will be discussed to illustrate how the method was used in particular cases. The methods have been ordered broadly into the following groups: politicking, mutual identification and recognition, individual and community psychology, arts-based practises, and infrastructure-focused programmes (Figure 67).

“Some programme designs used methods typically associated with social cohesion building programmes. Other methods, like urban planning, that do not, at first glance, revolve around peoples’ feelings towards one another, were also included.”

Figure 67: Five streams of intervention methodologies

GCRO

DATA SOURCE: GCRO social cohesion database 2017



5.1 Politicking

Strategies for changing people's minds have occupied politicians for centuries. Political strategies like canvassing and campaigning are now being used in attempts to bring about cohesion, since social cohesion has become a concern of government.

5.1.1 Canvassing

Canvassing (sometimes coupled with awareness raising) typically involves direct contact with individuals in an attempt to garner support for one's position. This is often a rationalist approach, to persuade or educate people about the merits of one's argument. Denizet-Lewis (2016: n.p.) notes that research (Fleischer in Denizet-Lewis 2016; also Broockman and Kalla 2016;) indicates that a short, in-depth conversation (termed a 'front-door conversation'), is more effective at opening people's minds than a campaign which tells people that what they think is wrong or tells them they should be behaving differently. Such a model, focused on the theory of how to change people's minds, has been tried in political campaigns in America (Denizet-Lewis 2016).

An example of this methodology is the Many Faces, One Africa event, also known as the Migrant Rights are Human Rights pan-African celebration, held at the Yeoville Recreation Centre in 2011. Many organisations including the International Organization for Migration, Amnesty International and Sonke Gender Justice were on hand at the event to distribute information and offer advice. Participants were "migrants from a diversity of African countries and South Africans" (www.adf.org.za n.d.). According to the ADF, which organised the event, the pan-African gathering centred on "celebrating African diversity and the human rights of migrants" and "commemorat[ing] those who were [killed], injured and displaced during the xenophobic attacks of May 2008" (www.adf.org.za n.d.).

The Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group, is practising a form of canvassing akin to doorstepping in their walkabouts. The group's activities, which have been well received by communities, involve "engaging people in whatever form and whatever way", in everyday community spaces, whether through a greeting in the street or a conversation in a tavern (Ditsie 2017). Ditsie notes that on a second visit to Vosloorus they met people who said: "[Other] people [told]us you guys were here

[in December] and it is nice that you are coming [back]."

Ditsie continues, "We had another guy say to us, 'We do self-defence courses maybe you should talk to us – we will train your people for free'. 'Like you will train these lesbians?' 'Yes we will train these lesbians for free'" (2017).

5.1.2 Setting an example: public appeal; appeal to authority; appeal to personality

Public appeal trades on the idea that public opinion can be swayed by the statements or actions of a powerful or popular person or by peer pressure. The Be Thumbprint challenge, a component of the ARNSA anti-racism week, was a public appeal to encourage others, at school or work or anywhere, "to pledge [their] commitment to the journey of becoming" (Moodley 2017). People were encouraged to send in photographs of their thumb print with a motivational 'be' statement – such as 'be courageous' – to demonstrate their participation and support for the cause.

The positive impact that those in authority can have is indicated in the study of xenophobic violence in Slovoview which describes how the "local leaders of the ANC (in Ward 96) appear to have been instrumental in initiating [the reconciliation] process and in ensuring that those who had been driven out from their homes returned in safety" (Von Holdt et al 2011: 76). Conversely, ACMS's Jean Pierre Misago (2017) considers that the political scapegoating of immigrants an underlying causal factor that fuels prevailing anti-immigrant sentiment. A coalition of ADF, UF and NUMSA members sought to admonish what they perceived to be the negative influence of one particular authority figure. They appealed to the president to "explicitly denounce the xenophobic statements of Mayor of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba and call for him to publicly and unconditionally withdraw his statement" (Polity.org.za 2017), in addition to insisting that the president prohibit a march they deemed xenophobic. This appeal invoked the authority of the constitution, and can be seen not only as an appeal to an alternative authority, but also as a way of compelling authority to act. Sesanga (2017) asserts that leaders need to be responsible "because as a leader you hold a lot of power [and when] you say certain things even if they are genuine you need to be very careful [of]

how you say it [and the effects that such statements may have]”. The ADF states that “[t]he hardships that migrants face in communities could have been avoided if the authorities had taken proactive action by rolling out programmes aimed at educating South African citizens ... rather than focusing on the negative innuendo and the baseless accusations about migrants” (TMG Digital 2017).

Celebrity involvement is used across sectors to popularise a brand or message with the objective of generating mass appeal. The Gauteng Premier’s Social Cohesion Games involved many famous African and South Africa soccer stars and celebrities fielded in mixed teams. These round-robin games took place in Alexandra, Westbury, Soweto, Diepsloot, Sedibeng and Orange Farm (Antonie 2017). The draw card for the final was that Premier Makhura would “lead a team of football legends against a celebrity team captained by SABC’s David Kekana” (Lebotha 2017). According to the Office of the Premier the aim of the games was “to foster good relations between South Africans and non-South African communities” (Sekhonyane 2017) through the logic that “football is a common denominator in Gauteng, on the continent and the world over. It transcends all differences and serves to remind us that we have a lot more in common than that which divides us” (Sekhonyane 2017).

5.1.3 Media campaigns

The mass media are capable of reaching a large audience, but the content of the communication can sometimes exacerbate social tensions rather than improve social cohesion. Cloete, Kotze and Groenewald argue that “[l]ocal newspapers, radio and television are influential tools in affecting relations between communities or fermenting divisions” (2009:46). While they can help to alleviate tension and promote cohesion, since local newspapers can also “exacerbate tensions in communities ... the media also need to recognise their responsibilities and the benefits of promoting social cohesion” (Cloete, Kotze and Groenewald 2009: 46).

One example of media use is the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign which, as noted in chapter 4, produced a radio series entitled *Once We Were There*, broadcast on 15 community radio stations across the country. The campaign also produced booklets, pamphlets, posters, and a magazine, as well as inputs for TV and educational programmes (Parsley 2003). Ditsie (2017) recognises that while television has the power to encourage empathy among viewers, it can just as easily be used to normalise and perpetuate unjust social relations.

Giving people information, or telling people what the right way to behave is, does not necessarily result in people modifying their behaviour (Legault, Gutsell



Photograph by Myhammad Gangat

and Inzlicht 2011). Famously, anti-smoking, safe sex or anti-drunk-driving campaigns do not necessarily achieve the desired outcomes as research indicates that many people continue with old patterns of behaviour despite fully understanding that they are harmful. Some prejudice-reducing messaging emphasises aggressively battling prejudice and the societal need to control prejudice. Even where media campaigns are intended to improve social cohesion, some prejudice-reduction messages have inadvertently been counterproductive. “Ironically, motivating people to reduce prejudice by emphasizing external control produced more explicit and implicit prejudice than did not intervening at all,” according to Legault, Gutsell and Inzlicht (2011:1472). This, they argue, is because interventions that eliminate people’s freedom to value diversity on their own terms may generate hostility toward the perceived source of the pressure, the stigmatised group, or a desire to rebel against the prejudice reduction initiative itself.

This is a difficult line for programmes to navigate. ARNSA’s Becoming campaign encouraged members of the public to reflect on their prejudices and become something other than what they were (ARNSA 2017). “[T]he idea was to say ‘let’s become, let’s work on ourselves’. It was a wonderful campaign that was developed” but in sloganeering “it easily slipped back into the take on racism” line (Stakeholder (a) 2017). “If you are saying ‘take on racism’ no one is interested in that” (Stakeholder (a) 2017).

Singling out inappropriate behaviours sometimes makes these acts seem removed and performed only by ‘bad people’, which can result in some people failing to see their own behaviour as part of the problem (Hawkins 2017).

5.1.4 Civic education

Crittenden and Levine (2013) point out that civic education and the promotion of nationally desirable values and norms are intended to help people become effective citizens. Frequently, the phrase ‘civic education’ denotes only programmes of instruction within schools, but the process may also be used to reduce disparities in political power by giving everyone the knowledge, confidence, and skills they need to participate in public life (Crittenden and Levine 2013).

It was noted earlier in this report that many people’s predispositions are firmly developed by the time they reach adolescence, and they are thereafter only receptive to messages that affirm their own world view. Unsurprisingly then, several initiatives explicitly target school learners because their social outlook is still malleable. Project Constitution, run by the Helen Suzman Foundation in partnership with HSBC and Constitution Hill, is a series of workshops, conversations and other activities, for learners from selected government and independent schools in and around the Johannesburg metropolitan area, aimed at creating greater awareness of the Constitution (www.hsf.org.za 2013). Another initiative, Building Inclusive Societies: Schools’ Oral History Project (2012–2016), offered learners from the Heritage Club at Reakantswe Intermediate School in Windsorton, Northern Cape, training workshops in oral history research and methodology (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016). Learners’ work was published by the IJR as a book, *The beginnings of my story. I was, I am. I will excel: A contribution to local history and social cohesion* (2016). The aim of this project was “the creation of platforms where personal and historical perspectives are acknowledged, prejudice challenged [and] inclusive narratives explored” (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016: 10).

Steyn (2017) notes that as a result of her work with the National Department of Education, there has been an infusion of Critical Diversity Literacy into the new textbooks used by school learners for the subject Life Orientation.

5.1.5 Legislative action

Legislative action relates to creating policy or calling for existing policy and laws to be upheld or changed. All the policy initiatives of the various spheres of government have a legislative component giving them the authority for implementation. Activist groups appeal at times to a legal framework to support their position. Khulumani Support Group, HSF and Roll Back Xenophobia frequently support their actions with citations of laws and policy to ensure legal obligations are met. These programmes lobby for the rights of people who should be protected under the law, but who are not, in actuality, being served properly. In other situations, legislative

tools are used to challenge the law directly, chiefly with a view to expanding legal definitions. The Civil Union Bill (2006) is one example. The law was amended to afford same-sex couples the same status, benefits, and responsibilities that marriage provides to opposite-sex couples (South African Government 2006).

Having strongly inclusive and caring policy is desirable, but a significant gap between de facto policy and de jure conditions on the ground remains in many places (Smith 2017). Laws are an important means of compelling people to behave in certain ways but are insufficient, by themselves, for ensuring this behaviour.

One reason is that laws do not entirely shape people's attitudes and social worlds. Another is that

enforcement is uneven. Laws and policy around issues of identity and belonging can only go part of the way to fostering social cohesion. As one city official noted: "[w]e can't force social cohesion" (City Official: Safety 2017). Two city officials pointed out that it is important to recognise the bottom-up initiatives initiated by ordinary people, which are not usually government funded or lead (City Official: Safety 2017; City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). How to develop policy that can facilitate and enable organic cohesion is precisely the crux of this investigation. Though there is ongoing research in this field, more work needs to be done on overcoming the implementation gap, as well as achieving genuine and deep-seated community buy in for policy.

5.2 Mutual identification and recognition

Some techniques are specifically intended to foster a sense of togetherness, where individuals identify with one another and with a collective. Groups that might regard themselves as separate are encouraged to identify with others through the development of mutual understanding and empathy. This means, specifically, people getting to know one another and developing common ground. Such techniques can also be used to secure recognition for groups and individuals who might feel they have not been properly recognised in society or by those in authority.

5.2.1 Mixing, contact and exposure

The contact hypothesis proposes that under appropriate conditions (typically people working together to solve a specific problem), properly managed interpersonal contact between different groups can cultivate an understanding and appreciation for different points of view, reduce prejudice, and lead to better interactions (Allport 1954).

There are several initiatives in South Africa encouraging mixing in various ways. Sustainable human settlement projects intend to overcome apartheid's segregationist urban form by designing for mixed-income housing although there are variations in the granularity of internal mixing within these communities. The Transport Sector Plan (City of

Johannesburg 2016: 64) – through the development of routes improving access to all parts of the city – could encourage spatial mixing. The Parks and Public Open Spaces project aims to stimulate community and social mixing by making greater communal use of public spaces. The Civics Academy programme, aimed at youth between the ages of 15 and 20, produced online explainer videos on human rights and the Constitution (Goga 2017). Goga describes how the Nelson Mandela Foundation tried "to get people from all over the place" together – rich people, poor people, people from different backgrounds – to "merge dialogue aspects" with videos (2017). They debated and enacted a mock parliament to contest various political positions (representing a communist party, a traditional African party, a liberal party, and a social democratic party, for example) to promote understanding and demonstrate learning (Goga 2017). "It worked very well, because people ... in their little groups, they started thinking about race; they started thinking about the economy. I thought it worked very, very nicely" (Goga 2017).

However, mixing sometimes does not reduce tension, but rather causes it. For example, the areas that have been most affected by xenophobia are relatively 'mixed', with high proportions of migrants living among local people (Von Holdt et al. 2011; Sesanga 2017). Although people might interact successfully with people

from other cultural, language or racial groups in daily engagements like buying groceries from a spaza shop owned by a foreigner or leasing a dwelling to a migrant, this interpersonal mixing does not necessarily counter hostility when it escalates (City Official (b); Migrant Help Desk 2017; Scheba 2017).

5.2.2 Dialogue

Since 1994 and the advent of the democratic era in South Africa, many initiatives have sought to create forums where different social groupings air a plurality of views. This approach attempts to achieve well-facilitated, safe spaces for fostering deeper understanding, empathy and respect.

The NICDAM community conversations, for example, began with a facilitator introducing the group discussion to participants: “What we want for today is not for anyone to shy away... [We would like you] [t]o communicate in a decent and respectful manner but also ... to raise your opinion” (Le Roux n.d.: 3:57–4:10min). We found in our research samples that initiatives with a strong dialogue-based methodology frequently had government ties. For example, the anti-xenophobia community dialogue in Katlehong had ties to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development; the NICDAM community conversations were sponsored by the DAC; and the nation-building project of the TRC was endorsed by national government.

Civil society organisations seemed more likely to stage public dialogues than mass conversations, or to utilise various dialogues for engagement. A number of civil society initiatives simultaneously appealed to both those responsible for causing harm, or potentially able to cause harm, and those who have been harmed: the Peace Building programme; Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group; Alex Pan African Carnival and the Youth African Soccer Cup. Most of these had the productive goal of getting the two ‘sides’ together and having a constructive engagement, within a shared space.

There are limitations to the efficacy of dialogue, however. One city official noted that when tensions flare, politicians typically suggest a prayer day or dialogue (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). “The problem is that they seem to assume that you can organise a discussion for two days in one area and then the problems are over, instead of looking at those as ongoing processes linked to systems of oppression” (City

Official: Arts and Culture 2017). Sometimes dialogues can even “go horribly wrong” and heighten tensions (Sesanga 2017). Motha (2017) notes that the anti-xenophobia dialogues can go one of two ways – either the dialogues are calm, or they can be “fierce neck-to-neck”. Several organisations including the Nelson Mandela Foundation, CSV, the Migrant Help Desk, and Reos Partners, note that when highly contentious topics are under discussion, they often replace face-to-face dialogues with “dialogue interviews” (Reospartners.com n.d.), in which stakeholders are engaged separately. How long the impact of dialogue lasts is also debatable. Erwin’s research illustrates that “an individual may well reflect briefly on a particular story, but outside the workshop privilege and discrimination are reaffirmed daily through countless small acts” (2017a: 50). Other studies agree that while these types of interventions are successful in the short term they have limited success in the long term (Pedersen, Walker and Wise 2005, cited in Erwin 2017a). Thus, while evidently still of value, the potential of dialogue for meaningful, long-term attitudinal change is not clear, since assessing and evaluating peoples’ attitudes over time is very difficult. While not a longitudinal measure over time, the NICDAM community conversations included a before and after impact assessment. The final report (NICDAM 2016) records broad positive change across most of the measured aspects regarding knowledge and attitude. The most marked positive change referenced ‘trust and respect for one another in the community’. In the pre-conversation assessment 29,2% of the participants responded positively to this statement, while in the post-conversation assessment the number had risen to 87,7% (NICDAM 2016). The perception of whether people in the community were united changed from 30,3% to 77,6% at the post-conversation stage (NICDAM 2016).

While in the field of restorative justice there is evidence that victims voluntarily opt to meet, and appreciate having dialogue with, their offenders (see Umbreit, Coates and Vos 2000; Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011), depending on the nature of the harms done, dialogues are not always appropriate. In cases of sexual assault, victims are not often likely to want to confront or engage with their attackers. Dialogues sometimes fail to consider power imbalances adequately, such as who feels free to speak and who might feel silenced by the process, and what

might be said or remain unsaid in the context.

The TRC, which might be considered an example of dialogue on a grand scale, has also been criticised (see Hamber et al. 1998; Mamdani 2002; Valji 2003). Some argue that the focus on amnesty and forgiveness was one-sided and there can be no justice without conviction or reparation. A major criticism of the TRC model, and dialogue in general, is the focus on the individual. This can serve to deflect responsibility from the broader structures of inequality and those who benefit from them (Valji 2003).

Public dialogues

While public dialogues tend to be staged, they are capable of presenting a difference or balance of opinions, are often very well mediated, and can be weighted to convey a core message.

ARNSA states that their “panel debates and public discussions [should] address difficult topics in relation to race ... but importantly [should] not become polarized debates” (ARNSA 2017: 2). This programme, like the Human Sciences Research Council’s (HSRC) Racism Dialogue series and NMF’s public debates and panels around racism and identity, is not trying to accommodate opposing views of racism to arrive at a negotiated space. Rather, these initiatives take the position that racism is wrong and should be discouraged. Their aim is to interrogate racist thinking deeply and make the audience aware of ways that behaviours might be interpreted, expressly if that behaviour is offensive to other people.

Consultation

There are many forms of consultation. At a basic level, consultation is a mutual process and is constituted by the giving and taking of advice, similar to the processes of dialogue and discussion. Where consultations are expert-led, however, consultations may in fact consist largely of experts presenting their positions (Backer et al. 1992).

Consultation is an important tenet of governance in South Africa. Sometimes consultation can be demanding, particularly when a community is disinterested or refuses to engage. The Parks and Public Open Spaces project, which is concerned with upgrading and promoting parks as shared spaces, faced an impasse with the End Street community with regard to rejuvenating the local park. The community’s standpoint

was: “We don’t use it. Why should we be looking after it? What are you going to give us [for doing this]?” (City Official: Safety 2017). The City of Johannesburg began establishing a consultative relationship to demonstrate the value of the park and the benefits the community could derive from it (City Official: Safety 2017). The anti-xenophobic community dialogue in Katlehong likewise drew on the opinions of the local community, and coupled local experience with expert advice from SAHRC, CBOs, community policing forums, and the human rights activists in attendance to achieve desirable outcomes.

Various consultative processes for conflict transformation are detailed in the CSVr and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights learning series, *Spinning the Web: Exploring the Nexus between Human Rights and Conflict Transformation*. The series, compiled between 2011 and 2013, developed a toolkit to better equip organisers and facilitators for handling conflict negotiation situations (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2013). Insights from over 20 years’ work by practitioners across national and international networks is incorporated. This publication views conflict as more than isolated events to be resolved and managed, and encourages an understanding of conflict as inherent to society. Addressing conflict can be an opportunity for productive development and evolution (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2013).

One booklet in the series, *What Lies Beyond? Delving Below the Surface of Conflict*, details a strategy called “The Onion” (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2013: 35), based on the understanding that any conflict situation has many different layers. The strategy is discussed in terms of ‘Positions’, ‘Interests’, and ‘Needs’. The outer layer consists of the various parties’ public statements or positions. Below the surface, and often undisclosed, lie their interests – what each party hopes to get out of the situation. At the core are the underlying needs “that must be satisfied for any solution to have a durable effect” (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2013). This approach to consultation can be useful when the public positions of the various parties involved appear to be fundamentally at odds. The method can be helpful in moving people beyond their public

positions towards potential common ground that can then be used for further discussion (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2013).

5.2.3 National symbols

National symbols are considered to promote national identification, pride and nation-building. According to the minister of Higher Education, Naledi Pandor, writing in the document, *My Country South Africa: Celebrating our National Symbols and Heritage*, “[t]he promotion of the values embodied in our national symbols is important not only for the sake of personal development, but also to ensure that a national South African identity is built on the values enshrined in our Constitution” (DAC and DE 2008).

Some of the initiatives analysed in this research explicitly reference national symbols. The NICDAM community conversations, for instance, open with participants singing the national anthem and close with the reading, by candle light, of a pledge decorated with maps of South Africa in the colours of the national flag. Participants pledge to ‘Know our constitution’, ‘Sing and respect our national anthem’ and ‘Fly the South African flag’, along with other aspects promoting love and harmony. The candles are in the colours of the South African flag, and participants are “invited to take home the South African and African Union flags encouraging national and African pride” (Le Roux n.d.).

Some project organisers query the way national symbols are expected to operate, and interesting dilemmas relating to the national anthem came up in interviews (Steyn 2017; City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). If someone does not want to sing the national anthem what should be done? Should they be compelled to sing it? One city official said, “[w]e don’t all agree on this anthem outside of our professional responsibilities. There are people who say why does it include the former Die Stem?” (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). He suggests that “maybe we shouldn’t see [objections] as a negative? We should see it in terms of society fully expressing themselves” (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). Is a refusal to participate or fully identify with such symbols a problem for cohesion, or can negotiated participation be productive?

National symbols generally foster a shared sense of pride, but they can also increase exclusion of those who are not citizens (Freemantle 2015). Even people within the group targeted by these kinds of campaigns can be resistant or feel discomfort about being compelled to participate (City Official: Community Development 2017; Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht 2011). The brochure, *My Country South Africa: Celebrating our National Symbols and Heritage*, acknowledges that the concept of belonging is not stable or fixed when it states, “[i]dentity is about belonging. We all belong to different social groups. We take on different roles in different social spaces or contexts” (DAC and DE 2008).

Invoking the Constitution

The Constitution is commonly invoked in attempts to guarantee the rights of otherwise marginalised groups. Project Constitution, a school-level educational programme, aims to instil “commitment to the fundamental values and principles of a democracy” in learners and teach them about the Constitution (www.hsf.org.za 2013). On the other end of the scale, the open letter to the president explicitly referenced comments made by the mayor of Johannesburg as “a violation of [migrant communities’] right to have their dignity respected and protected’ [by the] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996: Chapter 2, sub-section 10” (cited in Polity.org.za 2017: n.p.).

Teaching young people the values of the Constitution is without doubt a productive exercise but it is just as necessary for people in positions of authority to uphold the Constitution’s tenets (Ditsie 2017; Polity.org.za 2017; www.adf.org.za 2016). Programmes aimed at instilling the values inscribed in the Constitution in adults, especially municipal office bearers, bureaucrats, City Power technicians and police officers, might have a more significant influence and greater social impact.

Narratives and histories

IJR assert that readings of history are impoverished unless we acknowledge that “the past consists of many and varied stories and that our knowledge of the past is informed and shaped in multiple ways” (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016: 9). Some initiatives in this survey focused on history, particularly shared histories, as

being important for strengthening people's sense of identity and belonging, and as a means of better understanding one another.

The Gauteng Social Cohesion Carnival was a platform for celebrating the various traditions of a diversity of participants: "Embracing our shared heritage signals the beginning of acceptance of one another" said the then MEC Molebatsi Bopape (Gauteng Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation 2015: n.p.). Other interventions concerned themselves more with individuals' personal narratives. The Mooki trail (discussed under public art methodologies in this document) weaves real people's life histories into the fabric of the landscape as a form of memorial (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). The work of the TRC embraced, to an extent, the cathartic benefits of telling one's own story, and an aspect of the Becoming campaign looked at building consciousness through communicating one's own experience (ARNSA 2017).

IJR has several thematic projects centred on narrative and memory (Potgieter 2017). One of these is the Building Inclusive Societies: Schools' Oral History Project. The initiative with learners from Reakantswe Intermediate School, Northern Cape, culminated in a book that drew on biographical interviews related to how life has changed in Windsorton in the last 50 years. Esau and Hlohlomi posit in their introduction to this publication that, "few [young people] afford themselves the opportunity and time to explore how changes in societies are brought about and the respective roles of the individual and collective across generations" (2016:9). The framework encouraged learners to reflect on questions such as: "What kind of community and town do I want to live in?"; "Who must make it happen?" and "In what ways can I make a contribution to make those a reality?" (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016: backcover). Participants were able to reflect on and critique problems in their community, such as drug abuse, gang violence and unemployment (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016).

5.2.4 Sport and cultural events

Sport

As demonstrated by South Africa's hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 2010 FIFA World Cup (football), sport can be a powerful tool for

nation-building and social cohesion (Labuschagne 2008). Many Faces, One Africa brought together teams representing South Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Ghana for a series of friendly soccer matches (www.adf.org.za n.d.), and the Youth African Soccer Cup brought together teams of school-level players, both boys and girls, from various schools on the continent. A statement from the Gauteng premier's office about the Premier's Social Cohesion Games declares specifically that "sport plays a fundamental role in the development of social cohesion" and urges the people of Gauteng "to strive to use the sport plan to increase social cohesion and provide much needed opportunities for engagement in community life, foster healthy lifestyles as well as reducing conflict and criminal behaviour through education and sport" (Sekhonyane 2017: n.p.). However, a city official who is in favour of sport as a cohesion strategy cautioned that perhaps explicitly calling an event 'Social Cohesion Games' is "pushing it [the message] too hard" and that actually discourages people from engaging (City Official: Community Development 2017).

With reference to the Ubuntu Cup, a Johannesburg-based sports day, a city official was of the opinion that sport instils the right kind of values such as fairness, effort and healthy competition in people: "Things don't just come, you must put [in] effort and working hard pays [off]. Those are the things that come with sports activity" (City Official: Community Development 2017). Sport also teaches people that "sometimes you win and sometimes you lose, but it is okay. You will win another day" (City Official: Community Development 2017).

Some scholars have questioned the transformative capacity of sport, however and think that sport "has an inflated status as social unifier – that it is nothing more than 'ninety-minute patriotism'" (Labuschagne 2008: 3). Sport is also capable of encouraging violence and conflict: violent clashes between rival fans and football 'hooliganism' are a fairly common, especially in Europe. Leigh-Ann Naidoo, a South African former Olympic athlete, considers that although sport was pitched as a developmental and community upliftment strategy, in reality it devolved politically after the end of apartheid. "The values I learnt about contributing to building a sport and sport community ... were replaced

“

For many in under-resourced areas, sport is a welcome and beneficial distraction, but without other more sustained programmes, it acts on a superficial level only.

CITY OFFICIAL: ARTS AND CULTURE 2017

”



Photograph by Evans Symonds

with values of consumption and gain, which focused on the individual”, she notes (Naidoo 2017: 169). For many in under-resourced areas, sport is a welcome and beneficial distraction, but without other more sustained programmes, it acts on a superficial level only and does not contribute much to solving the core issues facing the community (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017).

Cultural events

Shared enjoyment has the potential to cement social relationships. Festivals are “enjoyable, exceptional and ... people participate for ... the pleasure of coming together” (Gibson et al. 2011). A city official noted that events open a space where “people can come together. People can create something together [and then] have a memory of being together” (City Official: Community Development 2017). Creating public events focused on activities relating to music or food that are considered to be universally enjoyable is a corner stone of ‘multicultural’ projects. Such processes not only reinforce in-group sociality but, crucially, can also be spaces where ‘strangers’ are welcomed and even honoured.

Ballantine and colleagues (2017) argue that social cohesion requires an affective aesthetic experience which people feel and are moved by emotionally. Carnivals can offer such an aesthetic experience, but they are historically derived from a general reversal of everyday rules and norms. They might serve, then, to maintain, rather than to challenge, the prevailing status quo. Initiatives harnessing the enjoyment and ‘magic’ of festivals should be mindful that for these events to have the greatest impact sustained, day-to-day work is also needed (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017).

The Becoming campaign used entertainment events like “comedy [shows] and a national film screening” (ARNSA 2017: 4), in addition to sport, to draw attention to its message. The Many Faces, One Africa event culminated in a pan-African concert, and one attendee noted that “the diversity of the music itself is a way for people to share their culture, and by doing so, this helps to create a greater interest and awareness of fellow Africans. As people dance and sing together, they can appreciate African diversity itself” (www.adf.org.za n.d.).

The annual Gauteng Social Cohesion Carnival (which began in 2005 as the Gauteng Carnival) is held

on national Heritage Day. It features a street parade with floats, marching bands and performers. Residents are encouraged to celebrate the diversity of cultural heritage at the event through dress and other adornments (www.carnivalcompany.co.za 2016).

Recognising significant calendar days such as Africa Refugee Day, Africa Human Rights Day and International Human Rights Day is another way of drawing together a broader community. Parsley (2003) notes that the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign first began embracing internationally recognised days during 1999, with cultural events, music concerts and art exhibitions. “Africa Refugee Day 2000 resulted in a dynamic week of debate and dialogue coupled with art, music and cuisine,” she states (Parsley 2003: n.p.).

Youth Day and Freedom Day are national heritage days that are commemorated officially in South Africa as public holidays, but one city official noted that “South Africa is unique in that when it commemorates it takes on party political” tones (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). “People do not unite as South Africans [a patriotically recognisable group] to celebrate Freedom Day ... They are bussed in to stadiums and given T-shirts by political parties so what becomes apparent when looking at the crowd is party affiliation” (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). Political antagonisms frequently arise, with different parties often organising their own separate events (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). One city official stated that although in “literatures on memory, commemoration is one of the tools for national building ... here in South Africa it is not a tool for nation-building” (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). He was of the opinion that finding a different way to commemorate might help us move closer to the social vision that we seek (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). Speaking more broadly, to pan-Africanism ideals, Von Holdt and colleagues (2011) insist that there is a need to develop a new imaginative archive which recognises a more coherent concept of shared national and continental history.

5.2.5 Religion

Religion is sometimes mobilised as a vehicle for conveying shared beliefs and common values. John MacAloon describes ritual as the expression of

“spontaneous *communitas*” (cited in Slowikowski 1991: abstract). More than 80% of South Africans identify as Christian (Statistics South Africa 2014) and there have been concerted efforts – from the ethos of the TRC lead by Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the late 1990s, to former President Zuma’s quoting of religious idioms – to shape political and social values in South Africa through appeals to religion.

Historically, the church was instrumental in both promoting, and resisting, apartheid. The Pray for South Africa! prayer guide correctly notes that the “Church played a dynamic role during the transformation period” and states that “the Church ... is an important vehicle to bring healing to a country’s people” (Jericho Walls Prayer Network 2016: 4). *The Pray for South Africa* guide calls for the church “to rise up, stand firm and lead prophetically!” (Jericho Walls Prayer Network 2016:4).

National Prayer Day and other large-scale annual Christian events target a non-territorial community of Christians. Pray for South Africa is a sustained programme that includes major one-day events as well as month-long prayer initiatives. In 2016, events were held at Orlando Stadium and the Hector Pieterse Memorial in Soweto. These are sometimes massive gatherings – on National Prayer Day in 2017, an event held on a farm outside Bloemfontein was reportedly attended by over 1 million people (Davis 2017). At this event, Evangelist Angus Buchan called for an expansion of the church’s

reach, saying: “I look forward to the day Parliament begins every morning with the reading of scripture and prayer, because that is what South Africa needs” (quoted in Davis 2017: n.p.).

Diverse faith-based communities frequently come together to debate major issues. The National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA), a Section 21 Company, held a two-day conference focused on social cohesion and nation-building in 2016. Dr Mathole Motshekga, chairperson of NICSA, proposes that “[n]othing is sustainable without values. Through NICSA, the many faith-based organisations across South Africa can come together to rekindle a movement towards a values-based society” (www.nicsa.org.za 2016).

There are limits to the amount that religion can contribute to social cohesion, because of differing religious beliefs. While religious leaders inspire their followers, they also potentially alienate others with different belief systems, and might promote the belief that those who follow other religions are of lower value or constitute a threat. Mobilising against certain forms of social prejudice can be difficult. Melissa Steyn expresses concern about models of social cohesion based on common values: “I think that that is extremely problematic because any appeal to something that has to be held completely in common is ... a precept of some people” (Steyn 2017).

5.3 Individual and community psychology

Some methods focusing on social cohesion advocate that for a society to function well, good individual mental health is needed, and the harmful effects of trauma need to be managed. Various psychological approaches attempt to help people who have experienced harm to recover from these negative experiences. This takes different forms, from individual counselling to supportive group sessions and therapeutic activities. Counselling is not only about helping individual people but might also be concerned with teaching communities about overarching structures that hold them back, and keep them from participating fully in society in the same ways that those who are privileged by these systems do.

5.3.1 Psychosocial support and trauma counselling

Psychosocial support frequently takes the form of trauma counselling that roots an individual’s personal psychological well-being within the social community. This method aims to restore social cohesion after a traumatic event by facilitating resilience of individuals, families and communities. This can aid recovery after a crisis, and help provide strategies for dealing with possible future stressful events (Bubenzer and Tankink 2015: 8).

CSVV works both directly and indirectly with people affected by violence and conflict. It has a clinic in

Johannesburg that offers a psychosocial service to victims of violence who seek counselling and support and engages in community development interventions such as the Peace Building programme (www.csvr.org.za n.d.). The method is based on a community development model, and rather than coming in to 'fix the problem', the organisation facilitates and supports, and through peace builders, partners with the community in developing its own resources and capacity to address its problems. The inclusion of both nationals and non-nationals as peace builders is important for improving overall perceptions of community involvement, according to Sesanga (2017), although she points out that getting non-nationals to participate actively is sometimes difficult. Non-nationals frequently say something like, "[I] agree with the concept, but I don't own the shop [I work in], I have to be in the shop [so I cannot go out to this event], but you have my support" (Sesanga 2017). The programme aims to ascertain the root causes of violence and, importantly, to develop mechanisms on the ground to de-escalate tensions. To do this effectively, Sesanga (2017) suggests, "you need to be able to see who your connectors are and where your power struggles are and it takes a lot of work," which is why community peace builders who have local knowledge are essential to the process. Peace builders are recognised as the "go-to" people when there is a dispute, and they do reflexive conflict mapping exercises once a quarter, since community dynamics are always changing (Sesanga 2017).

Bubbenzer and Tankink (2015) consider that much good can come from psychological and psychosocial support, although they caution that revisiting painful experiences can potentially retraumatise some people. This limitation is not exclusive to psychological interventions, however, since any type of programme that deals with sensitive issues runs such a risk. Another limitation of this methodology is that it necessarily requires highly skilled and well trained practitioners.

5.3.2 Liberation social psychology

This model, developed in Latin America, critiques traditional psychological approaches and focuses instead on the interaction between external change agents, organisations or facilitators, and the oppressed community. The role of the organisations, according to

this model, is to help communities recognise problems that have become naturalised, grasp the structures and mechanisms responsible for their oppression, and then work to oppose and change these structures (Martin-Baro, cited in Bantjes 2011). The value of political activism is stressed. Ahmed and Pretorius-Heuchert (cited in Bantjes 2011: 5) note, "while institutions shape people's consciousness and experiences, people have the capacity to change institutions". A reinvigorated strain of liberation ideology – freeing oneself from oppression – can be found in the discourse of the Fees-Must-Fall movement, and the Khulumani Support Group, the Violence Against Women social lab and, to a degree, the Roll Back Xenophobia campaign, also use this type of method in some of their campaigns.

5.3.3 Therapeutic activities

International practise has demonstrated that body-based exercises can help increase self-awareness and attune a person to their surroundings and past and present experiences. This, coupled with collaborative movement, games and relaxation techniques, can have impressive results for both psychological and physical recovery (Doyle 2017). People suffering the effects of violence, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and ongoing physical harm have reported on the success of these kinds of interventions (Doyle 2017).

ATU worked with the community of Ivory Park, Midrand, from 2001 to 2005. ATU's Therapeutic Spiral Model (TSM) uses props, art and experiential drama therapy to enable participants to explore previous traumatic experiences in a safe environment during a group session. The model has been designed to allow people who might not explicitly define themselves as trauma survivors, or who might be reluctant to seek psychological help, to access therapeutic processes (Hudgins and Toscani 2013). TSM enjoys a favourable reputation internationally, according to Hudgins and Toscani (2013), as it has the potential to break destructive cycles, help heal past trauma, and encourage new positive behaviours. On its website, ATU states that its mission is to "provide training for professionals and community leaders to use action methods, specifically psychodrama", to address post-traumatic stress disorder in disadvantaged communities. It also conducts



Photograph by Jhono Bennet

ongoing groups with: the disabled – quadriplegics and paraplegics, “elders, street children, children removed from homes due to abuse, youth at risk and [assists with] compassion fatigue in health providers” (www.actingthru.org.za 2014).

5.3.4 Tackling subsidiary problems facing communities

The national Department of Social Development (DSD) trains social workers and provides social assistance to individuals and groups. The department understands its role in social cohesion to be primarily “support[ing] and

strengthen[ing] family and community interventions” (DSD 2009:14). The DSD states that it contributes to social cohesion by “strategically tackling core challenges such as substance abuse” (DSD 2009: 5), which is seen to be one of the major social problems. Such abuse contributes to low levels of trust and is one of the causes of violence in families and communities. This was confirmed by Sarah Motha (2017), who heads up the community dialogues for FHR, by an official at the Migrant Help Desk (City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017), as well as by the findings from GCRO’s Quality of Life Survey (Siteleki and Ballard 2016).

5.4 Arts-based practises

Although the diversity of methods used by various initiatives indicates that there are numerous ways of doing social cohesion work outside of an arts and culture framework, some of the methods examined so far intersect with arts and culture methodologies in having common goals such as mutual identification and even political rationalising via mass media campaigns. Government often allocates responsibility for social cohesion to cultural departments (City Official: Arts

and Culture 2017), but there is a wide range of methods within arts-based practises. Curated cultural events can be a way to bring people together, and unexpected performances can inject political discussions into routine activities. Spontaneous creativity might allow participants to express themselves in a new way. Monuments might be used by collectives to mark significant events. In the national Concept Paper on Social Cohesion, the arts are considered to constitute a



medium and field for creativity, diversity and dialogue since they create a “space for communication” (Cloete, Kotze and Groenewald 2009: 45).

5.4.1 Theatre

Performances in formal theatre spaces can broach contentious issues, according to Doyle, “because they have entertainment value and effectively capture audience attention” (2017: 13), allowing for both a mediated and an intimate engagement. Arts Alive is a major festival, hosted by the City of Johannesburg. It provides an opportunity for residents from different parts of the city to come together and enjoy performances and presentations and, in addition, it provides jobs, develops the creative industries and contributes to mutual identification (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017). The 2017 Dance Umbrella featured a performance adapted from the Dance for Dialogue method (Doyle 2017) previously used at the Baxter Theatre in Cape Town. Audience members were encouraged to compare their lives in 1994 to their lives in the present, and were asked to describe how things had changed. This yielded storylines from audience members that the dancers interpreted spontaneously. To see one’s story performed (termed playback), sometimes differently from how it

may have happened, “creates new insights, catalyzes reflection, and can even motivate behavioural change” (Doyle 2017: 14). Doyle is of the opinion that “the capacity of ‘playback’ techniques to help people feel heard after a conflict could serve the demands of reconciliation processes, possibly leading to better psychosocial outcomes for survivors than formal truth telling in prosecutorial settings” (2017: 14).

5.4.2 Art in public space

An example of art in public spaces is the Mooki trail in Soweto, which highlights and celebrates local historical figures. These are not iconic figures, but ‘everyday’ people who helped build their community. A city official pointed out that this kind of public art “humanises the landscape”. In resisting the master narrative, it also does important political work, he argues, by asserting the multiplicity of histories and identities (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017).

Developed from Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, Invisible Theatre is enacted in the midst of everyday life. Performers disguise the fact that they are performers and interact with the public, who “engage with the scene as if it were real life” (Mitchell n.d.: n.p), and react spontaneously. Generally, the aim

of such exercises is to “pose a moral dilemma in the midst of everyday life – this can be particularly useful on a topic that people might normally be ‘too polite’ to bring up, such as poverty, racism or homophobia – creating very accessible conflictual situations in which people can rethink their assumptions and engage with sensitive issues they might otherwise avoid” (Mitchell n.d.: n.p). WiCDS’s bystander intervention is a form of well-managed invisible theatre that raises awareness. The programme includes subsequent debriefing and reflection, and follow-on bystander education workshops. Steyn (2017) describes how, for an audience member, the engagement provides an opportunity to register how day-to-day actions have the potential to interrupt or to condone the perpetuation and reproduction of violence. Bystander intervention is relatively unique in this respect, as it seeks neither to aid people who have suffered harm, nor to rehabilitate those responsible for causing harm (Steyn 2017). Rather, it confronts the bystanders and compels them to think and act more empathetically. Thokozani Ndaba, of Microscopia Labs, and Katswe Sisterhood, a feminist organisation from Harare, co-designed a Guerrilla Theatre intervention in which one of the characters wore a mini skirt and circulated through a taxi rank, with a larger cast moving through the surrounding spaces. The performance sparked public engagement “with often silent issues ... not only gender-based violence but also mugging, cultural oppressions, street crimes and general safety” (Ndaba and Chambert 2017).

5.5 Infrastructure-focused programmes

As noted earlier in this document, service delivery, and development more generally, can be thought of as important contributors to social cohesion. In their article relating social cohesion to economic growth, Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock argue that the state can “actively help to create social cohesion by ensuring that public services are provided fairly and efficiently (i.e. treating all citizens equally)” (2006: 16). A city official pointed out that inequality, abject poverty, and the structural reinforcement of apartheid geography are key contributors to the problem(s) the city faces (City Official: Arts and Culture 2017), and this was confirmed

As invisible theatre is spontaneous, organisers need to approach situations sensitively, and be prepared for the unexpected. Situations can quickly spiral out of control if not well monitored, potentially putting performers and the public alike at risk, or causing a backlash and having unanticipated ethical implications (Mitchell n.d.).

5.4.3 Autobiographical art

MoVE, which stands for ‘Method : Visual : Explore’, is an ACMS project that focuses on the development of visual and other methodologies to research the lived experiences of migrants in southern Africa (www.migration.org.za n.d.). This approach uses visual methods, including photography, narrative writing, participatory theatre, collage and other arts-based approaches to facilitate significant new research insights (www.migration.org.za n.d.). MoVE was instrumental in producing *Queer Crossings: A participatory arts-based project*, in which LGBTQ migrants applied auto-ethnographic story-telling, and self-study through art, to explore and express the complex and contradictory experience of being LGBTQ in South Africa (Oliveira, Meyers and Vearey 2016). The Roll Back Xenophobia campaign produced a photographic exhibition, *Soutra: Images of Refuge*, after refugees were provided with photographic equipment and trained in basic photography skills. “The photographs are of refugees, by refugees, so as to provide a unique insight into the lives and challenges they face” (Parsley 2003: n.p.).

by other sources during the course of this research (Von Holdt et al. 2011; Carracedo 2014; City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017; City Official: Community Development 2017; Goga 2017). It is important, therefore, that local government realises that cohesion can be a positive outcome of other activities such as urban planning and social upgrading programmes.

5.5.1 Infrastructure

In Gauteng, a relatively high proportion of the population has access to services (GCRO QoL IV 2015). However, discrepancies in the quality of services is extremely

marked. Even though the percentage of people who lack services is low, this still equates to large numbers of people in the province who live in a state of deprivation. Erwin (2017b: 41) argues that “[i]t is ... the reproduction of these disparities by the government itself that creates obstacles to the ‘cohesion’ it desires”. She stresses the need for a common provision of services over and above the familiar call for common principles. In their account of life at Number 1, Slovoview, Von Holdt and colleagues (2011) draw a connection between a lack of service provision and the potential for xenophobic violence:

These conversations that we have had with our informants point to one thing that is characteristic of the experience of life at Number 1 – an experience of dislocation. That is, the residents of Number 1 experience citizenship and the nation as dislocation. A characteristic feature of this dislocation is living life within conditions of squalor. This experience ... exists in contrast to the experience of life in other parts of Slovoview where ... dislocation is cushioned. These parts relate mainly to those places where there are formal housing structures, RDP houses, as well as in those places where people have been given stands so they can build themselves some temporary shelters. These places are characterised by some form of order that allows for a sense of ownership on the part of the residents and that enables the provision of services of one type or another. In these places citizenship and the nation are experienced as a cushion against dislocation.

It would appear that it is precisely at Number 1 where citizenship and the nation are experienced as dislocation that a nationalist rhetoric ... is concentrated. Consequently, it is no surprise that violence against foreign nationals manifested itself here, where conditions of extreme material deprivation dominate ... This may be particularly true when one considers that the logic of citizenship promises access to goods, like housing, jobs, et cetera. Where the presence of others who do not possess citizenship is seen as a stumbling block to the acquisition of these goods, and where there is a sense that the law is unable to deal with these people, the likelihood that violence will become a means to express displeasure appears likely (Von Holdt et al. 2011: 80–81).

At the same time, however, it should not be accepted uncritically that violence is more likely to manifest in poorer communities and communities that don’t have basic resources (City Official: Safety 2017). Research undertaken by the African Centre for Cities (ACC) surfaced a contradiction: in some parts of Cape Town “the provision of formal housing has had a negative impact on social cohesion” (Brown-Luthango 2015: n.p.). During the informal settlement phase, Brown-Luthango argues, community members in Freedom Park, Mitchell’s Plain, exhibited mutual trust and had support structures to regulate violence, crime and antisocial activities such as the illegal sale of alcohol and drugs. Once people received formal housing they stayed in their houses, were scared to go outside, and no longer engaged in the community policing structures (Brown-Luthango 2015). Brown-Luthango suggests that before upgrading projects are implemented, city officials should take cognisance of social networks and existing community structures and find ways to support and enhance these, rather than disrupt them.

5.5.2 Urban planning

An upgrading initiative focused on low-income and informal areas in Medellín, Columbia, set about improving five iconic buildings and the public space surrounding them in the Library Parks Strategic Project (Carracedo 2014). Carracedo (2014) argues that this type of investment in streets and public spaces should be seen as an essential social resilience strategy. The City of Johannesburg has had many projects that implicitly connect social cohesion values to city design. These include sustainable human settlements, the Transport Sector Plan, Corridors of Freedom, EPWP, Jozi@work, as well as the Parks and Public Open Space project which used material urban design as a methodology for improving safety, and by extension, social cohesion (City Official: Safety 2017). If people have a positive image of the space they use daily, pride and community development ensue (Fiori and Brandao, quoted in Carracedo 2014). This, suggests Carracedo, can then trigger the “regeneration of the neighborhoods from the inside” (2014: 8).

5.5.3 Upgrading spaces and skills development

Skills training for community members has the potential to decrease anti-social behaviours (Esau and Hlohlomi 2016; City Official: Safety 2017), while investment in the city's soft infrastructure, for example, the Migrant Help Desk, can stimulate a sense of safety and well-being for residents.

Opened in 2007, the Migrant Help Desk has several initiatives designed to help orientate migrants to the city in terms of "how the city functions, what the conditions are [and] issues of by-laws" (City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk 2017). Orientation sessions, which take place at least once a quarter in each region of the city, have, on average, 20 to 25 participants. They include NGOs and community peace forums. Many of the migrants who come to Johannesburg do not have personal networks and the Migrant Help Desk assists in connecting them with service providers, if required. An official at the Migrant Help Desk (City Official: Migrant Help Desk (a) 2017) elaborated:

[S]ome are very destitute and they will need shelter, food and sometimes transport. [S]ome have got problems in their families and we connect them with our social workers. We have got people who need shelter and we do advise them, there is an overnight shelter that we run as the City ... if perhaps they need a longer period of stay we connect them with other shelters.

To enhance social cohesion, local government needs to maximise the assets it already has (City Official: Safety 2017; City Official: Community Development 2017). A city official reasons that "especially in communities where youth need activities," community centres and other existing resources could be maximised to enable young people to "come from seven to nine and learn dancing and music and IT skills" (City Official: Safety 2017). These could be spaces where community members acquire valuable personal skills and enjoy the company of other community members. Professionals would contribute to lessening social troubles in communities as well: "There [is] a lot of volunteerism in South Africa" so community halls could be safe spaces "where you have social workers

who give of their time. You [could] have doctors who give some lessons to kids or something" (City Official: Safety 2017). As part of its goal to support and strengthen family and community interventions that foster social cohesion, the DSD stated that it would "retain and recruit social service professionals at appropriate levels, and enhance their ability to support households and communities" (DSD 2009: 44).

Education can be significant in improving collective social mobility. Although education is not officially in the ambit of city governance, the City of Johannesburg has introduced a number of learning programmes, including the Community Literacy Programme, which concentrates on "capacity building" (City Official: Community Development 2017). This initiative is run by municipal libraries throughout the city. It offers basic literacy and numeracy courses for people of all ages, free of charge, as well as English lessons for foreign nationals (City Official: Community Development 2017). The city also launched the eJozzi Massive Open Online Varsity (MOOV) in 2016, which provided public libraries in the inner city, Alexandra, Emdeni, Westbury, Jabavu, Sandton and Orange Farm with video-enabled learning centres (TMG Digital 2016). Additional centres are set to open in Ivory Park, Eldorado Park, Cosmo City, Poortjie, and Diepsloot (TMG Digital 2016). At these centres, which cater mostly for unemployed youth, students can earn certificates in subjects such as web design, financial management and marketing (City Official: Community Development 2017; TMG Digital 2016).

Social cohesion work is wide ranging and it is unlikely that any one government department could operationalise a comprehensive social cohesion policy. Terence Smith (2017), programme manager of the Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention Programme at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), suggests that local government could improve social cohesion by mainstreaming the concept. Each government department should have to assess how much, and in what ways, their work contributes to social cohesion, and to consider whether or not any new programme they are considering initialising will have a positive or a negative impact on social cohesion (Smith 2017).

5.6 Conclusion


There are a variety of methods available for doing social cohesion work. Some of these, such as sports events or cultural days, are already associated with social cohesion, and have been used effectively to promote positive, inclusive sentiments. Some methods might not, in the first instance, be associated with social cohesion, but might nevertheless have the potential to be effective in this regard. Sometimes attempts at social cohesion, such as exclusionary national symbols, or ill-conceived or poorly facilitated dialogues that threaten rather than support, can cause or heighten social tensions.

The City of Johannesburg, which provided the case study for this research, has a number of well-conceptualised programmes that promote social cohesion. Ensuring that these kinds of programmes continue to run effectively, and that the city maximises its current resources, is important. Municipal governments might want to encourage greater lateral thinking about how social cohesion objectives can be integrated into the other work they do – for instance, thinking of service delivery as an important part of reducing inequality and promoting social cohesion. This implies a reimagining of the social cohesion agenda by city structures, and a revision of budgets and performance measurement mechanisms.

Municipalities could also work in conjunction with, or in support of, other organisations who have active social cohesion projects. Given the funding pressures on smaller CBOs and NGOs, this is one area where government support and resources could bolster civil society organisations in developing more responsive and more effective social projects. Cities might consider how they could create innovative intergovernmental collaborations, for instance, by mainstreaming social cohesion ideals through education or the provision of social workers, which falls outside the regular scope of municipal responsibilities. There are fertile opportunities for different levels of government to collaborate and implement forward-looking agendas.

A core recommendation is that government structures introduce a substantive monitoring and evaluation programme for the current social cohesion interventions they run, such as public events and sports days, as well the initiatives modelled around shared public spaces and dialogues sessions. Rather than

requiring a specified number of social cohesion activities to be held per quarter, it would be useful to determine, through a qualitative impact assessment directed at participants and implementing agencies, whether the activity is helping to realise the desired objectives. This can help government learn what types of events actually succeed in moving it towards realising its goal of greater social cohesion.



Photograph by Darya Maslova

5.6 APPENDIX

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
#RacismStopsWithMe	2016	2016	Media campaign	Independent Media
#TakeOnRacism	2017	2017	Media campaign	Anti Racism Network of South Africa
African Union Agenda 2063	2015	2063	List of goals and agendas	African Union
Alex Pan Africa Carnival	2008	3-year programme anticipated but no information after 2008 found	Learner workshops and activities related to other African countries, community carnival	African Diaspora Forum, Alexandra Community Policing Forum
Amarightza	2015	Ongoing	Information campaign on socio-economic rights Distributing material and informing communities	Foundation for Human Rights
Amnesty International at Many Faces, One Africa	2011	2011	Information desk	Amnesty International
Annual Lecture	2003	Ongoing	Prominent people speak on significant social issues	Nelson Mandela Foundation
Anti-xenophobia Community Dialogues Jabulani	2016	Ongoing	Speeches and presentations made to the community	Foundation for Human Rights
Anti-xenophobia Community Dialogues Katsieng	2016	Ongoing	Community conversations	Foundation for Human Rights
Becoming Campaign	2017	2017	Public campaign to encourage the eradication of racism	Anti Racism Network of South Africa

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
	Independent Media's 20 newspapers, digital platforms and radio ads	South Africa	
	Social media slogan	South Africa	
18 schools (max 300 learners per school)	Two months of activities prior to carnival day	Johannesburg	Alexandra
		South Africa	
max 600 people	A few hours	Johannesburg	Yeoville
3 000 live audience + 2 000 online audience	A few hours, annual event		
20-70 participants	Day-long monthly dialogue in different areas	Johannesburg	Jabulani
20-70 participants	Day-long monthly dialogue in different areas	Gauteng, Katerhlong	
	One week annual event	South Africa	

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
Building Inclusive Societies: Schools' Oral History Projects	2012	2014	Learners training workshops in oral history research and methodology, culminating in a book of their accounts	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
Bystander Intervention	2014	Ongoing	Invisible theatre to prompt a response	Wits Centre for Diversity Studies
Civics Academy	2016	Website ongoing	Learners facilitate a parliament/interactive learning techniques that practise democracy	Nelson Mandela Foundation
Community Building and Engaged Citizenry	2011	IDP review 2017/18	To increase participation, governance and deliverability; decrease information gap between city and residents	City of Joburg
Community Literacy Programme	Unclear	Ongoing	Offers basic literacy and numeracy courses	City of Joburg
Creative Expression Retreat	2016	2016	Retreat centred around the victims of women abuse	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
Critical Diversity Literacy	2014	Ongoing	Master's programme at university level	Wits Centre for Diversity Studies
Dance for Dialogue	2016 (Jul)	2016 (Dec)	Improvisational dance interpretation of audience narratives	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
Dialogue Programme	2008	Ongoing	Thematic dialogues on various topics (race, land, inequality) with different levels of stakeholders	Nelson Mandela Foundation

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
64 participants	Several workshops, plus ongoing intervention work in nearby community (2012–2016)	Northern Cape, Windsorton	
		Johannesburg	Braamfontein
80 participants	Watch video material, then come together for interactive event		
		Johannesburg	Braamfontein
	12–18 months registered course	Johannesburg	All libraries in the city
20 women	2 days, plus ongoing intervention work in the community (2012–2016)	Northern Cape, Ikhutseng, Warrenvale	
10 students	1–2 year programme	Johannesburg	Braamfontein
4 dancers, 200 audience members	Hour performance; several iterations with different audiences		
45 stakeholders (closed) 130 people in auditorium (open)	Varies. Some a few hours, once-off, some part of a series, some community dialogues running for years	Johannesburg	Houghton Estate

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
Expanded Public Works Programme and Jozi@work	2004	2016	City development and skills transfer projects	City of Joburg
Fees-Must-Fall	2015	2016	Student protests for free tertiary education	Students
Gauteng Carnival	2005	2015	Procession of performers through the streets	Gauteng Provincial Government
Gauteng Social Cohesion Carnival	2015	Ongoing	Procession of performers through the streets	Gauteng Provincial Government
Heritage and Memorial Days	1994	Ongoing	Mass memorial of important national holidays	City of Joburg
HSF Briefs	1996	Ongoing	Newsletters interrogating state policy choices in relation to liberal democratic values	Helen Suzman Foundation
Individual Counselling	1992	Ongoing	One-on-one psychological counselling	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
International Dialogue Series	2013–2014	2016	Participants from various countries engage in a series of dialogues on memory work	Nelson Mandela Foundation
Joburg City Safety Strategy	2003	Ongoing	Reduce the impact of crime, also relates to business investment	City of Joburg
Joburg New Year Carnival	2004	Ongoing	Street procession and celebration	City of Joburg
Khulumani Support Group	1999	Ongoing	Compel the government to fulfil its obligations to survivors of apartheid era violations	Khulumani Support Group

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
51 977 EPWP opportunities citywide		Johannesburg	Cosmo City, Lufhereng, Orlando
	Weeks to months of sustained campaigning	Johannesburg	Auckland Park, Braamfontein
Over 20 000 participants	A few hours long annual event	Gauteng, Johannesburg	
Over 20 000 participants	A few hours long annual event	Johannesburg	Auckland Park, Emmarentia, Doornfontein
	1-day annual event		
		Johannesburg	Braamfontein
	Multi-day event First series 2013-14 Second series 2016	International	
		Johannesburg	Moroka, Newtown, Norwood
2 000 participants	Two to three months of skills development camps prior to carnival day. Annual event	Johannesburg	Hillbrow
100 000 members		South Africa	

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
Learning Series Spinning the Web: Exploring the nexus between human rights and conflict transformation	2011	2013	Resource booklet and exercises on conflict negotiation	Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
Library Parks Strategic Project	2004	2011	Upgrading of libraries and parks in poor neighbourhoods	Public agency, Urban Development Enterprise (UDE)
Many Faces, One Africa	2011	2011	Pan Africa music concert with other activities	African Diaspora Forum
Masithandane End Hate Crimes Action Group	2016	Ongoing	Oppose violence against LGBTQI people	Masithandane Action Group
Memorandum to the Mayor	2016	2016	Condemn mayor's comments about 'illegal immigrants'	African Diaspora Forum
Migrant Help Desk Common Citizenship Programme	2007	Ongoing	Integrate and orientate newcomers to the city	City of Joburg
Migrant Help Desk Counter Xenophobia Dialogues	2007	Ongoing	Dialogues to promote tolerance and understanding between cross border migrants and local communities	City of Joburg
Migrant Help Desk Events	2007	Ongoing	School debate competitions to raise awareness on topics related to migration and human rights	City of Joburg
Mkhaya Migrant Awards	2015	Ongoing	Recognise outstanding migrants	Department of Home Affairs and International Organization for Migration
Mooki Street Trail	2013	Ongoing	Heritage trail in Soweto	City of Joburg

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
	Infrastructure upgrade	Medellin, Columbia	
600 participants	Day-long event	Johannesburg	Yeoville
6-120 members	A few hours long, plus follow-up communications	Gauteng, Kwa-Thema, Vosloorus	
		Johannesburg	Braamfontein
20 participants in orientation sessions	Workshops of a few hours. Each region holds at least 1 session per quarter plus walk-ins	Johannesburg	Inner city and other regions
Up to 150 participants in dialogues	A few hours, 2 sessions per quarter in each region. Sessions move between wards within each region	Johannesburg	High-risk city regions
300 participants	Month-long	Johannesburg	Rotates through city regions
6 winners, audience and TV views numbers unknown	A few hours annual event	Johannesburg	
	Public art	Johannesburg	Soweto

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
eJozi's MOOV	2016 Official launch	Ongoing	Massive Open Online Varsity (MOOV) e-learning programme	City of Joburg
National Prayer Day	2017	2017	Response to national crisis. Prayer event for unity, truth and righteousness	Angus Buchan
NICDAM Community Conversations	2015/16	2016/17	Large-scale facilitated workshops. Participants discuss race, language, economic redress, sexism, family values and safety and security	Department of Arts and Culture through NICDAM
One Movement at Many Faces, One Africa	2011	2011	Information desk regarding project and international organisation IOM	International Organization for Migration
Open Letter to the President	2017	2017	Calling on the president to ban xenophobic march	African Diaspora Forum, the United Front, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
Peacebuilding	2016	Ongoing	Change agents within the community facilitate conflict negotiation	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
Parks and Public Open Spaces	2017	Ongoing	Revitalising a public park	City of Joburg
Poverty Intervention Programmes	Unclear	2021	Various strategies to reduce poverty, includes food gardens etc.	City of Joburg

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
9 000 participants		Johannesburg	White City Jabavu, Emdeni, Orange Farm. Alexandra, Westbury and Johannesburg inner city. Phase 2: Ivory Park, Eldorado Park, Cosmo City, Poortjie, and Diepsloot
Estimated over 1 million attended	Full day	Farm outside Bloemfontein	
60 people in each session. 1 555 people total during initial phase	A few hours per session. Sessions in different areas across the country.	Johannesburg	Lenasia
max 600 people	A few hours		
		Gauteng, Pretoria	
Approximately 15 peace builders in each site	Continuous Conflict mapping sessions every quarter	Johannesburg Marakana Mamelodi East	Diepsloot Orange Farm
	Infrastructure investment	Johannesburg	Hillbrow
5 500 people benefit from city food gardens		Johannesburg	Alexandra, Bezuidenhout Park, Cosmo City, Marlboro, Newtown, Rabie Ridge, Soweto, Troyeville

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
Pray for South Africa	2016	2016	Mass prayer event toward overcoming the divisions in society	Jericho Walls Prayer Network, South African Council of Churches
Premier’s Social Cohesion Games	2017	Expected to continue	Soccer tournament with international and local stars	Gauteng Provincial Government
Processing Spaces	1996	1998	Creating safe and supportive spaces for victims and perpetrators to process their experiences	linked to the TRC
Project Constitution	Post 1993	Unclear	Teaches learners about constitutional democracy	Helen Suzman Foundation
Queer Crossings: A participatory arts-based project	2014	2014	Auto-biographical reflections from LGBTQI refugees	Africa Centre for Migration and Society’s MoVE, Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA)
Queer Crossings: Follow-up poetry workshop	2015	2015	Auto-biographical reflections from LGBTQI refugees	Africa Centre for Migration and Society’s MoVE, Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA)
Redpeg Courses	2004	Ongoing	Offer SETA training courses	Redpeg
Roll Back Xenophobia	1998	Unknown	Promote and protect migrant rights	Roll Back Xenophobia
Save South Africa Launch	2016	2016	Originally set up to support Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan. Calls for an end to the abuse of executive power and corruption	Save South Africa
Slovoview Building Bridges	2008	2010	Re-establish sense of order after xenophobic violence in the community	Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
Orlando stadium has a capacity of 40 000	1-day major event (40 days sustained prayer)	Johannesburg	Hector Pieterse Memorial, Orlando Stadium
768 players, audience numbers unknown	A few hours in various locations over 1 week	Gauteng, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, Tshwane, West Rand and Sedibeng	Alexandra, Diepsloot, Orange Farm Soweto, Troyeville, Westbury
		South Africa	
Select grade 10 and 11 learners	6 consecutive workshops	Johannesburg	Constitution Hill
11 participants	Several workshops		
11 participants or less	Week-long follow-on project		
		Based in KwaZulu-Natal	
81 CEOs	Ongoing		
	Several days with research follow-up 2 years later	Johannesburg	Slovoview

Intervention	Initiated	Concluded	Summary	Organisation
Social Cohesion DSD	2010	2015	Promote cohesion through strengthening family values	Department of Social Development
Targeted Beneficiaries Unit (TBU)	2008	Unknown	Assist vulnerable groups to access work opportunities and services	City of Joburg
The Youth African Soccer Cup	2009	2009	Learners 'adopt' an Africa country and represent it in a soccer tournament and other activities practising democracy	African Diaspora Forum
Therapeutic Spiral Model	2001	2005	Integrated psychodrama and action process therapy	Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa
Transforming Sustainable Human Settlements	2009	2021	Building low- and middle-income mixed development housing	City of Joburg
Transport Sector Plan	2013	2021	Providing high-quality, safe, accessible, affordable, reliable and environmentally friendly public transport service	City of Joburg
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	1996	1998	Court-like body hearing apartheid-era victim and perpetrator testimony, able to grant amnesty	National project
Ubuntu Cup	2009	2016	Sports day with various events encouraging participation between South Africans and non-nationals	City of Joburg
Violence Against Women Social Lab	2015	2017	Lab to refine ideas and try prototype solutions	Reos Partners, Soul City
Virtue Citizens	Unknown	Unknown	Ensure learners have a valid ID	Virtue Citizens

Number of participants	Length of campaign from participants' perspective	Location	Johannesburg Suburb
		South Africa	
		Johannesburg	
19 schools	Month-long tournament, with supporting workshops held a month prior	Johannesburg	Bertrams, Bez Valley, Jeppestown, Kensington, Malvern, Troyeville
	Yearly workshops	Johannesburg	Marshalltown, Ivory Park
	Infrastructure investment	Johannesburg	Fleurhof, Lehae, Lufhereng, Pennyville
	Infrastructure investment	Gauteng	
		South Africa	
	Sporadic event	Johannesburg	Inner City
	4 phase programme, team repeatedly convened over 19 months	Johannesburg	
	Learners and teachers become ambassadors and help others	Johannesburg	



References

Abrahams, Caryn. 2016. Twenty Years of Social Cohesion and Nation-Building in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42 (1): 95–107.

Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Perseus Books.

Antonie, Sonwabile. 2017. Social Cohesion Games Kick Off. *Rodepoort Record*, March 5. Online edition.

ARNSA (Anti-Racism Network of South Africa). 2017. Anti-Racism Week 14–21 March 2017: Programme Guide for ARNSA Committees and Member Organisations.

Backer, Thomas, Judith Blanton, Alan Barclay, Robert Golembiewski, DeWayne Kurpius, Harry Levinson, Robert Perloff and Skipton Leonard. 1992. What Is Consultation? That's an Interesting Question! *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research* 44 (2): 18–23.

Ballantine, Christopher, Michael Chapman, Kira Erwin and Gerhard Maré, eds. 2017. *Living Together, Living Apart? Social Cohesion in a Future South Africa*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Bantjes, Megan. 2011. Theories of Community mIntervention: Implications for the Centre for the

Study of Violence and Reconciliation Torture Project. Appendix A. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). http://www.csvr.org.za/images/docs/Other/theories_of_community_intervention_appendix_a.pdf.

Barolsky, Vanessa. 2016. Social Cohesion: The Missing Link in Overcoming Violence and Inequality?" IDRC (International Development Research Centre).

Barolsky, Vanessa and Suren Pillay. 2009. A Call for Comparative Thinking: Crime, Citizenship and Security in the Global South. *SA Crime Quarterly* 27: 15–21.

Beall, Jo, Stephen Gelb and Shireen Hassim. 2005. Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31 (4): 681–700.

Bernard, Paul. 1999. *Social Cohesion: A critique*. Discussion Paper No. F/9, Canadian Policy Research Networks.

Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla. 2016. Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing. *Science* 352 (6282): 220–24. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aad9713>.



Photograph by Daniel Magidi

Brown, Ryan. 2017. The South African Building that Came to Symbolize the Apocalypse. *The Atlantic*, February 21, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/02/the-south-african-building-that-came-to-symbolize-the-apocalypse/517056/>.

Brown-Luthango, Mercy. 2015. Collective (in)Efficacy, Substance Abuse and Violence in 'Freedom Park' Cape Town. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 30 (2). <https://www.africancentreforcities.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/collective-inefficacy-paper.pdf>.

Bubbenzer, Friederike and Marian Tankink. 2015. Healing Communities, Transforming Society: Exploring the Interconnectedness between Psychosocial Needs, Practice and Peacebuilding." In *Healing Communities, Transforming Society Conference Report: War Trauma Foundation & Institute for Justice and Reconciliation*. <http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IJR-Healing-communities-conference-WEB.pdf>.

Carracedo, Oscar. 2014. Shaping Informality. The Role of Street-Based Strategies in Revitalizing Informal and Low-Income Areas. In 7th International Urban Design Conference, Adelaide.

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. 2013. *What Lies beyond? Delving below the Surface of Conflict*.

http://www.csvr.org.za/images/docs/BSPZ/what_lies_beyond_delving_below_the_surface_of_conflict.pdf.

Chipkin, Ivor and Bongani Ngqulunga. 2008. Family and Friends: Social Cohesion in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34 (1): 61-76.

Chou, Yuan K. 2006. Three Simple Models of Social Capital and Economic Growth. *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 35 (5): 889-912. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.053>.

City Official: Arts and Culture. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Joseph.

City Official: Community Development. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Joseph.

City Official: Group Strategy, Policy Coordination and Relations. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

City Official (a): Migrant Help Desk. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

City Official (b): Migrant Help Desk. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

City Official: Safety. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

City of Johannesburg. 2016. City of Johannesburg Integrated Development Plan 2016-2021. <http://www.joburg.org.za/images/stories/2016/May/PDFs/Final%20Council%20approved%202016-21%20IDP.pdf>.

Cloete, Pieter, Frans Kotze and Cornie Groenewald. 2009. Concept Paper on Social Cohesion/Inclusion in Local Integrated Development Plans. *Final Draft*. <https://presidentsaward.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Social-Cohesion-Final-Draftcorrect-IDP-DSD.pdf>.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996. Act 108 Preamble. <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96.pdf>.

Crittenden, Jack and Peter Levine. 2013. Civic Education. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/civic-education/>.

DAC (Department of Arts and Culture). 2012a. A National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society. Pretoria: Department of Arts and Culture.

———. 2012b. Working Together to Create a Caring and Proud Society: A National Social Cohesion Summit Report. Kliptown, Soweto: Department of Arts and Culture.

DAC and DE. 2008. *My Country South Africa: Celebrating our National Symbols and Heritage*. <http://www.dac.gov.za/sites/default/files/My%20Country%20South%20Africa%20-%20celebrating%20our%20national%20symbols%20and%20heritage.pdf>

Davis, Rebecca. 2017. Analysis: The Gospel According to Angus Buchan. Daily Maverick. April 24. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-24-analysis-the-gospel-according-to-angus-buchan/#.WQCVw_mGOHs.

Denizet-Lewis, Benoit. 2016. How Do You Change Voters' Minds? Have a Conversation. *The New York Times*, April 7, Magazine section. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/magazine/how-do-you-change-voters-minds-have-a-conversation.html>.

Dirsuweit, Teresa. 2014. Fear of Others. In *Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid*, edited by Philip Harrison, Graeme Götz, Alison Todes and Chris Wray, 546–52. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Ditsie, Bev. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

Dixon, John, Kevin Durrheim and Colin Tredoux. 2005. Beyond the Optimal Contact Strategy: A Reality Check for the Contact Hypothesis. *American Psychologist* 60 (7): 697–711.

DJCD (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development). 2011. Restorative Justice: The Road to Healing. Pretoria: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. <http://www.justice.gov.za/rj/2011rj-booklet-a5-eng.pdf>.

Doyle, Lindsey. 2017. Creativity in Conflict: Performing Arts for Sustained Dialogue, Justice and Reconciliation. Occasional Paper No. 22. IJR. <http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Policy-Brief-Creativity-in-Conflict-Web.pdf>.

DSD (Department of Social Development). 2009. Strategic Plan 2010–2015. Pretoria: Department of Social Development Republic of South Africa. http://www.dsd.gov.za/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=134&Itemid=3.

Durrheim, Kevin and John Dixon. 2005. *Racial Encounter: The Social Psychology of Contact and Desegregation*. London: Routledge.

Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzen and Michael Woolcock. 2006. Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth. *Economics and Politics Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983117>.

- Eizaguirre, Santiago, Marc Pradel, Albert Terrones, Xavier Martinez-Cellorio and Marisol Garcia. 2012. Multilevel Governance and Social Cohesion: Bringing Back Conflict in Citizenship Practices. *Urban Studies* 49 (9): 1999–2016.
- Erwin, Kira. 2017a. Antiracism in Post in Apartheid South Africa. In *Pathways to Antiracism*, edited by Caryn Abrahams. GCRO Research Report 5. Johannesburg: GCRO.
- . 2017b. The Danger of Empty Words: From Rhetoric to Action. In *Living Together, Living Apart? Social Cohesion in a Future South Africa*, edited by Christopher Ballantine, Michael Chapman, Kira Erwin and Gerhard Maré, 38–44. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Esau, Cecyl and Refiloe Hlohlomi, eds. 2016. *The Beginnings of My Story. I Was I Am. I Will Excel: A Contribution to Local History and Social Cohesion*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). <http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Windsorton-Publication-Web.pdf>.
- FHR (Foundation for Human Rights), DOJ and CD (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development), Zola Advice Centre, and Leratong Child Rescue and Advisory Centre. 2016. Agenda for Anti Racism and Anti Xenophobia Jabulani Community Dialogue. March 10. http://www.fhr.org.za/files/3114/5789/7013/AGENDA_FOR_youth_dialogue_on_racism_and_xenophobia_in_Soweto_10_March_2016.pdf.
- Freemantle, Iriann. 2012. Addressing the Division of Whom? South Africa's 'Fault Lines' and Trends in Social Cohesion Policy. Policy Brief. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS). http://www.migration.org.za/uploads/docs/addressing_the_division_of_whom_south_af.pdf.
- . 2015. Mobility and Anti-Outsider Sentiment in Informal Settlements: Blind Spots in South Africa's Social Cohesion Strategy. ACMS Issue Brief 12. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS). http://www.migration.org.za/uploads/docs/acms-issue-brief-12_blindspots-in-sa-social-cohesion-policy.pdf.
- Gauteng Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation. 2015. Gauteng Launches 2015 Carnival Programme during Heritage Month. Media Statements. South African Government. September 2. <http://www.gov.za/speeches/gauteng-launches-2015-carnival-programme-2-sep-2015-0000>.
- GCRO (Gauteng City-Region Observatory). 2013. The spoken diversity of Gauteng. GCRO Map of the Month July. Johannesburg: GCRO. <http://www.gcro.ac.za/outputs/map-of-the-month/detail/the-spoken-diversity-of-gauteng/>
- GCRO (Gauteng City-Region Observatory). 2015. Quality of Life survey IV. <http://www.gcro.ac.za/research/project/detail/quality-of-life-survey-iv-2015/>.
- Gibson, C, J Connell, G Waitt, and J Walmsley. 2011. The Extent and Significance of Rural Festivals. In *Festival Places: Revitalising Rural Australia*, edited by Chris Gibson and John Connell. Tourism and Cultural Change. Bristol: Channel View Publications.
- Goga, Khalil. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.
- Gordon, Steven. 2016. Understanding Hostility towards Barbarians: A quantitative analysis of public attitudes towards foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- Hamber, Brandon, Traggy Maepa, Tlhoki Mofokeng, and Hugo van der Merwe. 1998. Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Survivors' Perceptions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Suggestions for the Final Report. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & Khulumani Support Group. <http://www.csvr.org.za/publications/1705-submission-to-the-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-survivors-perceptions-of-the-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-and-suggestions-for-the-final-report>.

- Hawkins, Nicky. 2017. Telling People 'You're Wrong' Doesn't Work – for Breastfeeding or Anything Else. *The Guardian*, August 3, Opinion section. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/03/breastfeeding-human-behaviour-logic-drink-driving-passive-smoking>.
- Haynes, Jeffrey. 2009. Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 47 (1): 52–75.
- Hofmeyr, Jan and Rajen Govender. 2016. Perceptions of Economic Security and Well-Being. Briefing Paper 2. South African Reconciliation Barometer. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). <http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IJR-SARB-2-2015.pdf>.
- Hooghe, Marc, Tim Reeskens and Dietlind Stolle. 2007. Diversity, Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion: Trust and Ethnocentrism in European Societies. In Keith G. Banting, Thomas J. Courchene and F. Leslie Seidle. eds. *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. <https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/84600/1/20100708110945526.pdf>.
- Hookway, Nicholas. 2015. Moral Decline Sociology: Critiquing the Legacy of Durkheim. *Journal of Sociology* 51 (2): 271–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783313514644>.
- Hudgins, Kate and Francesca Toscani, eds. 2013. *Healing World Trauma with the Therapeutic Spiral Model: Psychodramatic Stories from the Frontlines*. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council). 2013. Evaluation of the Implementation of the Jo'burg City Safety Strategy (JCSS) Summary. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.
- Independent Media and Ornic Media. 2016. *Racism Stops With Me*. MAGIC 828AM. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSPv09_gXdM.
- Jenson, Jane. 1998. Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research. Ottawa: Renouf.
- Jericho Walls Prayer Network. 2016. *Pray for South Africa! 40 Day Prayer Guide for Reconciliation 7 May – 15 June 2016*. Johannesburg: Jericho Walls Prayer Network. <http://gatewaynews.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/40-Day-Prayer-Guide-for-Reconciliation2.pdf>.
- Kearns, Ade and Ray Forrest. 2000. Social Cohesion and Multilevel Urban Governance. *Urban Studies* 37 (5): 995–1017.
- King, Mandy and Quinton Mtyala. 2016. Racism Stops with Me. IOL. January 6. <http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/racism-stops-with-me-1967552>.
- Kpessa, Michael, Daniel Beland and Andre Lecours. 2011. Nationalism, Development, and Social Policy: The Politics of Nation-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34 (12): 2115–33.
- Labuschagne, Pieter. 2008. The Impact of Sport on Nation Building: A Critical Analysis of South Africa and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. *Africa Insight* 38 (3): 3–14.
- Lebotha, Mohlalefi. 2017. Gauteng Hosts Premier's Social Cohesion Games Final. Polity.org.za. March 3. <http://www.polity.org.za/article/gauteng-hosts-premiers-social-cohesion-games-final-2017-03-03>.
- Legault, Lisa, Jennifer N. Gutsell and Michael Inzlicht. 2011. Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (but also Increase) Prejudice. *Psychological Science* 22 (12): 1472–77. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611427918>.
- Le Roux, Charl. n.d. *DAC Community Conversations 2015/16*. Accessed December 5, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otZb7EJunok&feature=youtu.be>.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC). *Diacritics* 32 (3–4): 33–59.

- Misago, Jean Pierre. 2016. Responding to Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking Up the Wrong Tree? *Africa Human Mobility Review* 2 (2): 443–67.
- . 2017. Xenophobic Violence in the ‘Rainbow’ Nation. Aljazeera. March 1. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/xenophobic-violence-rainbow-nation-170301075103169.html>.
- Mitchell, Tracey. n.d. Invisible Theater. *Beautiful Trouble* (blog). <http://beautifultrouble.org/tactic/invisible-theater/>.
- Moodley, Sean. 2017. The Be Thumbprint Challenge. Presented at the Premier’s Champions for Social Cohesion, Johannesburg.
- Motha, Sarah. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.
- Naidoo, Leigh-Ann. 2017. The ‘Hidden’ Curriculum of South Africa Sport. In *Living Together, Living Apart? Social Cohesion in a Future South Africa*, edited by Christopher Ballantine, Michael Chapman, Kira Erwin and Gerhard Maré. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Ndaba, Thokozani and Simon Chambert. 2017. Acknowledging the Multitude, Complexity and Interdependence of Cities. Presented at the GCRO Taking Streets Seriously Symposium, Johannesburg, April 5.
- NICDAM (National Institute Community Development, and Management). 2016. Final Report: 2016 Community Conversations to Promote Nation Building and Social Cohesion in Nine Provinces for the Department of Arts and Culture. May 24. http://nicdam.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/DAC_Recommendations.pdf.
- Norton, Andrew and Arjan de Haan. 2012. Social Cohesion: Theoretical Debates and Practical Applications with Respect to Jobs. Background Paper for the World Development Report 2013. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12147>.
- Novy, Andreas, Daniela Coimbra Swiatek and Frank Moulaert. 2012. Social Cohesion: A Conceptual and Political Elucidation. *Urban Studies* 49 (9): 1873–89.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Oliveira, Elsa, Susan Meyers and Jo Vearey, eds. 2016. *Queer Crossings: A Participatory Arts-Based Project*. Johannesburg: The MoVE Project, African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS). https://issuu.com/move.methods.visual.explore/docs/queer_crossings_publication_v.2_-_f.
- Ortmann, Stephan. 2009. Singapore: The Politics of Inventing National Identity. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 28 (4): 23–46.
- Parnell, Susan. 2016. Fair Cities: Imperatives in Meeting Global Sustainable Developmental Aspirations. In *Rethinking Sustainable Cities: Accessible, Green and Fair*, edited by David Simon. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Parry, Kevin and Amanda van Eeden. 2015. Measuring Racial Residential Segregation at Different Geographic Scales in Cape Town and Johannesburg. *South African Geographical Journal* 97 (1): 31–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2014.924868>.
- Parsley, Jennifer. 2003. ‘We Are Not Treated Like People’: The Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign in South Africa. Humanitarian Practice Network Magazine. <http://odihpn.org/magazine/we-are-not-treated-like-people-the-roll-back-xenophobia-campaign-in-south-africa/>.
- . 2005. Displaced and Discarded: The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Promoting Socio-Economic Rights for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South Africa. CSS Grant Report Durban: Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- Peberdy, Sally. 2015a. Informal Sector Cross Border Trade Spending in Gauteng. *GCRO Vignettes* 26. Johannesburg: GCRO.

- . 2015b. Xenophobic Attacks: Are Migrants the Only Victims? *GCRO Vignettes* 25. Johannesburg: GCRO.
- Pedersen, Anne, Iain Walker and Mike Wise. 2005. 'Talk Does Not Cook Rice': Beyond Anti-Racism Rhetoric to Strategies for Social Action. *Australian Psychologist* 40 (1): 20–31.
- Polity.org.za. 2017. ADF, UF and NUMSA: Open Letter to President Jacob Zuma, January 29. <http://www.polity.org.za/article/adf-uf-and-numsa-open-letter-to-president-jacob-zuma-2017-01-29>.
- Potgieter, Elnari. 2016. Social Mobility in an Unequal Society: Exploring Access and Advantage in South Africa. Briefing Paper 4. South African Reconciliation Barometer. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. <http://ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/IJR-SARB-4-2016-TEXT-final-web.pdf>.
- . 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.
- Pridemore, Alex William and Kim, Seng-Weon. 2006. Democratization and Political Change as Threats to Collective Sentiments: Testing Durkheim in Russia. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605 (1): 82–103.
- Putman, Robert, D. 1993. What Makes Democracy Work? *National Civic Review* 82 (3): 101–7.
- Reos Partners. 2017. Violence Against Women Social Lab Overview. <http://reospartners.com/>.
- Reospartners.com. n.d. <http://reospartners.com/>.
- Rittel, Horst W J and Melvin M Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences* 4: 155–69.
- Sathekge, Robinson. 2017. City of Johannesburg Social Development Migration Sub-Unit. Presented at the Gauteng Migration Strategy Session, Johannesburg, February 16.
- Scheba, Suraya. 2017. Tracing the Metabolism of the Everyday: Livelihoods and Informality in Delft, Cape Town. Presented at the Faces of the City, University of the Witwatersrand, May 2.
- Sears, David O, Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer. 1979. Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics? *American Political Science Review* 73 (2): 369–84.
- Sekhonyane, Phumla. 2017. Statement by Gauteng Premier David Makhura during the Launch of the Social Cohesion Games. Gauteng Online. February 26. <http://www.gautengonline.gov.za/MediaStatements/Pages/tatement-by-Gauteng-Premier-David-Makhura-during-the-launch-of-the-Social-Cohesion-Games.aspx>.
- Sesanga, Tsholofelo. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Joseph.
- Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2004. People as Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg. *Public Culture* 16 (3): 407–29.
- Siteleki, Mncedisi and Richard Ballard. 2016. Concerns about Drugs and Other Community Problems. *GCRO Map of the Month*, November. Johannesburg: GCRO. http://www.gcro.ac.za/media/reports/Final_-_Nov_Map_of_the_Month__Drugs_and_Alcohol_03.pdf
- Slowikowski, Synthia. 1991. Burning Desire: Nostalgia, Ritual, and the Sport-Festival Flame Ceremony. *Sociology of Sport Journal* 8 (3): 239–57.
- Smith, Terrence. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.
- Sole, Carlota, Sorde, Teresa, Serradell, Olga, Alcalde, Rosalina et al. 2011. Cohesión Social e Inmigración: Aportaciones Científicas y Discursos Políticos. *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 69(1): 8 – 32.
- South African Government. 2006. Civil Union Bill. Presented at the National Assembly. http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/b26-06_0.pdf.



Photograph by Jhono Bennet

Stakeholder (a). 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

Stakeholder (b). 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

Statistics South Africa. 2011. Census 2011. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf>.

———. 2014. General Household Survey 2013. P0318. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182013.pdf>.

———. 2016. Mapping Diversity: An Exploration of Our Social Tapestry. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=7678>.

Steyn, Melissa. 2017. Personal interview for CoJ social cohesion research by Ballard and Joseph.

Struwig, Jare, Benjamin Roberts, Steven Gordon, Yul Derek Davids, Moses Mefika Sithole, Gina Weir-Smith and Tholang Mokhele. 2013. Towards a Social Cohesion Barometer for South Africa. In *State of the Nation South Africa 2012-2013: Addressing Inequality and Poverty*. Pretoria: HSRC Press.

Taylor, Ralph. 1988. *Human Territorial Functioning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thrift, Nigel. 2005. But Malice Aforethought: Cities and the Natural History of Hatred. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30: 133–50.

TMG Digital. 2016. Joburg Makes an Early 'Moov' into Online Education. Times LIVE. August 11. <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2016/08/11/Joburg-makes-an-early-Moov-into-online-education1>.

———. 2017. Complaint Laid with Human Rights Watchdog against Mashaba for Alleged Hate Speech

and Incitement of Violence. Times LIVE. March 5. <http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/03/05/Complaint-laid-with-human-rights-watchdog-against-Mashaba-for-alleged-hate-speech-and-incitement-of-violence>.

Twidle, Hedley. 2012. *City Johannesburg and Beyond: Writing the African Metropolis*. ELL2010S African Literature and Language Studies II. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Umbreit, Mark S., Robert B. Coates and Betty Vos. 2000. *Impact of Restorative Justice Conferencing with Juvenile Offenders: What We Have Learned from Two Decades of Victim Offender Dialogue through Mediation and Conferencing*. Prepared for Balanced and Restorative Justice Project Community Justice Institute, Florida Atlantic University. University of Minnesota: Centre for Restorative Justice & Peacemaking.

UN (United Nations). 2001. Declaration: World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Durban. <http://www.un.org/WCAR/durban.pdf>.

Valji, Nahla. 2003. South Africa: No Justice without Reparation. *Open Democracy*. July 2. http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-africa_democracy/article_1326.jsp.

Von Holdt, Karl, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi, Kindiza Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini and Adele Kirsten. 2011. *The Smoke That Calls. Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa*. Johannesburg: Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation. <http://www.diversityjoy.nl/downloads/files/thesmokethatcalls.pdf>.

Wale, Kim. 2013. *SARB 2003–2013 Over a Decade of Data. Reflecting on Reconciliation: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future*. Cape Town: Institute

for Justice and Reconciliation. <http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IJR-SA-Reconciliation-Barometer-Report-2014.pdf>.

Wray, Chris, David Everatt, Graeme Götz and Darlington Mushongera. 2014. Changing Spatial Inequality across the GCR. *GCRO Map of the Month, July*. Johannesburg: GCRO <http://www.gcro.ac.za/outputs/map-of-the-month/detail/changing-spatial-inequality-across-the-gcr/>.

Wrong, Dennis. 1994. *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides a Society* London: Free Press/Maxwell Macmillan.

www.actingthru.org.za. 2014. About ATU: Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa. Acting Thru Ukubuyiselwa. <http://www.actingthru.org.za/>.

www.adf.org.za. n.d. Many Faces, One Africa: Migrant Rights Are Human Rights. African Diaspora Forum. n.d. http://www.adf.org.za/migrant_rights.php#.

———. 2016. Press Releases | Memorandum to the Mayor. ADF Home Page. December 22. <http://www.adf.org.za/index.php#>.

www.carnivalcompany.co.za. 2016. Carnival Company: *Who We Are*. *Carnival Company* (blog). 2016. <http://carnivalcompany.co.za/about/>.

www.csvr.org.za. n.d. Clinical Intervention. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVr). <http://www.csvr.org.za/programmes/clinical-intervention>.

www.fhr.org.za. 2014. Amarightza: Socio-Economic Justice for All. December 11. http://www.fhr.org.za/latest_news/amarightza/.

www.hsf.org.za. 2013. Project Constitution: Helen Suzman Foundation. <http://hsf.org.za/projects/youth-outreach>.

www.jda.org.za. n.d. Rooftop Garden Plants Seeds of Success. Johannesburg Development Agency. <http://www.jda.org.za/index.php/corporate-social-responsibility/1542-rooftop-garden-plants-seeds-of-success-2>.

www.joburg.org.za. 2010. Targeted Beneficiaries Unit. City of Johannesburg. April 19. https://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5096&Itemid=78.

———. 2014. Jozi@Work Opportunities Open Up. City. December 11. https://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9405:-joziwork-opportunities-open-up&catid=88:news-update&Itemid=266.

———. 2015. Lufhereng Housing Development Gathers Pace. City of Johannesburg. February 12. https://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9500.

www.khulumani.net. 2016. Background: Khulumani Support Group. Khulumani. August 8. <http://www.khulumani.net/khulumani/about-us/item/1-background.html>.

www.migration.org.za. n.d. About MoVE: ACMS. African Centre for Migration and Society. <http://www.migration.org.za/page/about-move/move>.

www.nicsa.org.za. 2016. NICSA Conference on Rebuilding a Values-Based Society. NICSA. November 15. <https://www.nicsa.org.za/media.htm>.

www.redpeg.co.za. n.d. LGBTI Training Programmes." Redpeg. http://www.redpeg.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&Itemid=80.

www.wits.ac.za. n.d. Wits Centre for Diversity Studies: Wits University. University of the Witwatersrand. <https://www.wits.ac.za/wicds/about-us>.



Photograph by Christina Culwick

GAUTENG CITY-REGION OBSERVATORY

6th Floor University Corner
Cnr Jorissen and Jan Smuts
Braamfontein
Johannesburg
Gauteng
South Africa

+27 11 717 7280
info@gcro.ac.za

